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How to Think About Hell

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 February 2024

Extract

Hans Urs von Balthasar is correctly perceived within the contemporary Catholic Church as an exponent of an orthodox, even conservative, understanding of the faith. His nomination to the rank of cardinal just before his death is evidence of this, as was his friendship with Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger. Nonetheless, one aspect of his theology, that dealing with the possibility of the salvation of all souls, drew upon him ‘fire from the right.’ He was taken to task by, among others, Gerhard Hermes and Heribert Schauf. In reaction to such criticism, Balthasar wrote a book entitled Was dürfen wir hoffen? (‘What may we hope for?’), recently published in translation by Ignatius Press under the title, Dare we hope ‘That all men be saved’? One of the purposes of this article is to examine this answer by Balthasar to his critics. I believe that certain aspects of his argument are, indeed, inadequate and have been justly criticised. Nonetheless, the major question raised in the book (and, indeed, by the entire controversy) is a legitimate one—and precisely in the sense that Balthasar asks it. A second purpose of the present essay, therefore, is to suggest the parameters within which we might hope ‘that all men be saved.’

My First point is one of agreement with Balthasar. Balthasar rejects those criticisms of his own work that suggest that, in so far as we know that at least some souls are damned to eternal perdition, we may not in any sense hope for the salvation of all souls.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1991 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

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References

1 See. for instance, Hermes, G., ‘In die Hölle leer’, Der Fels 15 (Sept. 1984). pp. 250256Google Scholar and Schauf, H.Die ewige Verwerfung in neuren und älteren kirchlichen Verlautbarungen,’Theologisches 178 (1985), pp. 6253–8Google Scholar. In the United Stales, his speculations were attacked by the editor of the conservative National Catholic Register, although capably defended in the same journal by Fr. Joseph Fessio, S.J.

2 The original German was published by Johannes Verlag (Einsiedeln), in 1986. The Ignatius Press edition (San Francisco, 1988) also contains ‘A short discourse on hell’—a translation of Kleiner Diskurs über die Hölle (Ostfildem: Schwabenverlag AG 1987). Numbers in parentheses within the text of this essay refer to the page numbers of the Ignatius Press translation; in footnotes I will use the abbreviation DWH.

3 Italics in the translation.

4 In what follows I use lack of mercy as representative of the many sins which, according to traditional teaching, cut one off from the possibility of salvation.

5 A number of patristic writers, however, under the influence of Origen, appear to have favoured the notion of universal salvation. Notable among the latter were Clement of Alexandria and Gregory of Nyssa. For the patristic background, see Daley, Brian E., ‘Apokatastasis and “honourable silence” in the eschatology of Maximus Confessor,’ in Heinzer, Felix and Schönbom, (eds.) Maximus Confessor: Actes du Symposium sur Maximus le Confesseur, Fribourg, 2–5 septembre 1980 (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1982), pp.309339Google Scholar, especially pp. 309–15.

6 The beast here is the Antichrist. Augustine resisted the idea that the Antichrist was an historical figure: see De civ. Dei 20.19, also Rauh, H.D., Das Bild des Antichrist im Mittelalter: von Tychonius turn Deutschen Symbolismus (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1979), p.123Google Scholar. Augustine apparently identified him as the devil (Adnotationes in lob, 18). But the Antichrist's prophet is certainly human.

7 ‘Ad expediendum hoc dubium, oportet prius expedire aliud, quod in co involvitur, et ex quo pendet, nimirum si Deus revelet aliquem in particulari esse reprobum …’ Suarez, F., Opera Omnia, ed. C. Berton (Paris: L. Vivès, 1856–78), v. 14, p.57. From now on I will refer to Suarez's writings as ‘Opera.

8 ‘[P]ossumusque exemplum ponere in Antichristo, quern certo scimus esse damnandum, ac proinde reprobum. Nam quod pro tali persona non liceat orare, videtur colligi ex Augustino … et D. Thoma …, dicentibus ideo non posse non alicui negare orationis beneficium, quia non possimus distinguere praedestinatos a reprobis; ergo e converso, si propter specialem revelationem possimus distinguere nunc a praedestinatis, non poterimus orare pro illo’ [Opera v.14, p.57b]. Balthasar, incidentally, unjustly vilifies Suarez in connection with this passage. He paraphrases his answer to the question whether we may pray for all men: ‘Yes, certainly [says Suarez, according to Balthasar], since on earth we cannot distinguish the electi from the reprobati. But what if God should reveal to someone that certain person is damned?’ Balthasar then interjects the parenthetical remark, ‘One would like to ask Suarez whether there has ever been, or ever will be, such a revelation’ (DWH‐37, in note 3 beginning at p.35). Balthasar need not ask Suarez this, since he says quite plainly here that he means the Antichrist of Rev. 20.10. But, as I argue, Suarez is extremely reluctant to push this idea too far.

9 Opera v.14, p.59a.

10 The cited places are (Thomas) S.T. II—II. q.83, a.7, ad 3; (Augustine) De correptione el gratia, 15.

11 With regard to the Antichrist, Suarez writes, ‘si Deus revelet aliquem in particulari esse reprobatum’ [v.14, p.57b]; with regard to ‘Titius’ he says: ‘si per revelationem certo constaret Tilium esse a Deo reprobatum’ [v.14, p.59a).

12 Suarez's disinclination to declare any definite soul to be condemned is demonstrated also in his extreme reluctance to acknowledge that God might make known to a living individual his own future damnation. Such knowledge, he says, would be greatly repugnant to this state of life (‘talis credulitas multum repugnat statui viae’) (Opera, v.14, 60a]. He admits, however, that such knowledge is not absolutely impossible. See also below, note 14.

13 DWH‐35 n.3. Several of these prayers appear only in the German missal. The last is the very loose Roman Missal translation of what appears in the Missale Romanum as part of the third common preface. The pertinent part reads in Latin: ‘Qui per Filium dilectionis tuae, sicut conditor generis es humani, ita benignissimus reformator.’

14 Thomas is insistent that no one is beyond redemption before death: see S.T. II—II q.83 a.7, ad 3. Augustine too is clear on this: see De civ. Dei 21.24 (‘quia de nullo certa est, orat pro omnibus dumtaxat hominibus inimicis suis in hoc corpore constituás …’); De correptione et gratia, 5; Retractiones 1.19.7; Sermons 71.13.21. See also Suarez, Opera, v.14, p.60b (12). At one point Thomas suggests that it might be possible in special circumstances for someone to know by revelation of his own damnation (De Veritate, q.23 a.8, ad 2); but, at I Sent. d.48, q.1, a. 4, ad 2, he emphatically denies that this is possible, citing Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, XII, cc.17 and 18. Suarez discusses this issue at Opera v. 14, p.60a (11) (see above, note 12).

15 Opera, v.14. 60b‐61a. He draws a distinction, though: we are permitted to except souls formally but not materially.

16 DS‐3166. The abbreviation ‘DS’ stands for Denzinger, H. and Schönmetzer, A., Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, 36th ed., (Herder Rome, 1976)Google Scholar. Suarez says that charily ‘ornnes homines amplectitur, et omnium salutem exoptat’ (Opera, v. 14, p.59a; see also p.60b (12)).

17 See also DS‐1540, where it is allowed that by special revelation a person might know his own state of grace. Presumably, this would not be made known to a person who would not profit by it.

18 Note too that Thomas Aquinas says that, if an individual knew of his own damnation, this would cause him to despair [De veritate, q.23, a.8, ad 2]. But see above, note 14.

19 For this notion of post praevisa merita, see Suarez, Opera, v.14, p.58b.

20 He makes similarly strong claims in other places in the book: see DWH‐26, for instance, where he says that for men to be damned is for Hell to be stronger than Christ, or DWH‐27, where he strongly suggests that to conceive of the chosen rejoicing in heaven while others languish in hell is to countenance the unacceptable prospect of the chosen being pleased ‘because they have been relieved of the memory of their friends.’

21 See DWH‐97–113. This notion itself has been anathematised by the Church: see D5–1011 and 1077. For the distinctions within hell, see Thomas Aquinas, III Sent. d.22, q.2 a.2, solutio 2. Surprisingly, Augustine held that Christ descended not to the limbo of the just but to the lowest reaches of hell: De Genesi ad litteram libri XII, 33, 63 (see also De civ. Dei 17.11). Whom did he save from there?‘Whom he willed, ‘he says at Ep. 164.5.14. I argue against this notion below.

22 DS‐443, also 76, 801, 780.

23 S.T. I, q.10, a.3, ad 3; see also IV Sent. 49, q.1, a.2 solutio 3, ad 4.

24 The council was interested in opposing the errors of the Albigensians and Calhars who held that the punishment of hell was not eternal. See DS‐801.

25 Grammar of Assent (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930). p.422Google Scholar. Newman, incidentally, proposes a way of mitigating the objections to the notion of eternal damnation in ‘Note III’ of this volume (pp.501–3). It is, to my mind, a legitimate use of the notion that the eternity of hell might shrink to a ‘disconsolate immovable now’; and I employ it below. I am grateful to Stratford Caldecou for this reference.

26 Of course, in a certain sense evil does not exist—in so far as all God's creation is good. This might, indeed, serve as the seed of an anti‐Manichaean theory of how God can tolerate hell. Such a theory might incorporate the notion that the eternity of hell might shrink to a ‘disconsolate immovable now’. But again, the notion that the hypothetically condemned might be taken out of hell could play no pan in such a theory.

27 See especially, Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, v.1, pp.101–102, 382.

28 See, for instance, Augustine. De civ Dei 21.18; Suarez, Opera, v.14, p.60a.

29 That particular judgment occurs immediately after death was defined by Benedict XII (DS‐1002). This would seem to rule out post mortem conversions.

30 Opera, v.14, 55b.

31 I thank Stratford Caldecou, John Finnis, Germain Grisez, Brian Ferme, Mark O'Toole, Tony Meredith and Philip Clayton, each of whom provided helpful comments on an earlier version of this essay.