¹ Europe and the German Question (New York, 1940), p. 285.Google Scholar

² General von Seeckt made the interests of the Army and the security of the rearmament program his basis for judging any bid for political power. If those interests were served, he favored the bid; if not, he hindered it.

³ The Nemesis of Power (New York, 1954), p. 21.Google Scholar

⁴ The Nemesis of Power, p. 28.Google Scholar

⁵ Just how the Army played this game is illustrated by the incident concerning the Independents. The Army wanted the latter eliminated from the Provisional Government, but Ebert refused. However, less than two weeks later, on December 23, Ebert and his Cabinet were besieged in the Chancellery by troops of the “Peoples' Marine Division,” and it was necessary that the Army come to the rescue. It is significant that Ebert reformed the Provisional Government without the Independents. The Nemesis of Power, pp. 31–36.Google Scholar

⁶ Craig, Gordon A., “Reichswehr and National Socialism: The Policy of Wilhelm Groener,” Political Science Quarterly, LXIII (06, 1948), 196Google Scholar. Craig added that later Groener felt that Seeckt had kept the Reichswehr too ignorant of political matters and, thus, the Army did not have the experience necessary for perceiving the faults in Nazi policy. Ibid., pp. 207–208.

⁷ In an article “Aus den Groener-Dokumenten,” Phelps, Reginald H. wrote that Groener was generally in favor of the restoration of the Monarchy: “But it was certainly not a monarchical restoration as ordinarily understood.” Deutsche Rundschau, LXXVII (01, 1951), 30.Google Scholar

⁸ The Papers of General von Seeckt, Hans (Washington, D. C.: National Archives, 1949)Google Scholar, Microcopies, Roll 19. Hereafter cited as Seeckt Papers.

⁹ Seeckt Papers, Roll 21.

¹⁰ Seeckt Papers, Roll 21.

¹¹ Seeckt Papers, Roll 21.

¹² Seeckt Papers, Roll 21.

¹³ Seeckt Papers, Roll 21.

¹⁴ Grzesinski, Albert C., Inside Germany (New York, 1939), p. 84Google Scholar. In early March of 1920, the Reichswehrministerium ordered General Walter von Luettwitz, Commander of Gruppenkommando I near Berlin, to disband a marine brigade led by a Freikorps captain named Ehrhardt (sometimes called the Ehrhardt Brigade). In short, Luettwitz was already involved with a Dr. Wolfgang Kapp in a plan to overthrow the Republic, and therefore Ehrhardt's Brigade was allowed to enter Berlin on March 13. Ebert and the government fled to Stuttgart and proclaimed a general strike which was so successful that it left Kapp and Luettwitz isolated and without an ounce of power. On March 17, Kapp fled Berlin and the Kapp Putsch ended in failure.

¹⁵ Fischer, Ruth, Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948), p. 130CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The author noted however: “The establishment of a military dictatorship pure and simple was recognized as an unrealizable goal. … Seeckt especially resisted the tendency of the radicals to push him into the role of a military dictatorship.” Ibid., p. 133.

¹⁶ Minister of Defense Noske had requested both Generals Seeckt and Reinhardt (who, until the Putsch, Kapp, had held the position of Chef der HeeresleitungGoogle Scholar) to call out the Reichswehr against Captain Ehrhardt. Both men had refused.

¹⁷ General Maercker of Maercker's Rifles was one of the more prominent generals to be retired.

¹⁸ Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., The Nemesis of Power, p. 89.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Knight-Patterson, W. M., Germany from Defeat to Conquest (London, 1945), p. 282Google Scholar. Ebert “… renewed with him [Seeckt] the pact which he had sealed with Hindenburg and with Groener a year and a half before.” Wheeler-Bennett, J. W., The Nemesis of Power, p. 88.Google Scholar

²⁰ It is true that when Ebert called a general strike he was given a wholehearted response. However, after the defeat of Kapp the strike continued in the Ruhr, and the government utilized the services of some Freikorps groups to aid in disarming the workers. Along with the Reichswehr these groups helped in restoring order, but not until bitter fighting had ensued. “Order was completely restored by the end of April … the alliance of the Socialists and the generals had triumphed over the workers.” Knight-Patterson, , Germany from Defeat to Conquest, p. 282.Google Scholar

²¹ Not only did von Seeckt move up to head the Army, but Noske was replaced by Gessler, who was a favorite of von Seeckt and the Reichswehr.

²² This opinion is also held by Fischer, Ruth. Stalin and German Communism, p. 133.Google Scholar

²³ “Kapp Putsch—Success or Failure,” Journal of Central European Affairs, VII (01, 1948), 405Google Scholar. It is curious that Stresemann used the same phrasing in writing that when “… the accusation is brought forward that the Reichswehr is a state within a state … one must ask what General von Seeckt could do with his hundred thousand men.” Sutton, Eric, translator, Gustav Stresemann, His Diaries, Letters, and Papers (New York, 1935), Vol. I, 492.Google Scholar

²⁴ Seeckt Papers, Roll 19.

²⁵ See Hallgarten, George W. F., Hitler, Reichswehr, und Industrie (Frankfurt A. M., 1955), pp. 33–40.Google Scholar

²⁶ One case in point occurred shortly before the Hitler Putsch. At the same period that trouble was brewing in Bavaria a major by the name of Buchrucker attempted a rebellion. Buchrucker had issued orders to the units of the “Black Reichswehr” to mobilize at the fortress of Kustrine outside Berlin. The Reich government declared a state of emergency, and Buchrucker approached the Reichswehr headquarters for support for his plan, but instead the Reichswehr ordered his arrest and the putsch ended in failure. “In the future the Army would allow the Black Army to exist … but after Kustrine, Seeckt was more than ever convinced that only the legal way could lead to the reconstruction of Germany's military power.” Waite, Robert G. L., Vanguard of Nazism (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952), p. 253Google Scholar. See also Buchrucker, Major, Im Schatten Seeckt's (Berlin, 1928.)Google Scholar

²⁷ The Bavarian Grown Prince Ruprecht was to be the titular head of the new state.

²⁸ Seeckt's Papers contain an interesting letter dated October 30, 1923, from the Mecklenburg-Strelitzer Landbund. The letter is signed by some halfdozen persons and begins by lauding Seeckt for his work in re-building the Reichswehr to a respectable strength. However, “… only one trouble darkens the horizon: the conflict with Bavaria. We implore you to use all strength necessary that this struggle be brought to a suitable end for the sake of a united Reich. A union of Seeckt and Kahr is the greatest wish of all German patriots.” Roll 15.

²⁹ This was done under the much discussed Article 48 of the German Constitution.

³⁰ A very interesting letter from General von Seeckt to General Groener, dated two days after the Hitler-Ludendorff Putsch, gives some indication as to how Seeckt felt about Ludendorff: “Yes, my dear Groener, our friend L. is truly a leader, and while the opportunity did not present itself during the war, this time he may really get a bullet in the head.” Seeckt Papers, Roll 19.

³¹ “Seeckt und Stresemann,” Deutsche Rundschau, LXXIX (05, 1953), 470.Google Scholar

³² von Rabenau, Friedrich, Hans von Seeckt-Aus seinem Leben, 1918–1936 (Leipzig, 1941), p. 365Google Scholar. General Rabenau also expressed the opinion that von Seeckt would not have been successful in a bid for power either in 1923 or later. Loc. cit.

³³ On November 10, the day after the failure of the Hitler-Ludendorff Putsch, Lord D'Abernon recorded a note on Seeckt: “Some of his subordinates who aim at a military regime complain that he has insufficient political ambition.” And again: “… he (Stresemann) also seemed confident regarding the loyalty of von Seeckt, who is popularly supposed to aspire to the dictatorship himself.” Rapallo to Dawes, 1922–1924 (Garden City, New York, 1930), pp. 288, 289.Google Scholar

³⁴ Seeckt Papers, Roll 15.

³⁵ Seeckt Papers, Roll 15.

³⁶ I Paid Hitler (New York, 1941), p. 84.Google Scholar

³⁷ “General Hans von Seeckt and Russia, 1920–1922,” The Journal of Modern History, XXI (03, 1949), 33–34Google Scholar, f.n. Curiously enough Stresemann recorded in a note of November 9, 1923, that he had received a complaint from the Allies to the effect that the Hitler Putsch illustrated that the Bavarian citizens were by no means disarmed. Stresemann scoffed at the idea, and wrote: “It was more probable that many men in Germany had kept their rifles, and still had them; the Government was not in a position to search every house.” Stresemann Papers, Vol. I, 202–203Google Scholar. The relationship that existed between Seeckt and Stresemann was a curious one. Hans Gatzke, in a recent work based upon some unpublished Stresemann documents, has written that just how far Stresemann was opposed to Seeckt is not clear. It is clear, however, that Seeckt's opposition to the policies of Stresemann was a constant source of irritation. Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany (Baltimore, 1954), p. 13Google Scholar. Gatzke wrote that when the Reichswehr was attacked as the stronghold of monarchism and reaction, and some of the Reichswehr violations of the Versailles Treaty were revealed to the public, Stresemann became very angry: “He was well aware both of the Reichswehr's secret arrangements with Russia and its rearmament efforts at home. And it was largely due to his patient labors that the military fetters of Versailles … were gradually loosened. … Stresemann conveniently supplied the diplomatic front, behind which ‘Seeckt perfected his military foundation’.” Ibid., p. 15. Gatzke wrote that Seeckt never felt friendly toward Stresemann regardless of how much he acted the champion of the Reichswehr cause. Seeckt not only disliked Stresemann personally, Gatzke continued, but objected violently to Stresemann's Western orientation. Ibid., p. 38.

³⁸ Seeckt Papers, Roll 26.

³⁹ It is obvious from von Seeckt's writings that he expected trouble from the politicians in carrying out his plans for secret rearmament. In a letter to his wife in February, 1919, Seeckt wrote: “I can see that my battle to renew German military strength is not going to be against the enemy (Allies). It is going to be against those representatives in Germany who are afraid to take steps in the direction of re-building. … Politics is the art of the possible—not the impossible.” Seeckt Papers, Roll 28.

⁴⁰ Friedrich Minoux was a general director in industry for Hugo Stinnes.

⁴¹ Deutsche-National-Volks-Partei.

⁴² The Putsch, Hitler-Ludendorff in 11, 1923.Google Scholar

⁴³ Seeckt Papers, Roll 26.

⁴⁴ Grzesinski, Albert, Inside Germany, pp. 88–89Google Scholar. He also added that: “The Reichswehr has always been the mysterious political sphinx of Germany.” Loc. cit. In writing of Nazi-Reichswehr relationships following the Putsch, Henri Lichtenberger wrote that: “From then on the Nazis and the army had very little to do with each other. The leaders of the Reichswehr showed no sympathy for a party ‘which aims to overthrow the constitutional regime of the German Reich’.” The Third Reich (New York, 1937), p. 173.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Wheeler-Bennett, John W., The Nemesis of Power, p. 153.Google Scholar