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The lure of the private sector: career prospects affect selection out of Congress

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 April 2021

Benjamin C. K. Egerod Open the ORCID record for Benjamin C. K. Egerod [Opens in a new window]
Benjamin C. K. Egerod*
Affiliation:
Department of International Economics, Government and Business, Copenhagen Business School, Porcelænshaven 24A, DK-2000, Frederiksberg, Denmark
*
*Corresponding author. Email: bcke.egb@cbs.dk
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Abstract

Does the potential for a successful private sector career induce legislators to leave office? How does this affect the representation voters receive? I show that when former US senators—who now work as lobbyists—become more successful, currently serving senators with similar characteristics are more likely to take private sector employment. I replicate all results on data from the House. A number of tests suggest that senators react to the opportunity costs of holding office. Investigating selection effects, I find that legislative specialists are attracted the most in the Senate. Preliminary evidence suggests that the least wealthy respond most strongly in the House. This suggests that the revolving door shapes the skill set of legislators and the representation voters receive.

Keywords

(Adverse) political selectionrevolving door politicsthe post-elective labor market for politiciansUS Congress
Type
Original Article
Information
Political Science Research and Methods , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , October 2022 , pp. 722 - 738
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the European Political Science Association

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