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Reflections about Newman and Wittgenstein on Knowledge, Certainty and Language
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
In breaking out from the analytic paradigm of certainty, St John Henry Newman is credited with keeping channels open for new streams of thought to irrigate philosophy in the century after his. Contemporary commentators sometimes see themes in Newman that anticipate ones taken up by Wittgenstein after him. This paper explores some simple convergences and divergences between Newman's and Wittgenstein's tendency of thought. It draws mainly on Newman's philosophical writings, in such as the Oxford University Sermons and the Grammar of Assent, and from Wittgenstein's mid to later writings, from such works as The Blue Book, Philosophical Investigations and, of course, On Certainty. It argues that Newman's attention to speech as distinct from the rest of what might be called language is critical. This paper eventually challenges the assumption that Wittgenstein has provided the last word on approaches to knowledge such as Locke's. Instead, it proposes that within Newman there is already a more powerful critique, one that would cast Wittgenstein as the last protesting exemplar of an approach he is thought to have dismantled.
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- Copyright © 2020 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
References
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48 Words in and of our natural discursive contexts in contrast to words from revelation which come into our understanding but are from a transcendent source.
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