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#Blockade: Social Media and the Gulf Diplomatic Crisis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2019

Jocelyn Sage Mitchell
Jocelyn Sage Mitchell*
Affiliation:
Northwestern University in Qatar
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Abstract

The online public sphere, and the ways in which its digital media platforms influence discourse, is a crucial but understudied area of research in the six Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf. Through a case study of the ongoing Gulf diplomatic crisis, which began in June 2017, this essay draws on the disciplines of political science, communication, and digital media studies to analyze qualitative examples of digital discourse: the role of women, territorial boundaries, and the FIFA World Cup 2022. Linking these flash points to historical struggles between the countries, this essay suggests that the politicization of the online public sphere in the region does not represent a fundamental change in the diplomacy of the region but rather a new battleground for old regional rivalries.

Keywords

Social MediaOnline Public SphereGulfPatriarchySovereigntyLegitimacyWorld Cup
Type
Special Focus: The Online Public Sphere in the Gulf
Information
Review of Middle East Studies , Volume 53 , Issue 2 , December 2019 , pp. 200 - 220
Copyright
Copyright © Middle East Studies Association of North America, Inc. 2019

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Footnotes

1

Mitchell is an assistant professor in residence at Northwestern University in Qatar. Support for this research was provided by a grant (UREP 22-067-5-021) from the Qatar National Research Fund (a member of Qatar Foundation). The author thanks co-investigators Banu Akdenizli and Ibrahim Abusharif and research assistants Nada Qaddourah, Ömer Alaoui, and Lulwa Al-Khori for their insights. The author also thanks Sean Foley, Sahar Khamis, and Jessie Moritz for their comments on a draft of this essay, presented at the 2018 Middle East Studies Association in a panel entitled “The Online Public Sphere in the Gulf: Disagreement, Dialogue, Creativity, and Change,” Natalie Koch for her feedback, the peer reviewers for suggestions, and the editorial team at Review of Middle East Studies for their support.

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