We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
The so-called Madisonian dilemma has dominated recent debates over the role of the Supreme Court and suggested a “majoritarian paradigm” for constitutional interpretation. But a reexamination of James Madison's unique contributions to republican theory indicates that the “Madisonian dilemma” is in many ways misleading and unfaithful to his political vision. Madison, argues the author in Section I, worked a conceptual change in republican theory. Madison did so because he was convinced that republican liberty (and government) was primarily threatened by popular majorities and legislative majoritarianism in Congress and the states. For that reason, Madison advanced his well-known “naturalist” argument for republicanism and, on that basis, argued for buttressing the political architecture of republican government with “auxiliary precautions” for securing republican liberty. From Madison's reconstruction of republicanism, Section II moves to his conversion to the project of amending the Constitution with a declaration of rights and the basis he laid for the Supreme Court's role in defending republican government and liberty. Finally, Section III takes up Madison's view of the role of the Supreme Court and his articulation of a novel theory of pragmatic constitutional interpretivism.
Copyrighted 1990, David M. O'Brien. This article originated as a lecture delivered at the “James Madison Symposium” in Madisonville, Kentucky, 27 September 1990, and is reprinted in Constitutional Commentary (1991). The author is grateful for the support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Kentucky Humanities Council, and his former colleague, Robert J. Morgan, as well as for the assistance of Stephen Bragaw. While absolving them of responsibility for any of the interpretive arguments here, the author benefitted from the comments on an early draft by Professors Lance Banning, Kermit Hall, and Leonard Levy, as well as from those of three anonymous reviewers. The author is also grateful for the encouragement of Professors Daniel A. Farber and Donald P. Kommers, and Judge Charles W. Boteler, Jr.
1. Bork, R., The Tempting of America (New York: Free Press, 1990), p. 239.Google Scholar
2. For further discussion, see, O'brien, D., “The Supreme Court: From Warren to Burger to Rehnquist,” PS: Political Science and Politics 12 (1987).Google Scholar
3. See, O'brien, D., “The Rehnquist Court Comes of Age,” Update on Law-Related Education 3 (Fall 1989);Google Scholar and Chemerinsky, E., “Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution,” 103 Harv. L. Rev. 44 (1989).Google Scholar
4. Chemerinsky, , “Foreword,” p. 71.Google Scholar
5. Bickel, A., The Least Dangerous Branch (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), pp. 16, 17, 18.Google Scholar
6. Ibid., p. 27.
7. Bork, , Tempting of America, p. 139 n. 1.Google Scholar
8. Scalia, A., “Originalism: The Lesser Evil,” 57 Cinn. L. Rev. 849 (1989)Google Scholar, at 854 (emphasis added).
9. Employment Division, Department of Human Resource of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990).
10. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.398 (1963).Google Scholar
11. Employment Division, Department of Human Resource of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, at 1606.
12. See also, Scalia's, Justice opinion in Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S.Ct. 2969 (1989).Google Scholar
13. Employment Division, Department of Human Resource of Oregon v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, at 1606.
14. Choper, J., Judicial Review and the National Political Process (Chicago: Univesity of Chicago Press, 1980), pp. 4–6.Google Scholar
15. Ely, J., Democracy and Distrust (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 7–9.Google Scholar
16. Perry, M., The Constitution, The Courts, and Human Rights (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 9.Google Scholar But, see and compare, Perry, M., Morality, Politics, and Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 164.Google Scholar
17. See, O'brien, D., “Judicial Review and Constitutional Politics: Theory and Practice,” 48 Uni. Chicago L. Rev. 1052 (1981).Google Scholar
18. Brennan, W. Jr., “The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,” Speech delivered at Georgetown University, 12 10 1985.Google Scholar
19. West Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
20. Chemerinsky, , “Foreword,” p. 61 n. 3.Google Scholar
21. See ibid., pp. 74–95; Tushnet, M., Red. White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 71Google Scholar; Sunstein, C., “Beyond the Republican Revival,” 97 Yale L. J. 1539 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Sunstein, C., “Interest Groups in American Public Law,” 38 Stanford L. Rev. 29 (1985)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Michelman, F., “Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,” 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1986)Google Scholar; Horowitz, M., “Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought,” 29 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 57 (1987)Google Scholar; Michelman, F., “Law's Republic,” 97 Yale L. J. 1493 (1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Fallon, R. Jr., “What Is Republicanism, And Is It Worth Reviving,” 102 Harv. L. R. 1695 (1989).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
22. It might be objected that neither Bickel nor Bork seriously attempt to link their discussions of the “Madisonian dilemma” to the “historical Madison,” and therefore revisiting Madison's republicanism in order to show that the “Madisonian dilemma” was not Madison's misses the mark as a critique of Bickel’s and Bork’s positions. To be sure, Bickel and Bork make no pretense of documenting their construction of the “Madisonian dilemma” in terms of Madison’s own works. Indeed, in Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel principally relies on the works of political scientists, citing only Truman’s, DavidThe Governmental Process (New York: Knopf, 1951)Google Scholar, and Dahl’s, RobertPreface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).Google Scholar See also, Bickel, A., The Morality of Consent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).Google Scholar Nor does Bork bother to ground his construction of the “Madisonian dilemma” in Madison’s works; Bickel provides his primary reference, see, Least Dangerous Branch, pp. 139 and 187. While Bickel and Bork do not undertake to marshall historical support for their construction of the “Madisonian dilemma,” they implicitly and explicitly attribute the dilemma to Madison, and that attribution has served (for some scholars) to legitimate their broader claims about interpretive theory and the exercise of judicial review. My aim here is narrow and limited to simply reconstructing Madison's republicanism in order to underscore that the so called Madisonian dilemma is wrongly and misleadingly attributed to James Madison. It would be impossible in the space here to undertake a complete critique of their broader jurisprudential claims. For further discussion of the latter, see, Purcell, E. Jr., “Alexander Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution,” 11 Haw. C.R.-C.L. Law Rev. 521 (1976)Google Scholar, and the sources cited in supra note 17 and infra notes 155 and 177.“Madisonian dilemma,” they implicitly and explicitly attribute the dilemma to Madison, and that attribution has served (for some scholars) to legitimate their broader claims about interpretive theory and the exercise of judicial review. My aim here is narrow and limited to simply reconstructing Madison’s republicanism in order to underscore that the so-called Madisonian dilemma is wrongly and misleadingly attributed to James Madison. It would be impossible in the space here to undertake a complete critique of their broader jurisprudential claims. For further discussion of the latter, see, Purcell, E. Jr., “Alexander Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution,” 11 Harv. C.R. -C.L. Law Rev. 521 (1976)Google Scholar, and the sources cited in supra note 17 and infra notes 155 and 177.
23. Madison, J., “Who are the Best keepers of the People’s Liberties,” National Gazette (12 20, 1792)Google Scholar, in The Papers of James Madison, ed. Rutland, Robert A. et al. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1984), 14: 426.Google Scholar
24. Ibid.
25. See, Hanson, R., “ ‘Commons’ and ‘Commonwealth’ at the American Founding: Democratic Republicanism as the New American Hybrid,” in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, ed. Ball, T. and Pocock, J. G. A. (Lawrence, KS: University press of Kansas, 1988).Google Scholar See also Lienesh, M., New Order of the Ages (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988);Google Scholar and Kammen, M., A Machine That Would Go of Itself (New York: Knopf, 1986).Google Scholar
26. Montesquieu, , The Spirit of the Laws, ed. Carrithers, D. W. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), bk. 1, p. 107.Google Scholar
27. See, Wood, G., The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1972), pp. 485, 513, 562Google Scholar; Mcdonald, F., Novus Ordo Seclorum (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1985), pp. 4–5Google Scholar; and O’brien, D., “Federalism as a Metaphor in the Constitutional Politics of Public Administration,” Public Administration Review 49 (1989): 411.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
28. Madison, J., Letter to George Washington (16 04 1787), Papers, 9: 382, 383.Google Scholar
29. Madison, J., Ancient & Modern Confederacies, in Papers, 9: 3.Google Scholar
30. Madison, J., Vices of the Political System of the United States, Papers, 9: 348.Google Scholar
31. Ibid., p. 354.
32. Ibid., p. 355.
33. Madison, J., Letter to Mr. ——— (1833), reprinted in Letters and Other Writing of James Madison (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1867), 4: 326.Google Scholar
34. See Ibid., p. 333, and the discussion in the text at infra note 60, as well as Morgan, R., James Madison on the Constitution and the Bill of Rights (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988), pp. 197–99.Google Scholar
35. Madison, , Vices, p. 354.Google Scholar
36. Madison, J., Notes on Debates (28 01 1783), Papers, 6: 141, 147.Google Scholar
37. Madison, J., Letter to Thomas Jefferson (3 10 1785), Papers 8: 373, 374.Google Scholar
38. Madison, , Vices, p. 354.Google Scholar
39. Ibid., p. 355.
40. Ibid., pp. 355–56.
41. Ibid., p. 356. See also the discussion in the text at infra note 139.
42. See, J. Madison, The Federalist, Nos. 10, 14, and 63, at 77, 99, and 38 (C. Rossiter ed., 1961).
43. Madison, , Vices, p. 357.Google Scholar
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Madison, , Letter to —— (1833), Letters, 4: 333.Google Scholar
47. See Kurland, P. and Lerner, R., eds., The Founders’ Constitution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1: 96.Google Scholar
48. See, e.g., Madison, J.Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments (20 06 1785), Papers, 8: 295.Google Scholar
49. Madison, , Vices, p. 357.Google Scholar
50. Madison, , Federalist, No. 10, p. 81.Google Scholar
51. Ibid., p. 82.
52. Ibid., p. 83.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid., p. 84.
55. See Madison, , Federalist, Nos. 51 and 63, pp. 317 and 382.Google Scholar
56. Madison, , Federalist, No. 51, p. 322.Google Scholar
57. Ibid., No. 63, p. 385.
58. Ibid., No. 39, p. 241.
59. Ibid.
60. Madison, , Letter to ——— (1833), Letters, p. 333.Google Scholar
61. Gerry, E., in Farrand, M., ed., Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), p. 48Google Scholar; and Madison, , Federalist, No. 39, p. 244.Google Scholar
62. Madison, , Federalist, No. 37, pp. 224 and 227.Google Scholar
63. U. S. Const., Art. VI.
64. Madison, , Letter to Washington, Papers, 9: 384.Google Scholar
65. Ibid., pp. 383–84.
66. See Brant, I., James Madison: Father of the Constitution (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), pp. 23–54.Google Scholar
67. See Farrand, , Records, 1: 28.Google Scholar
68. See Wood, , Creation of the American Republic, pp. 435–36 and 455–56.Google Scholar
69. Madison, , in Farrand, Records, 2: 74.Google Scholar
70. Madison, , Letter to Thomas Jefferson (6 09 1787), Papers 10: 163.Google Scholar
71. Madison, , Letter to Thomas Jefferson (17 10 1788), Papers 11: 295, 298.Google Scholar
72. Madison, , Letter to Mr. ——, Letters, 4: 328.Google Scholar
73. Madison, , Letter to Richard Peters (19 08 1789), Papers, 12: 346.Google Scholar
74. See, Wilson, J., in Elliot, J., ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution as Recommended by the General Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Co., 1888), 2: 434–37Google Scholar [hereafter cited as Elliot’s Debates].
75. See Hamilton, A., Federalist, No. 81, p. 481.Google Scholar
76. Madison, , Letter to Richard Peters, Papers, 12: 347.Google Scholar
77. Madison, , Letter to Edward Livingston (10 07 1822), Letters, 3: 273, 275.Google Scholar
78. Quoted by Madison, J., in Koch, A., ed., Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1966), pp. 455–56.Google Scholar
79. Madison, , Letter to Caleb Wallace (23 08 1785), Papers, 8: 435, 436.Google Scholar
80. Madison, , Letter to Mr. ——— Letters, 4: 327.Google Scholar
81. Jefferson, T., Letter to James Madison (20 12 1787)Google Scholar, The Paper of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Lipscomb, A. A. and Bergh, A. E., 20. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950–82), 12: 38, 440.Google Scholar
82. See, generally, Rutland, R.The Birth of the Bill of Rights, 1776–1791 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), pp. 194–98.Google Scholar
83. Madison, , Letter to George Eve (2 01 1789), Papers, pp. 404–405.Google Scholar
84. Jefferson, to James Madison (31 07 1788), Papers of Jefferson, 13: 440, 442.Google Scholar
85. Madison, to Jefferson, Papers, 11: 297.Google Scholar
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid.
88. Ibid., p. 298.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p. 299.
91. Madison, J., Amendments to the Constitution (8 06 1789), Papers, 12: 196 and 205.Google Scholar See also Madison, J., “The Bank Bill” (2 02 1791), Papers, 13: 372, 375.Google Scholar
92. Jefferson, T., Letter to James Madison (15 03 1789), Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 14: 659.Google Scholar
93. Madison, , Amendments, Papers, 12: 206–207.Google Scholar
94. See Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil.”
95. Madison, , Amendments, Papers, 12: 203.Google Scholar
96. Ibid., p. 206.
97. U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 18.
98. Madison, , Amendments, Papers, 12: 205.Google Scholar
99. Ibid., p. 206.
100. Hamilton, , Federalist, pp. 513–14.Google Scholar
101. The Ninth Amendment provides that, “The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.” U.S. Const., 9th Amend.
102. Madison, , Amendments, Papers, 12: 202.Google Scholar Compare the language of Madison’s proposed amendment and that of the Ninth Amendment, quoted in supra note 101.
103. Madison, , to Jefferson, , Papers, 11: 297.Google Scholar
104. Jefferson, to Madison, , Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 14: 659–60.Google Scholar
105. Jefferson, to Madison, , Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 13: 443.Google Scholar
106. See Madison, to Jefferson, , Papers, 11: 299.Google Scholar
107. Madison, , Amendments, Papers, 12: 200.Google Scholar
108. Madison, supra note 22.
109. See U.S. Const., Art. V.
110. Madison, , Amendments, Papers, 12: 201–202.Google Scholar
111. Ibid., p. 344.
112. See Madison, J., Letters to Jefferson and Monroe (1794), Papers, 15: 397–98, 406–407, and 419–20Google Scholar; and Madison, , Report on the Virginia Resolution, in Elliot’s Debates, p. 549.Google Scholar
113. Madison, to Jefferson, , Papers, 11: 297 (emphasis added).Google Scholar
114. Rakove, J., “The Madisonian Theory of Rights,” 31 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 245, 247 (1990).Google Scholar
115. Madison, to Washington, , Papers, 9: 384.Google Scholar
116. Madison, to Jefferson, , Papers, 11: 211.Google Scholar
117. U.S. Const., Art. III.
118. The Judiciary Act of 1789, Sec. 25.
119. Madison, , Federalist, No. 39, Papers, 11: 381.Google Scholar
120. Madison, , Letter to Thomas Jefferson (27 06 1823), Letters, 3: 322, 326.Google Scholar
121. See Madison, , Letter to Joseph Cabell (7 09 1829)Google Scholar, The Writings of James Madison (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1910), 9: 346–51Google Scholar; Letter to Trist, N. P. (12 1831), Letters, 4: 204–205Google Scholar; and Letter to Everett, Edward (28 08 1830), Writings, 9: 383.Google Scholar
122. Madison, , Letter to Edward Everett, Writings, 9: 397–98.Google Scholar
123. Madison, Letter to Joseph Cabell, ibid., pp. 346, 351.
124. See, Locke, J., Two Treatises of Government, ed. Laslett, Peter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), chap. 19, 454–77.Google Scholar
125. Madison, , Letter to Joseph Cabell, Writings, 9: 351.Google Scholar
126. Madison, , Letters, 3: 140, 143.Google Scholar
127. J. Madison, Letter to Edward Everett, ibid., p. 398.
128. Madison, J., Letter to Mr. —— (1834), Letters, 4: 349, 350.Google Scholar
129. Madison, , Letter to Joseph Cabell, Writings, 9: 351.Google Scholar
130. Madison, , Letters to Jefferson and Monroe, Papers. 15: 397–98, 406–407, 419–20.Google Scholar
131. Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in Elliot’s Debates, 2: 540–544.
132. See, Koch, A. and Ammon, H., “The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions: An Episode in Jefferson’s and Madison’s Defense of Civil Liberties,” Wm. & Mary Quarterly 5 (1948): 145.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
133. Madison, , Letter to N. P. Trist, Letters, 4: 205.Google Scholar
134. Ibid. See also, Madison, J., Letter to Daniel Webster (15 03 1833), Letters, 4: 293.Google Scholar
135. Madison, , Report on the Virginia Resolution, p. 549.Google Scholar
136. Madison, , The Federalist, No. 49, p. 314.Google Scholar
137. Ibid., No. 39, p. 245.
138. Madison, , Speech in the House of Representatives, Annals of Congress (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834), 1: 532.Google Scholar
139. Ibid.
140. Ibid., p. 568.
141. Hamilton, A., “Opinion on the Constitutionality of An Act to Establish A Bank,” The Papers of Alexander Hamilton, ed. Syrett, Harold C. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961): 8: 97.Google Scholar
142. Madison, , Speech in House of Representatives, Annals, 2: 1944–1954.Google Scholar For a further discussion see, Finkelman, P., “The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of Historical Analysis,” University of Pittsburgh Law Rev 50 (1989): 349.Google Scholar
143. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
144. See, e.g., Corwin, E., The Doctrine of Judicial Review (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1914), pp. 19–28.Google Scholar
145. Jackson, A., “President’s Veto Message” (10 07 1832)Google Scholar, in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, ed. Richardson, J. (New York: Bur of National Literature, Inc., 1917), 2: 582.Google Scholar
146. Webster, D., 8 Cong. Debates 1232, 1239–1240 (1832).Google Scholar
147. Corwin, E., “The Constitution as Instrument and as Symbol,” APSR 30 (1936): 1078.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
148. Farrand, M., Letter to Edward Corwin (3 01 1939)Google Scholar, in Edward Samuel Corwin Papers, Box 3, Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey.
149. Madison, J., Letter to Mr. Ingersoll (25 06 1831), Letters, 4: 183.Google Scholar
150. Ibid., pp. 183–84.
151. Ibid., p. 184.
152. Ibid., p. 185.
153. Ibid., p. 184.
154. Ibid.
155. See, e.g., Brest, P., “The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,” 60 B.U.L. Rev. 204 (1980)Google Scholar; Farber, D., “The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed,” 49 Ohio St. L. J. 1085 (1988)Google Scholar; Kurland, P., “The Constitution: The Framers’ Intent, the Present, and the Future,” 32 St. Louis U.L.J. 17 (1987)Google Scholar; Powell, H., “The Original Understanding of Original Intent,” 98 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (1985)Google Scholar; and Powell, H., “The Modern Misunderstanding of Original Intent,” 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1513 (1987).Google Scholar
156. Madison, J., Letter to William Cogswell (10 03 1834), Writings, 9: 533.Google Scholar
157. See, e.g., Madison, J., Letter to Robert Garnett, S. (11 02 1824), Letters, 3: 367Google Scholar; Letter to N. P. Trist (2 March 1827), Ibid., p. 565; and Letter to Joseph C. Cabell (18 September 1828), Ibid., p. 636.
158. Madison, J., Letter to William Cabell Rives (12 03 1833), Writings 9: 511, 514.Google Scholar
159. See, e.g., Madison, J., Letter to Thomas Ritchie (15 09 1821), Letters, 3: 228.Google Scholar
160. J. Madison, Letter to Edward Livingston (17 April 1824), Ibid., pp. 435, 436 (1884).
161. Madison, , Letter to Thomas Ritchie, Letters, 3: 228.Google Scholar
162. Ibid.
163. Madison, , Letter to Mr. Ingersoll, Letters, 4: 185.Google Scholar
164. Madison, J., Undated Memorandum on Power of the President to appoint Public Ministers & Consuls in the recess of the Senate, Writings, 9: 91, 92–93.Google Scholar
165. Madison, J., Letter to M. L. Hurlbert (05 1830), Writings, 9: 370, 372.Google Scholar
166. Madison, , Letter to Mr. Ingersoll, Letters, 4: 186.Google Scholar
167. Ibid., p. 185.
168. Ibid., pp. 184–85.
169. Ibid. See, also, Madison, J., Letter to Joseph C. Cabell, Letters, 3: 642–43.Google Scholar
170. Ibid.
171. Ibid.
172. See, Scalia’s, Justice concurring opinion in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3064 (1989)Google Scholar; and his dissenting opinion in South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 2218 (1989)(Scalia, J., dis. op.).
173. Powell, L., “Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint,” The Lesile H. Arps Lecture before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (17 10 1989), text pages 10–13.Google Scholar
174. Madison, , Letter to Mr. ——— (1834), Letters, 4: 349.Google Scholar
175. Ibid., p. 350.
176. Madison, , Letter to Joseph Cabell, Writings, 9: 143.Google Scholar
177. Madison, , Letter to Mr. ——— (1834), Letters, 4: 350.Google Scholar This letter indicates that Madison’s view of the Court’s institutional role matured and that he came to accept the Court as the “surest expositor of the Constitution” with regard to both disputes over federalism and the separation of powers, contrary to suggestion of some scholars. See, Levy, L., Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution (New York: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 103–106.Google Scholar
178. See, Montesquieu, , Spirit of the Laws, 1. 3. 3, pp. 117–18Google Scholar; 2. 24. 14 and 16, pp. 328 and 330.
179. See, Storing, H., ed., The Complete Anti-Federalists, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 3,: 76; 4: 242; 4: 246–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar; 5: 126–27; 5: 264; 6: 238–40. See also Wood, , Creation of the American Republic, pp. 34, 65–69Google Scholar, 92–96, 117–18, 418, 427–28, and 610.
180. Tocqueville, A. De, Democracy in America, ed. Bradley, P. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1945), 1: 304–306Google Scholar; 2: 121–27, and 143–44.
181. See, e.g., Madison, , Memorial and Remonstrance; and Letter to Jefferson, Papers, 11: 295, 298.Google Scholar
182. Madison, , “Who are the Best keepers of the People's Liberties,” p. 247.Google Scholar
