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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2020
The question of the dignity of man and his place in the universe was much discussed in the Renaissance. With an inflated idea of their departure from medieval tradition, the thinkers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries tried hard to arrive at a new, “humanistic,” evaluation of man. We know now, of course, that their departure was not as sharp as they thought and that certain traditional arguments persisted in one form or another. Herschel Baker, in his study, The Dignity of Man, published in 1947, showed the persistence of some themes and the introduction of others, especially in the Neoplatonic and Protestant thinkers. It is the purpose of this article to examine the way in which the question was handled by Montaigne, who was up to date in his readings on the subject and who had the advantage of coming at the end of the Continental Renaissance; to determine the extent of his departure from tradition, the paths which he followed in his thinking, and the degree of independence which he exercised. Since man is the central subject of the Essais, Montaigne's opinions are likely to be well thought out and carefully formulated. The material presented here can hardly be new; it is the sweep and originality of Montaigne's views that need to be pointed out.'
Note 1 in page 43 Rabelais' Bk. ii, Ch. viii is fairly typical. See, for many other examples, Ferguson, “Humanist Views of the Renaissance,” AER, xlv (1939–40), 1–28; Weisinger, “The Self-Awareness of the Renaissance,” Papers of Mich. Acad. of Sci., Arts, and Letters, xxix (1944), 561–567; and F. Simone, “La Coscienza della Rinascita negli Umanisti,” Rinascita, ii (1939), 838–871.
Note 2 in page 43 References to Montaigne's essays are to the Bibliothèque de la Pléiade edition (Paris, 1950). “A” indicates that a passage was written prior to 1580, “B” 1580–88 (but almost all the “B” passages date from 1586–88), “C” 1588–92.
Note 3 in page 44 See the opening sentences of Bk. ii, Ch. xxix of the Essays, with this important addition made by Montaigne at the end of his career: “Sauf l'ordre, la moderation et la constance, j'estime que toutes choses sont faisables par un homme bien manqué et deffaillant en gros.”
Note 4 in page 43 The Nature and Destiny of Man, 2 vols. (New York and London, 1941–42), i, 15.
Note 5 in page 43 “Let us, lest we speak more of other things than of ourselves, take care that, while we scrutinize the heights, we do not live too basely, in a manner unworthy of beings to whom has been given the divine power of inquiring into things divine. We ought, then, to consider assiduously that our mind, with its divine privileges, cannot have a mortal origin nor can find happiness otherwise than in the possession of things divine, and that the more it elevates and inflames itself with the contemplation of the Divine by renouncing earthly preoccupations while yet a traveller on this pilgrimage here below, the more it will approach felicity. The best precept, then, which this discussion can give us, seems to be that, if we wish to be happy, we ought to imitate the most happy and blessed of all beings, God, by establishing in ourselves unity, truth, and goodness” (De Ente et Uno, trans. V. M. Hamm, Milwaukee, 1943, Ch. x, p. 33). 45
Note 6 in page 43 See Vives' Fabula de homine, in Opera Omnia, rv (trans. Nancy Lenkeith in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. Cassirer et al.). On the Paduan philosophers in this connection, see Randall's introduction to Pomponazzi, esp. p. 266.
Note 7 in page 43 Trans. E. L. Forbes, in Cassirer et al., p. 225.
Note 8 in page 46 Ibid., p. 304.
Note 9 in page 46 An excellent demonstration of the intermingling of these 3 themes in the Middle Ages appears in the course of Garin's article, “La ‘Dignitas Hominis’ e la letteratura patristica,” Rinascita, I (1938), 102–146.
Note 10 in page 46 “Cette seule fin d'une autre vie heureusement immortelle, mérite loyalement que nous abandonnons les commoditez et douceurs de cette vie nostre. Et qui peut embraser son âme de l'ardeur de cette vive foy et espérance, réellement et constamment, il se bastit en la solitude une vie voluptueuse et délicate au delà de toute autre forme de vie … Les gens plus sages peuvent se forger un repos tout spirituel, ayant l'âme forte et vigoureuse. Moy qui l'ay commune, il faut que j'ayde à me soutenir par les commoditez corporelles …” (i, xxxix, 283, C).
Note 11 in page 46 Montaigne seems to accept Catholic theology in the matter of free will (see ii, xxix, 794, A), but it never became an integral part of his thinking.
Note 12 in page 47 Bk. ii, Chs. i and ii are fair examples.
Note 13 in page 47 D. M. Frame points out, with good evidence, that by the time he translated Sebond (1569), Montaigne already had serious reservations about this author (“Did Montaigne Betray Sebond?” R.R., xxxviii (1947), 297–329).
Note 14 in page 47 He speaks of “froisser et fouler aux pieds l'orgueil et humaine fierté; leur faire sentir l'inanité, la vanité et deneantise de l'homme; leur arracher des points les chetives armes de leur raison; leur faire baisser la teste et mordre la terre soubs l'authorité et reverance de Ia majesté divine” (ii, xii, 493, A). His many references to “cette miserable et chetive creature” are too well known to require repetition.
Note 15 in page 48 Trans. The Essays of Michel de Montaigne, 3 vols. (New York, 1934–36), ii, 503.
Note 16 in page 48 Bk, ii, Ch. xi (probably written about 1578) is illustrative of Montaigne's transition period. He still expresses his old, Stoic, view of virtue, but his preference is clearly for the conception typical of his later years. See especially his discussion of Socrates.
Note 17 in page 49 In a late passage, devoid of his frequent modesty, Montaigne speaks of “cette nouvelle leçon, que le prix et hauteur de la vraye vertu est en la facilité, utilité et plaisir de son exercice …” (i, xxvi, 196, C).
Note 18 in page 50 “Ficino and Pomponazzi on the Place of Man in the Universe,” JEI, v (1944), 220–242.
Note 19 in page 52 For his attack on anthropocentric religion and on the idea of an anthropomorphic God, see the sections of the Apologie at pp. 585, 596, et passim.
Note 20 in page 52 Villey thought that Montaigne was refuting Pliny particularly {Hist. Nat., VII, opening sentences) when he said in this same passage: “la licence de leurs opinions les esleve tantost au dessus des nues, et puis les ravale aux antipodes.” The statement is general enough so that Montaigne could have had neither Pliny nor any other particular writer in mind. (Cf. Porteau's ed. of the Apologie, Paris, 1937,1. 794 n.) As for creatures “above” men, Montaigne's ridicule appears in ii, xii, 596–598, A, B.
Note 21 in page 53 See also m, x, 1131, B. A counterpart in his social-political views is the idea that each nation has a form of government which specially suits its background. This may be determined on the basis of past experience: “l'excellente et meilleure police est à chacune nation celle soubs laquelle elle s'est maintenue” (iii, ix, 1071, B). Reforms and improvements must be worked out within that framework.
Note 22 in page 53 See Zeitlin's translation, iii, 421, and Neal Dow, The Concept and Term “Nature” in Montaigne's Essays (Philadelphia, 1940).
Note 23 in page 54 For the best discussion of the relationship between reason and nature, see Zeitlin's notes to his translation of iii, xiii, 420–436.
