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The Cognitive-Miser Response Model: Testing for Intuitive and Deliberate Reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2025

Ulf Böckenholt
Ulf Böckenholt*
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
*
Requests for reprints should be sent to Ulf Böckenholt, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208, USA. E-mail: u-bockenholt@kellogg.northwestern.edu
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Abstract

In a number of psychological studies, answers to reasoning vignettes have been shown to result from both intuitive and deliberate response processes. This paper utilizes a psychometric model to separate these two response tendencies. An experimental application shows that the proposed model facilitates the analysis of dual-process item responses and the assessment of individual-difference factors, as well as conditions that favor one response tendency over another one.

Keywords

local item dependenciesmultiple-choice itemsnominal response modelmarginal maximum likelihood estimation

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Psychometrika , Volume 77 , Issue 2 , April 2012 , pp. 388 - 399
Copyright
Copyright © 2012 The Psychometric Society

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