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Modeling Preferences Using Roll Call Votes in Parliamentary Systems

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2017

Thomas Bräuninger
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and MZES, University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany
Jochen Müller
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science and Communication Studies, University of Greifswald, Baderstr. 6/7, 17489 Greifswald, Germany, e-mail: Jochen.Mueller@uni-greifswald.de
Christian Stecker
Affiliation:
Mannheim Center for European Social Research (MZES), University of Mannheim, 68131 Mannheim, Germany, e-mail: Christian.Stecker@mzes.uni-mannheim.de

Abstract

Models of ideal point estimation usually build on the assumption of spatial preferences. This ignores legislators' non-policy incentives and is thus likely to produce implausible results for many legislatures. We study this problem in parliamentary systems and develop a model of roll call voting that considers both the policy and the non-policy, tactical incentives of legislators. We go on to show how the relative weight of these policy and tactical incentives is influenced by the identity of the mover and characteristics of the motion. Analyses of two data sets of 2174 roll call votes in German state legislatures and 3295 roll call votes in the British House of Commons result in three main findings. First, we show that tactical incentives may be more important than policy incentives, and second, that the importance of tactical incentives varies with the importance of motions. Third, there are interesting twists: backbench private members' bills may reverse tactical incentives whereas proposals from anti-system parties are virtually always rejected by moderate parties, rendering these votes uninformative. Our findings have implications for ideal point estimation in parliamentary systems, as well as for research on separation of power systems.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Author 2016. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Political Methodology 

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Footnotes

Authors' note: Earlier versions of this article were presented at the 2013 annual meeting of the MPSA and the 2014 conference of the EPSA. We would like to thank our panelists, Nicholas Allen, Daina Chiba, Christopher Claassen, Michael Peress, and two anonymous referees for their comments and suggestions. We also thank Masha Haghighat- Kashani and Sebastian Juhl for research assistance. Replication materials are available online as Bräuninger, Müller, and Stecker (2016). Supplementary materials for this article are available on the Political Analysis Web site.

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