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Learning about Learning: A Response to Wand

  • Kenneth A. Schultz (a1) and Jeffrey B. Lewis (a2)
Extract

We welcome the opportunity to respond to Wand's careful and detailed analysis of our paper (Lewis and Schultz 2003). With the discipline's increasing inclination to move toward fully structural strategic choice models (e.g., Signorino 1999; Morton 1999), the issues that Wand raises are important to consider, as they bear on crucial questions of model construction and interpretation. Moreover, his work has allowed us to consider more carefully the properties of an estimator that we are in the process of applying to actual data.

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de Mesquita, Bueno Bruce, and Lalman, David. 1992. War and Reason: Domestic and International Imperatives. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fearon, James D. 1995. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 (Summer): 379414.
Fearon, James D. 1997. “Sunk Costs versus Tying Hands.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 6890.
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. “Limitations to the Direct Testing of Extensive Form Crisis Bargaining Games.” Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Schultz, Kenneth A. 2003. “Revealing Preferences: Empirical Estimation of a Crisis Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information.” Political Analysis 11 (Fall): 345367.
Lewis, Jeffrey B., and Schultz, Kenneth A. 2005. “Estimating State Preferences in International Crises.” Unpublished manuscript, Stanford University.
Morton, Rebecca B. 1999. Methods and Models. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Morrow, James D. 1989. “Capabilities, Uncertainty, and Resolve: A Limited Information Model of Crisis Bargaining.” American Journal of Political Science 33 (November): 941972.
Signorino, Curtis S. 1999. “Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict.” American Political Science Review 93 (June): 279298.
Wand, Jonathan. 2005. “Comparing Models of Strategic Choice: The role of uncertainty and signaling.” Political Analysis doi:10.1093/pan/mpi017.
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Political Analysis
  • ISSN: 1047-1987
  • EISSN: 1476-4989
  • URL: /core/journals/political-analysis
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