We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2020
Burckhardt has remarked that during the Renaissance culture and enlightenment were almost powerless against astrology, kept alive as it was by the ardent imagination of the people, and their passionate wish to penetrate the future. But what he calls the “delusion” of astral influence charmed even the cultured and enlightened, and for rather more complex reasons than he suggests. The modern scholar, in analyzing Renaissance trends, tends to denounce the mind that surrenders to such influences in a rationalist atmosphere. A belief in the occult powers of the stars over Man did not, however, necessarily betray intellectual backwardness, nor was disbelief a proof of great enlightenment. Astrology, though often tolerated by princes of the Church, generally incurred the censure of theologians, and such a fatalistic belief, denying free will and granting powers of revelation to stars named for pagan dieties, appeared to the clerical mind as an incitement to idolatry. In many cases, then, the opponents of the art were conformists, not rebels—nor were they immune to superstition. Even so formidable an enemy of the stars as Pico della Mirandola toyed with magic and the cabala, and often directed his attack at science in general. On the other hand, such a champion of astrology as Mellin de Saint-Gelays argued that Man should remain unhindered in his desire to fathom the mysterious forces of the universe. If man remains earthbound, never lifting eyes or mind heavenward, wrote Mellin, he will sink to a level beneath all earthly creatures instead of becoming their master. For the French poet, prediction by the stars is not the chief purpose of the true astrologer, but a mere accessory of his earthly and heavenly researches. Such a defense of astrology as this stems from a reluctance to forbid any phase of Man's activity in the search for truth, an attitude which, though uncritical, remains consistent with the rationalistic spirit.
1 Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien (Leipzig, 1877–78), ii, 358.
2 Cf. Mellin, Advertissement sur les jugemens d'astrologie (Lyon, 1546), in Œuvres, ed. Blanchemain (Paris, 1873), pp. 270–271; L. Thorndike, History of Magic and Experimental Science (New York, 1929–41), v, 4 ff.; and D. C. Allen's excellent treatment of Pico in The Star-Crossed Renaissance (Duke Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 19–37.
3 SP, xxxi (1938), 224–235.
4 Œuvres de Rabelais, ed. A. Lefranc, et al. (Paris, 1913–32), iii, Introduction, xlv; A. Tilley, The French Renaissance (Phila., 1907), pp. 347–348; L. Sainéan, La Langue de Rabelais (Paris, 1922), i, 314; J. Plattard, Montaigne (Paris, 1933), p. 85; F. Strowski, Montaigne (Paris, 1906), p. 122; P. Villey, Les Sources et l‘évolution des Essais de Montaigne (Paris, 1908), i, 173; G. Lote, La Vie et l‘Œuvre de Rabelais (Paris, 1938), pp. 178 ff.
5 Cf. Montaigne's remark about Epimenides, infra, p. 537.
6 Œuvres, ed. Plattard (Les Belles Lettres, 1929), iv, 60–61.
7 Cf. Allen, pp. 212–214, for an interesting discussion of the mock almanac.
8 Œuvres, v, 208. Plattard omits the words “de celle” in the last line.
9 Œuvres, ed. Lefranc, ii, 87; 235.
10 Œuvres, ed. Plattard, iv, 112.
11 The reference, in the title of the chapter, to Guillaume du Bellay, Rabelais' revered patron, proves the passage is serious. Plattard has noted, “C‘était alors une croyance commune. A la fin du siècle le grave historien de Thou ne manque jamais de mentionner ce genre de présages”, but A. F. Chappell (The Enigma of Rabelais [Cambridge, 1924], pp. 132–133), sees here an indication of Rabelais’ hatred of superstition, and asserts that by avoiding a gloomy interpretation of the comet's appearance, Rabelais shows “he entirely lacked sympathy with that contemporary speculation which represented these sights as proof of God's displeasure.” This is forcing Rabelais to a ready-made mold. The question is not what Rabelais said the comets foretold, but whether or not he believed they were portents of Man's fate.
12 Lote, op. cit., p. 184.
13 Cf. Rabelais' list of ridiculous remedies for seasickness, “ce que les folz medecins ordonnent à ceux qui montent sus mer”, Œuvres, ed. Plattard, iv, 30.
14 Essais, ed. Plattard (Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1931), ii, xii, 301.
15 See ibid., ii, xvii, 51; i, xxvi, 28.
16 Ibid., i, xxxii, 107, and i, xxvi, 25.
17 Rabelais tells how Gaster invented both medicine and astrology, “avec les mathematiques necessaires, pour grain en saulveté par plusieurs siecles guarder et mectre hors les calamitez de l'air, deguast des bestes brutes, larrecin des brigands”—Œuvres, ed. Plattard, iv, 220. Lote (p. 186), writes that by placing medicine and astrology on the same basis, Rabelais accords the latter “un très grand éloge.” But this is to ignore the fact that astrology was almost invariably an accessory of medicine.
18 Essais, iii, ix, 30; ii, xvii, 81; i, xi, 55.
19 “Il se faut garder de s'atacher aux opinions vulgaires, et les faut juger par la voye de la raison, non par la voix commune” (i, xxxi, 88).
20 Montaigne probably refers here to Jean Bodin, who declared in his Démonomanie des sorciers (1580) that it was as impious to deny sorcery as to deny the existence of God.
21 Norton, Studies in Montaigne (New York, 1904), pp. 14–15, and J. Zeitlin, The Essays of Montaigne (New York, 1936), p. 306.
22 (Lyon: J. de Tournes, 1556), p. 51.
23 Cf. John C. Lapp, “The Identity of Pontus de Tyard's ‘Curieux,‘ ” MLN, lxi (1947), 468–471.
24 Mantice, ou Discours de la verité de divination par astrologie (Lyon: J. de Tournes, 1558), pp. 4 ff. An able summary of the main arguments in Mantice is given by D. C. Allen, op. cit. pp. 78–81. Allen, however, erroneously states that Pontus de Tyard “obviously inclines to the side of Mantice.” He also attributes a statement of Pontus to Mantice (p. 81).
25 Cf. Essais, i, xi, 55: “Je ne les estime de rien mieux, pour les voir tomber en quelque rencontre.”
26 Cf. Cicero, De Divinatione, ii, 44. Ptolemy, however, claimed for general catastrophes precedence over individual destinies, Cf. T. O. Wedel, The Medieval Attitude Toward Astrology (Yale Univ. Press, 1920), p. 13. Viothanates: those who meet violent death.
27 Pontus comments here that public esteem for such authors was partly due to their impressive Latin: “Cestui, qui pour le respect de son stile, se sentant encores de la Latine antique naiveté, est leu et receu entre nos bons autheurs.” Cf. Essais, ii, xvii, 212 (ed. Motheau et Jouaust) : “le latin me pipe, par la faveur de sa dignité, au dela de ce qui luy appartient.”
28 Discours philosophiques (Paris: L'Angelier, 1587), p. 153a.
29 Mantice, p. 75. Cf. Essais, i, xi, 56.
30 Ibid., p. 89. Cf. Pontus' reference to the Indian custom, this quotation, and Montaigne's remarks, supra, p. 538. Resemblances between Pontus and Montaigne are fairly frequent. Villey (op. cit., I, 223) notes a possible borrowing by Montaigne from L'Univers, but such similarities are probably due to common sources.
31 Cf. Thorndike, op. cit., vi, 86 ff.
32 L'Univers (Paris: Patisson, 1578), p. 49a.
33 Ibid., p. 51a. This is the theory of “feintise”, held by members of the Pléiade. Cf. R. J. Clements, Critical Theory and Practice of the Pléiade (Harvard Univ. Press, 1942), pp. 4ff.
34 Cf. Pensées diverses sur la comète, ed. A. Prat (Paris, 1911), i, 27 ff. Bayle comes to essentially the same conclusions as Pontus with regard to the poets' and historians' treatment of comets.
35 “Pontus de Tyard and the Science of His Age”, RR, xxxviii (1947), 17–23.
