1 This was announced over the Peking Radio Station on January 22.

2 The estimates of China's Moslem population are completely unreliable. Two Japanese surveys in the 1920's put the number at about 10 million. See Ching-chih, Yang, “Japan—Protector of Islam!” Pacific Affairs, Dec, 1942, p. 474.Google ScholarSome Chinese Moslems claim a following of 48 million (China Handbook, 1937-1945, p. 27)Google Scholar, but Man Ying-keng is reported to have reached the conclusion that Moslems constituted only 1 per cent of China's population (David-Neel, Alexandra, “Mohammedans of the Chinese Far West,” Asia and the Americas, Dec., 1943, p. 677). There are perhaps 8 to 10 million Moslems in the five provinces of the Northwest: roughly 3. million in Sinkiang, 3 to 4 million in Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai, and over 1 million in Shensi.Google Scholar

3 See Robert B. Ekvall, Cultural Relations on the Kansu-Tibetan Border, passim; Iwamura, Shin-obu, “The Structure of Moslem Society in Inner Mongolia,” Far Eastern Quarterly, Nov., 1948, pp. 34–44.Google Scholar

4 This was evident, for example, in the Draft Plan for the Development of Sinkiang drawn up by a committee formed by the Exective Yuan on Feb. 20, 1934. An outline of this appears in Meng's, C. Y. W., “Nanking's Elaborate Plan to Develop Sinkiang,” China Weekly Review, Jan. 5, 1935, p. 194.Google Scholar Also see Hubert T. M. Soong, “Promoting Mohammedan Education in the Development of China's Northwest,” Ibid., March 28, 1936, pp. 116, 117. The Moslems' need for fuller integration into China's national life was recognized by Moslems in the Chinese Islamic National Salvation Federation headed by General Pai Chung-hsi as well as by the others. See Kim, John, “Chinese Muslims View Pakistan,” Asia and the Americas, March, 1943, pp. 155–57;Google ScholarChien, Ma, “Views of a Chinese Moslem,” Moslem World, Jan., 1936, p. 73.Google Scholar

5 Chien, Ma, loc. cit., p. 77. This apparently is also true of the Tung-kan Moslems of Kansu, Ninghsia and Chinghai and the Han Hui (Chinese Mollems) who are Chinese linguistically, culturally and, predominantly, in race. With the exception of 90 to 100 thousand Tung-kan Moslem immigrants, Sinkiang's Moslems are non-Chinese in language and culture.Google Scholar

6 For a discussion of these views, as well as other positions, see Lattimore, Owen, Pivot of Asia, pp. 108–115.Google Scholar

7 The Tung-kan Moslems were largely organized by a family of Ma's from Hochow (Linhsia), the center of Chinese Islam. Ma Pu-fang was governor of Chinghai, his cousin, Ma Hung-kuei was governor of Ninghsia, and his elder brother, Ma Pu-ch'ing, controlled the Kansu corridor. Another relative was Ma Chung-ying who attempted to use Tung-lean Moslems to gain control of Sinkiang in the early thirties with the encouragement of Japanese agents. See Wu, Aitchen K., Turkistan Tumult, pp. 236–237.Google Scholar Relatives, friends and neighbors of the Ma's from the county of Linhsia, Kansu, had positions of importance throughout the Northwest as governors, divisional corps commanders, officials and ahungs. See Mei, Y. P., “Stronghold of Muslin China,” Moslem World (reprinted from Asia), 04, 1941, pp. 178, 183;Google ScholarForman, Harrison, “China's Moslemia,” Canadian Geographic Journal, 09, 1948, p. 143.Google Scholar

8 See Snow, Edgar, Red Star Oyer China (Modern Library Edition), pp. 220–232, for an account of the Shensi Soviet and its growth.Google Scholar

9 First (Red) Army Corps, Political Department: company discussion Materials, “The Mohammedan Problem,” p. 2 (June 2, 1936), quoted in Snow, , op. cit., p. 346.Google Scholar

10 See Wales, N., Inside Red China, p. 154,Google Scholar and Snow, , op. cit., p. 354.Google Scholar

11 Religious liberty did not become a part of the Communist program until it began to develop the United Front program in 1936. Religious liberty was then granted to Moslem troops which joined the Red Army and to students in political training. Chou Enlai explained this shift in policy to a group of church and missionary representatives in Sian in the early part of 1937. See Young, George, The Living Christ in Modern China, p. 182.Google Scholar

12 Snow, , op. cit., p. 384.Google Scholar

13 Speech of General P'eng Teh-huai, September 6, 1936, quoted in Snow, , op. cit., p. 377.Google Scholar

14 Wales, , op. cit., p. 154.Google Scholar

15 Wang Ming (Chen Shao-ju) Fifteen Years of Struggle in China; also see reference to Wang Ming's interpretation of the United Front in Dallin, David J.: Soviet Russia and the Far East, p. 129.Google Scholar

16 See Bertram, James M., First Act in China, The Story of Sian Mutiny, pp. 205 ff., passim.Google Scholar

17 A composite of items from Central News Agency reports.

18 Wales, , op. cit., p. 154.Google Scholar

19 An illustration of this tendency, if not policy, of reducing Islam to a racial or cultural characteristic of the Moslem peoples was the requirement that non-Moslem Chinese recruits observe the religious rituals and customs of the Moslems while serving in Moslem Army units: this was a denial of Islam's religious claims. See Stein, Gunther: The Challenge of Red China, p. 244.Google Scholar

20 See Massignon, Louis, quoted by Gibb, H. A. R., Whither Islam? pp. 378, 379;Google Scholar and Ekvall, Robert B., op. cit., pp. 15ff.Google Scholar

21 See Iwamura, Shinobu, “The Structure of Moslem Society in Inner Mongolia,” loc. cit., pp. 39ff.Google Scholar

22 See Hussian, Mohammed, Islam and Socialism, Lahore, 1947;Google ScholarKohn, Hans, A History of Nationalism in the East, pp. 40–41.Google Scholar

23 Ekvall, , op. cit., p. 25.Google Scholar

24 Ekvall, , op. cit., p. 15.Google Scholar

25 The utter impossibility of Moslem independence or autonomy has now been recognized by the Communists. See below.

26 See Kai-shek, Chiang (Jaffe, Philip, ed.), “China's Destiny, p. 39, for an authoritative statement of “Ta Han chu-i.” Earlier expressions of such assimilative views were frequent.Google Scholar

27 Wales, Nym, op. cit., p. 154.Google Scholar

28 For Japanese efforts to win the support of the Moslems and use them, see Taylor, G. E., Struggle for North China, pp. 84, 85;Google Scholarching-chih, Yang, “Japan-Protector of Islam!” Pacific Affairs, Dec, 1942, pp. 471–481.Google Scholar

29 See Young, George, op. cit., pp. 137, 138;Google ScholarIwamura, S., “The Structure of Moslem Society in Inner Mongolia,” loc. cit., pp. 42, 43;Google ScholarSnow, E., op. cit., p. 344.Google Scholar

30 Snow, , op. cit., p. 348.Google Scholar

31 Ekvall, , op. cit., p. 25, says that Moslem public opinion supported cooperation with the Kuomimang because of the Communists' anti-religious propaganda.Google Scholar

32 Ma Hung-k'uei was first drawn into cooperation with the Kuomintang in 1930 when Feng Yu-hsiang broke with Chiang K'ai-shek.

33 In 1934 and 1935 the Kuomintang established branches of the Central Political Institute in Chinghai, Ningsia and Kansu. In 1936 Moslem units of Ma Pu-ch'ing and Ma Pu-fang were formally incorporated into China's National armies as the 7th Cavalry Division and the 2nd Army respectively.

34 After the ”Sian Incident” Ma Hung-k'uei sent Nanking a message urging the necessity of suppressing the Communists rather than joining them in a united front.

35 The united front program was initiated by the Comintern in the summer of 1935. It was not until the end of 1936 that the Chinese Communists were willing or able to extend it to include cooperation with the Kuomintang (See Dallin, David I., Soviet Russia and the Far East, p. 129). The changes in policy in the initial phase of the united front were manifest in a number of ways: a propaganda shift to anti-Japanese themes based on appeals to Chinese nationalism; attempts to organize comprehensive mass organizations of Moslems and others independent of Soviet class organizations; cooperation with indigenous secret and peasant societies, such as the Red Spears, which they had ruthlessly suppressed prior to this; and religious and cultural freedom for groups cooperating with or being attracted to the united front. Not until the summer of 1937 were the electoral laws introduced to implement a united-front democracy and to replace the Soviet system of party and class dictator.Google Scholar

36 The Communist attitude toward Sun Yat-sen has been highly opportunistic. In 1928 “The Programme of the Communist International,” adopted by the Sixth Congress, and accepted by the Chinese Communist Party, stated that Sun Yat-senism had become a fetter on the revolution's further development and called for “opposition to the remnants of die Sun Yat-sen ideology.” The unity statement of the Chinese Communist Party on September 22, 1937 declared: “The San Min Chu-I enunciated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen is the paramount need of China today. This party is ready to strive for its enforcement.”

37 Stein, G., op. cit., p. 244.Google Scholar

38 See Forman, Harrison, Report from Red China, pp. 60, 132;Google ScholarC., and Band, W., Two Years with the Chinese Communists, p. 147.Google Scholar

39 For a general account of the Federation see Kim, John, “Chinese Muslims View Pakistan,” Asia and the Americas, March, 1943.Google Scholar

40 Communist troops were attacked and driven back ni 1946 and 1948. See United States Relations with China, 1944–1949, pp. 313, 328.Google Scholar

41 The chronology of events is drawn from the reports of the New China News Agency and the New York Times.

42 On September 10 Suiyuan surrendered to the Communists. The telegram announcing Suiyuan's adherence was signed by 38 officials and representatives of various organizations, including the Moslem Association. For the text, see China Digest, Oct. 5, 1949, p. 19.Google Scholar The collapse of Suiyuan's resistance opened Ninghsia to a flank attack. See New York Times, Sept. 21, 1949.Google Scholar

43 New York Times, April 8, 1949.Google Scholar

44 “Racial Prejudices,” China Weekly Review, Oct. 1, 1949, p. 58;Google ScholarShih-chieh Wenhua, Sept. 2, 1949.Google Scholar

45 China Weekly Review, Sept. 3, 1949, p. 10.Google Scholar

46 New York Times, August 5, 1949.Google Scholar

47 Chien, Ma, “Views of a Chinese Moslem,” loc. cit., pp. 77–78.Google Scholar

48 Brown, Marguerite, “Emancipation by Decree,” Independent Woman, March, 1949, p. 49.Google Scholar

49 In 1944 Mao Tze-tung said: “Chinese Communists may form an anti-imperialist front politically with certain idealists and disciples of religions, but can never approve their idealism or religious teaching.”

50 Report of Mao Tze-tung to the Second National Soviet Congress, 1932: “The point of departure for the Soviet national policy is the capture of all the oppressed minorities around the Soviets as a means to increase the strength of the revolution⃜”

51 Ta Kung Pao, quoted in the China Weekly Review, Oct. 8, 1949, p. 83.Google Scholar

52 Common Program of the Political Consultative Conference, article 51.

53 This is the policy developed by Chang Chih-chung who has now been made vicechairman of the Northwest Regional Government. For his former views see “Dilemma in Sinkiang,” Pacific Affairs, Dec. 1947, pp. 422–429.Google Scholar

54 New York Times, Jan. 23, 1950.Google Scholar

55 See SirBell, Charles, “China and Tibet,” Royal Central Asian Journal, 01. 1949, pp. 54–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

56 See Sarkisyanz, Emmanuel, “Communism and the Asiatic Mind,” The Yale Review, Spring, 1950, pp. 506–507.Google Scholar

57 The right of secession is not granted minority groups in the new constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, nor may autonomous areas or regions have their own armed forces under the new unified military system. Instead, all nationalities have the obligation to defend China as their “fatherland.” (Common Program, Article 8, 9.) The New China News Agency, the official organ of the new Chinese Government, has announced that “The Chinese Liberation Army must liberate all Chinese territory including Tibet, Sinfciang, Hainan Island and Taiwan and will not permit a single inch of territory to remain outside the rule of the Chinese People's Republic.”—Quoted in China Digest, Sept. 21, 1949, p. 4.Google Scholar