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ACTION TYPES IN STIT SEMANTICS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2017

JOHN HORTY*
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
ERIC PACUIT*
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
*
*PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND COLLEGE PARK, MD 20742, USA E-mail: horty@umd.edu
PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND COLLEGE PARK, MD 20742, USA E-mail: epacuit@umd.edu

Abstract

Stit semantics grows out of a modal tradition in the logic of action that concentrates on an operator representing the agency of an individual in seeing to it that some state of affairs holds, rather than on the actions the individual performs in doing so. The purpose of this paper is to enrich stit semantics, and especially epistemic stit semantics, by supplementing the overall framework with an explicit treatment of action types. We show how the introduction of these new action types allows us to define a modal operator capturing an epistemic sense of agency, and how this operator can be used to express an epistemic sense of ability.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2017 

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