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Aquinas on the Passion of Despair

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

Michael R. Miller
Michael R. Miller*
Affiliation:
16300 018 Emmitsburg Road Emmitsburg, MD 21727
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Email: mimiller@msmary.edu
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Abstract

St. Thomas Aquinas argues that all of the passions, including hatred, anger, sorrow and despair, are morally neutral. That is, Thomas Aquinas argues that the manner in which a person responds to a particular passion determines the morality of the passion, and not the passion itself. Hatred, for example, can lead one to a good end, as when one comes to hate his sin. Likewise, Aquinas notes that even the passion of despair is not necessarily evil, since when felt rightly it can move one to some good end. Aquinas, however, fails to recognize that according to his own account despair so stupefies the soul that it cannot lead to any good end. Unlike hope or love, or any of the other passions, despair paralyzes the soul and thus must always be avoided.

Type
Original Articles
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 93 , Issue 1046 , July 2012 , pp. 387 - 396
Copyright
© 2011 The Author. New Blackfriars © 2011 The Dominican Council

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References

1 Some of the relevant articles include: Murphy, Claudia Eisen, “Aquinas on Our Responsibility for Our Emotions” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 8 (1999): 163–205Google Scholar; Floyd, Shawn, “Aquinas on Emotion: A response to Some Recent Interpretations” History of Philosophy Quarterly 15 (1998): 161–175Google Scholar; Kretzmann, Norman, “Aquinas on God's Joy, Love and Liberality” The Modern Schoolman 72 (1995): 125–148CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roberts, Robert, “Thomas Aquinas on the Morality of Emotions” History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (1992): 287–305Google Scholar: and Drost, Mark, “Intentionality in Aquinas's Theory of Emotions” International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991): 449–460CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 ST.I–II. 24.4. All quotations are from the Blackfriars Edition of The Summa Theologica of St. Thomas Aquinas. (New York: McGraw Hill)Google Scholar.

3 See ST.I–II. 23.1 and 2 for more on how Aquinas conceives the order of and relationship between the passions.

4 See ST.I–II. 23.2.

5 See ST.I–II. 46.6.

6 See ST.I–II. 23.3.

7 See ST.I–II. 25.3.

8 ST.I–II. 24.1 and 4.

9 ST.I–II. 24.2.

10 ST.I–II. 24.4.

11 See ST.I–II. 24.3.

12 See ST.I–II. 33.3; 37.1, and 44.4.

13 ST.I–II. 28.5.

14 ST.I–II. 24.3.

15 See ST.II–II. 34.3.

16 ST.I–II. 39.2.

17 See ST.I–II. 37.1.

18 ST.I–II. 39.3.

19 See ST.I–II. 37.1.

20 ST.I–II. 46.1 and making reference to ST.I–II. 25.2.

21 ST.I–II. 44.2 and ST.I–II. 44.4 respectively.

22 See ST.I–II. 47.2.

23 See ST.I–II. 47.3.

24 ST.I–II. 25.3

25 See ST.I–II. 20.3.

26 ST.I–II. 20.3.

27 ST.I–II. 20.3. The Proverb reads: If thou lose hope being weary in the day of distress, thy strength shall be diminished.

28 See ST.1-II.20.4.

29 ST.I–II. 20.4.

30 ST.I–II. 20.1.

31 ST.I–II. 40.8.

32 ST.I–II. 37.2.