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Cultural Racism and Ethnic Cleansing: The Islamic Republic of Iran and Minority Rights

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 July 2023

Said Shams*
Affiliation:
Sociology, Soran University, Soran, Iraq

Abstract

The phenomenon of “political Islam” has been explored in several social theories. These accounts have mainly concentrated on the forms of violence that Islamists have instigated, but the racist drive that is often embedded within political Islam has remined overlooked and unexplored, that is, at least until recently when the brutal crimes by ISIS against Yazidis and Christians in northern Iraq were widely documented and broadcasted. Even so, this tendency has only been attributed to ISIS and extreme Jihadi groups, while states infused with Islamist ideology have remained relatively untouched by such critical analyses.

This article argues that most extant theoretical frameworks on political Islam do not adequately explain the often-latent racist trend in Islamist political ideology. By building off of Foucault's theory of biopolitics and genealogy of racism, it takes the Islamic Republic of Iran's policy against the Kurds as a case study to demonstrate how power shifts in favor of Islamist factions in early-1980s Iran legitimized a racist policy toward minorities in general and the Kurds in particular.

Type
Special Focus: Revisiting Legacies of Anfal and Reconsidering Genocide in the Middle East Today: Collective Memory, Victimhood, Resilience and Enduring Trauma
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of Middle East Studies Association

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References

1 Qarna (Persian: قارنا, also Romanized as Qārnā; also known as Karna and Qārneh) is a village in Beygom Qaleh Rural District, in the Central District of Naqadeh County, West Azerbaijan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was estimated at 813, including 128 families.

2 Qalatan is a village situated between Naqadeh and Oshnavieh cities.

3 Inderqash is a village situated around the city of Mahabad. At the 2006 census, its population was tallied at 2911, with 578 families.

4 Sari Qomish-e Qeshlaq is a village in Feyzolah Beygi Rural District, in the Central District of Bokan County, West Azerbaijan Province, Iran. At the 2006 census, its population was 463, with 77 families.

5 There was a wide range of reports about these atrocities. For example, Ittelahat published an investigative report titled “The Massacres of Qarna People,” Ittelahat, Mordad 25, 1358.

6 Asnad ve Didgaha (Documents and Viewpoints, Since the Establishment of the Tudeh Party of Iran Until the February Revolution of 1979), (Tehran: Tudeh Publishing Centre, 1982), 940–80.

7 See, for example, Gellner, Ernest, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1982)Google Scholar.

8 Zubaida, Sami, Islam, the People and State: Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993), xviGoogle Scholar.

9 Shams, Said, Nationalism, Political Islam and the Kurdish Question in Iran: Reflections on the Rise and Spread of Political Islam in Iran (VDM Verlag, 2011), 26132Google Scholar.

10 Foucault, Michel, Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France, 1975–76, trans. Macey, David (London: Penguin Books, 2003)Google Scholar.

11 Ibid., 242.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 259.

14 Solomos, John, Race and Racism in Britain (London: MacMillan, 1993), 245CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 Al-Azmeh, Aziz, Islams and Modernities (London: Verso, 1993), 57Google Scholar.

16 “Radical Islam” is a term that was used to define the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran. The Mojahedin are an Iranian militant-Islamist group which played a major role in the revolution and after which advocated for overthrowing the IRI and installing their own government. Mojahedin's radical interpretation of Islam contrasts with the conservative Islam of the traditional clergy, as well as the populist interpretation developed by Ayatollah Khomeini in the 1970s. See Abrahamian, Ervand, Radical Islam: The Iranian Mojahedin – Society and Culture in the Modern Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989)Google Scholar.

17 The Liberation Movement of Iran (LMI) was formed in 1961 by well-known Iranian personalities who were closely related by ties of kinship and friendship, including Ayatollah Mahmood Taleqani, Mehdi Bazergan, and Yadollah Sahabi. The LMI was one of the mainstream parties in the “Second National Front” and after the Revolution its leader, Bazargan, became the prime minister of the provisional government, from November 6th 1979 to July 20th, 1980.

18 Radical Islamists included the Mojahedin Khaleq and the followers of Ali Shariati, among others.

19 Shams, Political Islam, 227.

20 Bazargan, Mehdi, ed., Masa'el va moshkelate-e nakhostin sal-e enqelab (the Problems and Challenges of the First Year of the Revolution) (Tehran: 1982), 9, 10, 13, 43, 362Google Scholar.

21 Shams, Political Islam, 190.

22 Ibid.,192.

23 The Kurds formulated their request for autonomy in 30 clauses; see Shiekh Ezzaddin Houssine's interview with Kayhan, no. 10652, Esfand 13, 1357, p. 8.

24 Kayhan, nos. 10665 & 10666. The Guardian, February 22 and March 20, 1979.

25 Shams, Political Islam, 174–75.

26 For press reports, see: Ettela'at and Daily Telegraph, August 20 and 21, 1979.

27 Shams, Political Islam, 230–31.

28 The Assembly of Experts was the deliberative body empowered to discuss and pass the new constitution of Iran. Its formation dated back to 1979, when a constituent assembly was needed to draft a constitution. Debates over the nature of that body ultimately led to the formation of a small, expert-based group rather than a larger assembly of representatives from across the country. The Assembly was dissolved after the constitution was ratified in December 1979.

29 Kayhan, Aban 20, 1358/ November 29, 1979.

30 Shams, Political Islam, 231.

31 On November 4th, 1979, 52 U.S. diplomats and citizens were held hostage after a group of militarized Iranian college students belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line took over the U.S. embassy in Tehran and seized hostages. A diplomatic standoff ensued. The hostages were held for 444 days, being released on January 20th, 1981

32 Kayhan, Aban 27, 1358/ December 6, 1979.

33 Shams, Political Islam, 231.

34 The Kurdish People's Representation was composed of the KDP, Komala, Fadayan, and Sheikh Ezzadin Hussaini.

35 Kar, year 2, no. 57, May 7, no. 58, May 13, and no. 59, May 20, 1980.

36 Islamic authorities have recently expressed this view. For example, the interior minister who recently warned Islamization has failed and that secular trends and women's movements are major obstacles against Islamic values, which still have not institutionalized after forty years. See Donya-e-Eqtesad, “The Minister of Interior warned about the danger of women to the revolution,” September 18, 1979, https://tinyurl.com/3dy8zjk9.

37 “Sept Ans d'Aide Medicale au Kurdistan d'Iran 1981–1987,” Unpublished document, housed in the library of the Kurdish Institute, Paris, GEN. 1158, 33.

38 Shams, Political Islam, 1888.

39 Schirazi, Ali, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987) 12Google Scholar.

40 Ibid., 62.

41 Ibid., 62.

42 Ibid., 64.

43 Radical Islam is a term constructed by Ervand Abrahamian to distinguish the Islamism of Mojahedin-i-Khalq and ‘Ali Shariʿati from Khomeini's Islamism, see, Radical Islam: Iranian Mojahedin - Society & Culture in the Modern Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 1989).

44 Shariʿati asserted that “Theocracy means the rule of the clergy over people; the natural effect of such a government is despotic oppression, because the clergy believes itself to be the vicegerent of God and the legitimate authority for implementing what is it believes to be God's commands on earth. In such state, people have no right no right to express themselves, criticise, or disagree the clergy,” ‘Ali Shariʿati, Collected Works, Vol. 22. (Tehran: Agah Publishers, 1982), 197.

45 Ibid., 18.

46 Foucault, quoted in Agamben, Giorgio, Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive (New York: Zone Books, 1999), 84Google Scholar.

47 During an interview before returning to Iran with Professor James Cockcroft, Khomeini stated that Baha'is would not have religious freedom. See James Crockcroft, “Select interviews by and of Cockcroft on Iran, including Khomeini in Paris, 1978–1979 , + articles and award-winning book,” July 29, 2014, https://www.jamescockcroft.com/node/265.

48 The Babi movement was based on the teachings of the Bab, Sayyid Ali Muhammad (1819–50), a young Shirazi merchant who elaborated a novel interpretation of Shiʿi Islam. In 1844, he announced he was the intermediary (the bab or “gate”) between the Shiʿi faithful and the expected messianic figure of the Twelfth Imam. Bab was detained and executed by Iranian authorities in 1850.

Mirza Husayn ‘Ali Nur (1817–92), was the most distinguished personage to embrace the cause of the Bab and later became known as Baha'u'llah. He claimed to be the promised one and prophet, and in 1863 he faced exile and imprisonment. Once Baha'u’llah had announced that he was the promised one foretold by the Bab, many Babis accepted him, adopting the name of “Baha'is,” i.e., “followers of Baha'u’llah.” Whilst rooted in Babism, the Baha'i movement diverged from it in various ways, notably in Baha'u’llah's absolute prohibition on his followers taking up arms to defend themselves as the Babis had done, and his wide-ranging vision of a new world order. See, Walbridge, John, “Essays and Notes on Babi and Baha'i HistoryOccasional Papers in Shaykhi, Babi and Bahá'í Studies 6.1 (2002–03)Google Scholar.

49 Genocide is defined as “the mass expulsion or killing of members of one ethnic or religious group in an area by those of another.” When a UN commission empaneled to look into violations of international law in the former Yugoslavia defined ethnic cleansing in its interim report S/25274, in S/1994/674, the commission defined ethnic cleansing as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographic areas.”

50 Bauman, Zygmunt, Modernity and the Holocaust (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989) 65Google Scholar.