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A Universe Devoid of Sentient Beings?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2024
Abstract
In his published Gifford Lectures, Professor Michael Dummett asks ‘what would it be for there to be a universe devoid of sentient beings? What would be the difference between God's creating a material universe, in the whole of which there never was any creature able to experience it [‘a unidead’, in Moonan's shorthand], and His creating nothing at all? … What difference would its existing make?’ He answers: ‘there would surely be no difference…’ and ‘unless there are sentient and rational observers, it would not be possible for either observation or inference to occur’. (Thought and Reality, 97.)
Some theists might find this a disconcerting restriction on divine power; and if in addition realist, might put it down to a refusal of realism for the range of language in question. In this article, however, I presuppose a coherent realism for the range, and argue that Dummett's contentions can hold for realisms too, and ought not to disconcert serious theists. What is crucial is not (just) whether you are prepared to understand your assertions in an ‘anti-realist’ rather than a realist manner, but whether or not you are prepared to use ‘God’ to stand for something not finite in any way, if there is any, and for nothing else in extra-mental reality. Dummett's Giffords are metaphysically serious: where it would matter if there were no God.
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- Copyright © The author 2008. Journal compilation © The Dominican Council/Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
References
1 Dummett, M., Thought and Reality, Oxford [2006]CrossRefGoogle Scholar, xi + 111pp.
2 Aristotle, , Metaphysics XI,1, 1060a25, tr. Oxford rev. Barnes, J., Princeton 1984Google Scholar, 2 vols.
3 In particular, realism for ranges of assertions mentioning ‘God’, where ‘God’ is to stand for something strictly infinite, in no way finite, if there is any; and for nothing else in extra-mental reality.
4 Dummett, M., The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge, Mass. 1991Google Scholar, xiii + 355 pp., 349–50.
5 Ibn Sina: Abu ‘Ali al-Husayn b. ‘Abd Allah b. Sina (AH 370-428/ AD 980-1037).
6 This is sometimes called a thing's ‘conceived quiddity’: ‘a representation in the intelligence, where it has intentional existence (esse rationis) (thus P.Hoenen, Reality and Judgment … 1952,45).
7 Aquinas, Quodlibet 8, qu.1,art.1, Utrum senarius numerus, secundum quem omnes creaturae dicuntur esse perfectae, sit creator, vel creatura, ed. Busa, Opera … 3, 482–83.
8 Determinate in at least some respect; not necessarily in all respects.
9 This approach is sometimes called attributionist; as against, in particular, either the more plainly dualist approaches, or those embodied in what Ayer used to call the Australasian Creed of central states materialism. For a helpful guide through the older “isms” in the matter, and through many of the main related issues still in need of resolution, see Armstrong, D.M., A Materialist Theory of the Mind, London [1968], xiiGoogle Scholar + 372 pp., 5–14, 37–48.
10 Summa theologiae, 1/13/2c ad fin. Cf. L.Moonan, Divine Power … 1994, 239–45. A way of doing this is shown in chs 5 and 6 of Infinite God: The central issues addressed by existence-theism, forthcoming.