1 The conventional assumption is captured by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy: “Our policy — while providing opportunity to a portion of the world's population — must be guided by the basic national interests of the people of the United States.” From U.S. Immigration Policy and the National Interest: The Final Report and Recommendations of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to the Congress and the President of the United States (1 03 1981). The best theoretical defense of the conventional assumption (with some modifications) is Walzer, Michael, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), pp. 31–63. A few theorists have challenged the conventional assumption. See Ackerman, Bruce, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 89–95; Lichtenberg, Judith, “National Boundaries and Moral Boundaries: A Cosmopolitan View” in Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits, ed. Brown, Peter G. and Shue, Henry (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981), pp. 79–100, and Nett, Roger, “The Civil Right We Are Not Ready For: The Right of Free Movement of People on the Face of the Earth,” Ethics 81:212–27. Frederick Whelan has also explored these issues in two interesting unpublished papers.
2 Nozick, Robert, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 10–25, 88–119.
3 Ibid., pp. 108–113. Citizens, in Nozick's view, are simply consumers purchasing impartial, efficient protection of preexisting natural rights. Nozick uses the terms “citizen,” “client” and “customer” interchangeably.
4 Nozick interprets the Lockean proviso as implying that property rights in land may not so restrict an individual's freedom of movement as to deny him effective liberty. This further limits the possibility of excluding aliens. See p. 55.
6 Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 60–65, 136–42, 243–48.
7 Ibid., pp. 8–9, 244–48.
8 The argument for a global view of the original position has been developed most fully in Beitz, Charles, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 125–76, especially 129–36 and 143–53. For earlier criticisms of Rawls along the same lines, see Barry, Brian, The Liberal Theory of Justice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 128–33 and Scanlon, Thomas M., “Rawls's Theory of Justice,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 121, no. 5 (05 1973): 1066–67. For more recent discussions, see Richards, David A. J., “International Distributive Justice,” in Ethics, Economics, and the Law, eds. Pennock, J. Roland and Chapman, John (New York: New York University Press, 1982), pp. 275–99 and Beitz, Charles, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiments,” The Journal of Philosophy 80, no. 10 (10 1983): 591–600. None of these discussions fully explores the implications of a global view of the original position for the issue of immigration, although the recent essay by Beitz touches on the topic.
9 Respecting others as free and equal moral persons does not imply that one cannot distinguish friends from strangers or citizens from aliens. See the conclusion for an elaboration.
10 Rawh, , Justice, pp. 136, 72.
11 Rawls, John, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” The Journal of Philosophy 77, no. 9 (09 1980): 515–72.
12 Ibid. See also Rawls, John, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (Summer 1985): 223–51.
13 Beitz, Compare, Political Theory, p. 183.
14 For more on the comparison of mobility within a country and mobility across countries, see Carens, Joseph H., “Migration and the Welfare State” in Democracy and the Welfare State, ed. Gutmann, Amy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).
15 Rawls, , Justice, pp. 212–13.
17 For statistics on current and projected levels of immigration to the U.S., see Teitelbaum, Michael S., “Right Versus Right: Immigration and Refugee Policy in the United States,” Foreign Affairs 59 (1980): 21–59.
18 For the deep roots of the right to emigrate in the liberal tradition, see Whelan, Frederick, “Citizenship and the Right to Leave,” American Political Science Review 75, no. 3 (09 1981): 636–53.
19 Rawls, , Justice, pp. 325–32.
20 For recent discussions of utilitarianism, see Brandt, Richard, A Theory of the Good and the Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Singer, Peter, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Hare, R. M., Moral Thinking (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981); and Sen, Amartya and Williams, Bernard, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).
21 For recent communitarian critiques of liberalism, see MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981) and Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). For a critique of the critics, see Gutmann, Amy, “Communitarian Critics of Liberalism,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (Summer 1985): 308–322.
22 Walzer, , Spheres, p. 61.
24 Ibid., pp. 33, 45–48, 55–61, 42–44.
28 I am not arguing that the changes in treatment of women, blacks, and workers were brought about by the inner logic of liberalism. These changes resulted from changes in social conditions and from political struggles, including ideological struggles in which arguments about the implications of liberal principles played some role, though not necessarily a decisive one. But from a philosophical perspective, it is important to understand where principles lead, even if one does not assume that people's actions in the world will always be governed by the principles they espouse.
29 Compare Walzer's claim that the caste system would be just if accepted by the villages affected (ibid., pp. 313–15).