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Casassas, David and De Wispelaere, Jurgen 2016. Republicanism and the political economy of democracy. European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 19, Issue. 2, p. 283.
Flavin, Patrick and Franko, William W. 2016. Government's Unequal Attentiveness to Citizens' Political Priorities. Policy Studies Journal,
Franko, William W. Kelly, Nathan J. and Witko, Christopher 2016. Class Bias in Voter Turnout, Representation, and Income Inequality. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 14, Issue. 02, p. 351.
Keohane, Nannerl O. 2016. A Discussion of Suzanne Mettler’s Degrees of Inequality: How the Politics of Higher Education Sabotaged the American Dream. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 14, Issue. 02, p. 496.
Kulesza, Christopher Witko, Christopher and Waltenburg, Eric 2016. Reform Interrupted? State Innovation, Court Decisions, and the Past and Future of Campaign Finance Reform in the States. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy, Vol. 15, Issue. 2, p. 143.
Lesschaeve, Christophe 2016. Finding inequality in an unlikely place: Differences in policy congruence between social groups in Belgium. Acta Politica,
Witko, Christopher 2016. Regulation and Upper Class Bias in Campaign Finance Systems. Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy,
Dubrow, Joshua Kjerulf 2015. Political Inequality is International, Interdisciplinary, and Intersectional. Sociology Compass, Vol. 9, Issue. 6, p. 477.
Enns, Peter K. 2015. Relative Policy Support and Coincidental Representation. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 13, Issue. 04, p. 1053.
Erikson, Robert S. 2015. Income Inequality and Policy Responsiveness. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 18, Issue. 1, p. 11.
Flavin, Patrick 2015. Campaign Finance Laws, Policy Outcomes, and Political Equality in the American States. Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 68, Issue. 1, p. 77.
Gonzalez, George A. 2015. Is Obama's 2014 Greenhouse Gas Reduction Plan Symbolic? The Creation of the US EPA and a Reliance on the States. Capitalism Nature Socialism, Vol. 26, Issue. 2, p. 92.
Schlozman, Kay Lehman Jones, Philip Edward You, Hye Young Burch, Traci Verba, Sidney and Brady, Henry E. 2015. Organizations and the Democratic Representation of Interests: What Does It Mean When Those Organizations Have No Members?. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 13, Issue. 04, p. 1017.
Swalwell, Katy 2015. Mind the civic empowerment gap: Economically elite students and critical civic education. Curriculum Inquiry, Vol. 45, Issue. 5, p. 491.
Gilens, Martin and Page, Benjamin I. 2014. Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 12, Issue. 03, p. 564.
Grant, John 2014. The End of Critique? Ideology as Replication in Adorno and Jameson. Culture, Theory and Critique, Vol. 55, Issue. 1, p. 1.
Hayes, Thomas J. 2014. Do Citizens Link Attitudes with Preferences? Economic Inequality and Government Spending in the “New Gilded Age”. Social Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, Issue. 2, p. 468.
Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander 2014. Who Passes Business’s “Model Bills”? Policy Capacity and Corporate Influence in U.S. State Politics. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 12, Issue. 03, p. 582.
Miles, Matthew R. 2014. Process over outcome: How perceptions of procedural fairness influence conservative support for redistributive taxes. The Social Science Journal, Vol. 51, Issue. 4, p. 615.
Schram, Sanford F. 2014. The Great Disconnect: Occupy and Political Science. Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 12, Issue. 02, p. 455.
We explore the possibility that the US political system can usefully be characterized as oligarchic. Using a material-based definition drawn from Aristotle, we argue that oligarchy is not inconsistent with democracy; that oligarchs need not occupy formal office or conspire together or even engage extensively in politics in order to prevail; that great wealth can provide both the resources and the motivation to exert potent political influence. Data on the US distributions of income and wealth are used to construct several Material Power Indices, which suggest that the wealthiest Americans may exert vastly greater political influence than average citizens and that a very small group of the wealthiest (perhaps the top tenth of 1 percent) may have sufficient power to dominate policy in certain key areas. A brief review of the literature suggests possible mechanisms by which such influence could occur, through lobbying, the electoral process, opinion shaping, and the US Constitution itself.
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