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Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as National Policymakers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

Cornell W. Clayton
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Extract

The activities of state attorneys general have received little scholarly attention despite their growing importance as national policymakers. This article examines how New Federalism and divided government during the past two decades has altered the political context of state legal work and how state attorneys general have responded. In addition to establishing new mechanisms for integrating state law enforcement policies, state attorneys general have assumed a more coordinated and proactive litigating posture in the federal courts. These developments have allowed states to launch effective challenges to federal law enforcement policy and to protect state regulation from federal preemption.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 56 , Issue 3: Special Issue on Public Law , Summer 1994 , pp. 525 - 553
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1994

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References

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62. U.S. Reports is not as accurate as LEXIS and tends to underreport Supreme Court amicus data. Nevertheless, because LEXIS only tracks amicus briefs back to 1979 previous studies relying on LEXIS have sacrificed longitudinal overview for slight increases in accuracy. Because this study is primarily interested in longterm trends in the role of state attorneys general, it utilizes data from U.S. Reports instead. Although this will introduce some error into the sample, that error should remain random and consistent across time and therefore should not effect observations about amicus trends. Those seeking to replicate any part of this study should also be aware that while LEXIS reports amicus briefs by the date that the brief is filed, the U.S. Reports reports briefs by the Supreme Court term when the case is decided. Inconsistency from year to year will occur depending upon the data source. These however should wash-out over time.

63. Kearney and Sheehan, “Supreme Court Decision Making.”

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78. See Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (1984); and Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S.Ct.1649 (1985). For a discussion of the impact of these decisions and the Court's trend toward limiting lower court review of agency action see Clayton, , Politics of Justice, pp. 178–80.Google Scholar

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80. See Webster, “The Emerging Role of State Attorneys General.”