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Let's Work This Out: Is Work A Basic Human Good?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
In this paper, I explore the axiological status of work. I engage with a number of prominent natural law theorists who consider it a basic human good and explain why their arguments fail. In the process, I put forward a novel argument against the very possibility of work being considered a basic good. I conclude that whilst work may be very important to us psychologically and instrumentally it should not be considered a basic human good.
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- Copyright © 2019 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
References
1 Oderberg, David, “The Structure and Content of the Good” in Oderberg, David and Chappell, Timothy (ed.) Human Values: New Essays on Ethics and Natural Law, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2008), pp. 128-129Google Scholar.
2 Oderberg, David S., Moral Theory: a non-consequentialist approach (Blackwell Publishers: Oxford, 2000), p. 43Google Scholar.
3 Ibid.
4 This is excluding the instrumental value it has for the worker as a source of money etc.
5 One might challenge whether or not these are basic goods, but let's either grant it for the sake of argument or insert a different example with which we are happy.
6 Arguably perhaps it derives some value from it being (potentially) a just punishment. However, in this case, it is the justice which is valuable not the work itself. Further, whether or not breaking rocks is ever a just punishment is another question and I won't try to answer that here.
7 Gómez-Lobo, Alfonso, Morality and the Human Goods; An Introduction to Natural Law Ethics (Georgetown University Press: Washington D.C., 2002), pp. 17-18Google Scholar.
8 Chappell, Timothy, Understanding Human Goods (Edinburgh University Press: Edinburgh, 1998), Ch. 2CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
9 Murphy, Mark C., Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001), Ch. 3Google Scholar.
10 It might as a form of exercise, or as part of a newly invented (and slightly unusual) competitive sport, or as a way for a miner to hone his pickaxing skills, but if it is entirely for the sake of breaking rocks I am doubtful it would lead to these feelings. I think this becomes still more obvious when we consider that breaking rocks is considered a punishment. If breaking rocks were an inherently worthwhile activity, which made prisoners feel good about themselves, then why do we force prisoners to do it? And why don't we see free citizens choosing the same activity?
11 Gómez-Lobo, Alfonso, Morality and the Human Goods; An Introduction to Natural Law Ethics (Georgetown University Press: Washington D.C., 2002), p. 17Google Scholar.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid, p. 18.
14 Murphy, Mark C., Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001), p. 111Google Scholar.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Macintyre, Alasdair, “A Partial Response to My Critics.” In Horton, John, John, and Susan, Susan (ed.) After Macintrye: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair Macintyre. (University of Notre Dame Press, 1994)Google Scholar.
18 Murphy, Mark C., Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001), p. 112Google Scholar.
19 Murphy, Mark C., Natural Law and Practical Rationality (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2001), p. 113Google Scholar.
20 If we're prepared to grant that knowledge has intrinsic value.