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Observation: An Empirical Discussion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 31 January 2023
Extract
Of the many controversial claims in Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions perhaps none are more troublesome than those made in his account of the role of a paradigm in perception. For if we take it that “a paradigm is prerequisite to perception itself (Kuhn 1970, p. 113) and that “two groups of scientists see different things when they look from the same point in the same direction” (Kuhn 1970, p. 150) then we seem to be burdened with all the familiar problems about whether, and how, experimental evidence could possibly serve to promote the acceptance of a paradigm. And, indeed, these problems have been amply discussed in the last several decades. Dudley Shapere, for instance, has questioned Kuhn’s account of how science comes to move between incommensurable paradigms. (Shapere 1964) Still, Kuhn’s discussion of perception has an empirical foundation in psychological research which gives it a certain resilience in the face of surface problems with the consequences of his account.
- Type
- Part VI. Special Sciences
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1990
Footnotes
1
I would like to thank Ron McClamrock and William Wimsatt for their helpful discussion of an earlier treatment of this material.
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