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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
For several decades the official teaching office of the Roman Catholic Church has consistently invoked the notion of religious experience as a category for interrelgious dialogue. Moreover, the Church has appealed to the so-called dialogue of religious experience as a means of encouraging its members to constructively engage with persons who are committed to ‘other’ religious traditions. This essay seeks to develop a systematic understanding of religious experience as well as the dialogue associated with it. Subsequent to summarizing the recent magisterial teaching on the dialogue of religious experience, the essay continues by probing the meaning of religious experience as such, particularly with the assistance of the theological insights of Bernard Lonergan and Louis Roy. The essay concludes by acknowledging some of the limitations that persist in connection with the dialogue of religious experience, namely, those that inevitably arise when considering the particularity of the incarnation and the necessity of the Church for salvation.
1 The first World Day of Prayer for Peace was held in Assisi on October 27, 1986, and a sequel was held on January 24, 2002. For a comparative analysis of the meetings of 2011 and 1986 see Michael Barnes, “Symbol and Reality: Repetition with a Difference,” available at http://www.thinkingfaith.org/articles/20111101_1.htm (accessed November 9, 2011).
2 See “Prayer in Preparation of the Meeting in Assisi,” available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/audiences/2011/documents/hf_ben-xvi_aud_20111026_en.html (accessed November 9, 2011).
3 http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2011/october/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20111027_assisi_en.html (accessed November 9, 2011).
4 The other three forms of dialogue, which I will not discuss in this essay are: (i) the dialogue of life, (ii) the dialogue of action, and (iii) the dialogue of theological exchange. Eric J. Sharpe has suggested that this fourfold classification has roots that date as far back as 1967 when Richard W. Taylor proposed the scheme of Socratic, Buberian, Discursive, and Pedagogic Dialogue. Sharpe also notes that he (Sharpe) modified this scheme in 1970 so that the dialogues became labeled as Discursive, Human, Secular, and Interior. See Sharpe, Eric J., ‘Mission Between Dialogue and Proclamation’, in Burrows, William R., ed., Redemption and Dialogue: Reading Redemptoris Missio and Dialogue and Proclamation (New York: Orbis, 1993), pp. 161–72, at p. 170Google Scholar.
5 My understanding of ‘doctrine’ and ‘doctrinal documents’ is based on Lonergan's presentation of doctrines as the sixth functional specialty in Method in Theology. See Lonergan, Bernard, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2003, pp. 293–333Google Scholar. The distinction that Lonergan draws between doctrines and systematics is well summarized by Charles Hefling in ‘Method and Meaning in Dominus Iesus,’ in Pope, Stephen J. and Hefling, Charles, eds., Sic et Non: Encountering Dominus Iesus (New York: Orbis, 2002), pp. 108–110Google Scholar.
6 These claims are based on Bernard Lonergan's distinction between ‘doctrines’ and ‘systematics’ within his theological method that is explicitly structured according to the so-called ‘functional specialization.’ See Lonergan, Bernard, Method in Theology (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2003)Google Scholar.
7 Bulletin, Secretariatus pro Non-Christianis, vol. 56, no. 2 (1984), pp. 126–141.
8 Dialogue and Mission, §35, p. 138.
9 Ibid.
10 See ‘Redemptoris Missio: An Encyclical Letter on the Permanent Validity of the Church's Missionary Mandate’, in William R. Burrows, ed., Redemption and Dialogue: Reading Redemptoris Missio and Dialogue and Proclamation, pp. 1–55. Also available at http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0219/_INDEX.HTM (accessed November 9, 2011).
11 Marcello Zago authored a commentary that does a fine job of reviewing the main points of Redemptoris missio. See Marcello Zago, ‘Commentary on Redemptoris Missio’, in Redemption and Dialogue: Reading Redemptoris Missio and Dialogue and Proclamation, pp. 57–90.
12 Redemptoris missio §2.
13 Ibid., §2. The fact that Redemptoris missio explicitly mentions the need for systematic reflection supports the aforementioned point that the document itself is doctrinal in character, and therefore, more concerned with stating ‘what is so’ than with explaining ‘why it is so.’
14 Ibid.
15 Redemptoris missio §55.
16 Ibid., §56.
17 Ibid., §28. Redemptoris missio makes special reference to the presence and activity of the Spirit through the “seeds of the Word.” This term appeared as semina Verbi in the Decree on the Missionary Activity of the Church, Ad Gentes, see Tanner, Norman P., ed., Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, vol. 2, (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1990), §11Google Scholar.
18 Ibid., §29.
19 Ibid., §29. This claim is based on the conviction that Christ gave his Spirit to the Church in order to guide her into all the truth (Jn 16:13.) The main point is that the universal activity of the Spirit cannot be separated from his particular activity with the Body of the Christ, which is the Church.
20 The act of interpreting for the ‘other’ is one that has come under stringent attack from contemporary (postmodern) philosophers. One such critic is Judith Butler. Butler recognizes that religion continues to function as a “key matrix for the articulation of values” and that most people continue to look to religion to guide their discernment of values (e.g., the respect for the public expression of religious difference such as the wearing of veils in public schools in France). Far from advocating that religion needs to be abolished or overcome, Butler proposes that it be considered as a discursive matrix for subject formation in which values are articulated and disputed. She juxtaposes this view of religion with one that conceives it simply as a set of beliefs or dogmatic views that are imposed on one person(s) by another. On this view of religion, it would seem that the interpretation of ‘spiritual experience’ is properly done in a discursive context in which the experiencing subject's voice is actually heard and taken seriously. See Butler, Judith, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009), p. 122Google Scholar.
21 See ‘Dialogue and Proclamation: Reflections and Orientations on Interreligious Dialogue and the Proclamation of the Gospel of Jesus Christ’, in Redemption and Dialogue: Reading Redemptoris Missio and Dialogue and Proclamation, pp. 93–118. Also available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/interelg/documents/rc_pc_interelg_doc_19051991_dialogue-and-proclamatio_en.html (accessed November 9, 2011). See also Jacque Dupuis’ commentary in Redemption and Dialogue: Reading Redemptoris Missio and Dialogue and Proclamation, pp. 119–58.
22 Dialogue and Proclamation §42.
23 Bernard Lonergan, The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, Michael G. Shields, trans., vol. 7 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2002), p. 165Google Scholar.
24 Lonergan notes that conscious acts, such as seeing and hearing, “differ radically from such unconscious acts as the metabolism of one's cells, the maintenance of one's organs, the multitudinous biological processes that one learns about through the study of the contemporary medical science.” The difference is that conscious acts allow us to become aware of their contents. See Lonergan, Bernard, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, in Crowe, Frederick E. and Doran, Robert M., eds., vol. 3 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1992), p. 345Google Scholar.
25 Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 9. In Insight, the levels of consciousness are limited to the first three. The fourth level of consciousness becomes clearly established in Method in Theology. See also John D. Dadosky, The Structure of Religious Knowing: Encountering the Sacred in Eliade and Lonergan (Albany: State University of New York, 2004), pp. 46–7. The advancement of a fifth-level of consciousness as the experience of being loved unconditionally by God and invited to love God in return, was suggested, but never fully developed by Lonergan. See Bernard Lonergan, ‘Lecture 2: The Functional Specialty “Systematics”’, in Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran, eds., Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965–1980, vol. 17 in Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), pp. 179–98, at p. 193Google Scholar. The advancement of the ‘fifth level’ has been a quaestio disputata among Lonergan scholars. For a survey of this discussion see Jacobs-Vandegeer, Christiaan, ‘Sanctifying Grace in a ‘Methodical Theology,’’ Theological Studies 68 (2007): pp. 52–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 This distinction was made by Jim Kanaris in his book entitled, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion (Albany: State University of New York, 2002), pp. 29–38Google Scholar.
27 Ibid., p. 29.
28 Lonergan, Insight, p. 658.
29 Ibid.
30 The term ‘sublation’ was used by Lonergan to denote that, in the transcendental structure of consciousness, the lower level operations are preserved and complemented (not abolished) by the higher ones. He says, “The sublating set [of operations] introduces operations that are quite new and distinct; it finds among them a new basis and ground; but so far from stunting or interfering with the sublated set, it preserves them integrally, it vastly extends their relevance, and it perfects their performance.” See Lonergan, Bernard, ‘Faith and Beliefs’, in Croken, Robert C. and Doran, Robert M., eds., Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965–1980, vol. 17 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2004), pp. 30–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 36. Though he does not use the word ‘sublation’, the idea is implicitly present in the essay entitled ‘Horizons’, Philosophical and Theological Papers 1965–1980, pp. 21–2. Lonergan attributes his use of the notion ‘sublation’ to Karl Rahner. See Lonergan, ‘Faith and Beliefs’, p. 36, and Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 241.
31 Lonergan, Insight, p. 658.
32 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 103
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Roy, Louis, Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), p. xiCrossRefGoogle Scholar.
36 Ibid., p. 3.
37 Ibid.
38 In Chapter 1, Roy alerts us to the fact that, in his view, transcendent experience differs in significant ways from religious experience, as well as from mystical experience and praeternatural phenomena. Referring to R.C. Zaehner, he describes praeternatural phenomena as “visions, auditions, locutions, telepathy, [or] telekinesis.” See Ibid.
39 Ibid., p. 9.
40 Ibid., pp. 9–10.
41 Ibid., p. 9.
42 Ibid.
43 Roy, p. 5.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., pp. 5–6.
46 Ibid., p. 6.
47 Ibid., pp. 6–7.
48 Ibid., pp. 8–9, 140.
49 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
50 Kanaris, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion, p. 35.
51 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 105.
52 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 5. See also Bernard Lonergan, ‘First Lecture: Religious Experience’, in Frederick E. Crowe, ed., A Third Collection: Papers By Bernard J.F. Lonergan, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), pp. 115–28, at p. 123. Newman described first principles as “the propositions with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter.” Newman, John Henry, An Essay in aid of A Grammar of Assent (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), p. 60Google Scholar.
53 Dadosky, The Structure of Religious Knowing, p. 113. Dadosky's description is reminiscent of Paul Tillich's understanding of faith as ultimate concern. See Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). Lonergan makes explicit reference to Tillich's notion of ultimate concern as an example of what he means by ‘the dynamic state of being in love.’ See Lonergan, Method in Theology, 106.
54 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 105; Lonergan, ‘Religious Experience’, pp. 123–24.
55 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 106.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., pp. 106, 111. The same point is made by Lonergan when he says that being in love with God is the fulfillment of our conscious intentionality. See Ibid, p. 105.
58 Due to the primacy that Lonergan assigns to decision and action, he is able to easily connect religious experience to the notion of commitment, which, on his view, is the defining characteristic of the religious person who decides for herself how she is going to live. We are committed to the extent that we make reasonable decisions and act responsibly. See Lonergan, ‘First Lecture: Religious Experience,’ p. 123.
59 This point is captured well by Christiaan Jacobs-Vandegeer, who stated, “Lonergan did not advise theologians to follow a strict recipe for a contemporary systematics: (1) ignore the midievals, (2) work out theological foundations through solitary advertence to interiority, (3) derive from those foundations the critical metaphysics that theology needs, and then (4) compare it all to the Scholastics to find out how they really fared.” Jacobs-Vandegeer, “Sanctifying Grace in a ‘Methodical Theology,’” p. 55.
60 Bernard J.F. Lonergan, ‘On the Supernatural Order,’ trans. Michael G. Shields (unpublished manuscript, 2001). The original Latin text is available electronically at http://www.bernardlonergan.com/
61 Ibid., p. 12.
62 Jacobs-Vandegeer, ‘Sanctifying Grace in a ‘Methodical Theology,’’ p. 58. Jacobs-Vandegeer does a fine job of clearly summarizing the scholastic notion of sanctifying grace as well as Lonergan's use of it in his early theology of grace, see pp. 57–60.
63 For a most recent study of Lonergan's presentation of habitual grace, especially with respect to how to he sought to develop it in light of his understanding of the conscious dimensions of human nature, which he labeled as “intentionality analysis,” see Wilkens, Jeremy D., ‘Grace and Growth: Aquinas, Lonergan, and The Problematic of Habitual Grace,’ Theological Studies 72 (2011): pp. 723–49CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
64 Roy, Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique, p. 140.
65 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 240.
66 See pp. 7–8. Roy appeals to Karl Rahner's notion of mystery to express the idea of the presence of transcendent reality that is accessible to human experience. See Ibid., pp. 130–32. Lonergan also refers to Rahner when he speaks of religious experience as an experience of mystery. See Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 106.
67 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 241.
68 Roy, Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique, p. 140.
69 Ibid. p. 140.
70 Stebbins, J. Michael, The Divine Initiative: Grace, World-Order, and Human Freedom in the Early Writings of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), p. 127Google Scholar.
71 Maintaining the unity between Christ and the Spirit was one of the chief concerns of Dominus Iesus. For example, the Declaration affirmed that the Spirit that affects all peoples, societies, cultures, and religions is the same “same Spirit who was at work in the incarnation in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus and who is at work in the Church. He is therefore not an alternative to Christ nor does he fill a sort of void which is sometimes suggested as existing between Christ and the Logos.” See Dominus Iesus, in Pope, Stephen J. and Hefling, Charles, eds., Sic et Non: Encountering Dominus Iesus (New York: Orbis, 2002), pp. 3–23Google Scholar. Also available electronically at: http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000806_dominus-\iesus_en.html.
72 I am not suggesting that sacrifice and satisfaction are mutually exclusive or that being in love is primarily a morbid affair in which one must constantly suffer without experiencing joy or pleasure. The point is that when understood in reference to the historical person of Christ, love becomes real in the sense that it co-exists with our earthly experience of suffering.
73 See, for example, Dominus Iesus §16, “Indeed, Jesus Christ continues his presence and his work of salvation in the Church and by means of the Church (cf. Col 1:24–27), which is his body (cf. 1 Cor 12:12–13, 27; Col 1:18). And thus, just as the head and members of a living body, though not identical, are inseparable, so to Christ and the Church can be confused nor separated, and constitute a single ‘whole Christ.’” See also, Dominus Iesus §20, “Above all else, it must be firmly believed that “the Church, a pilgrim now on earth, is necessary for salvation: the one Christ is the mediator and the way of salvation; he is present to us in his body which is the Church.”
74 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 361.
