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BELIEVING EPISTEMIC CONTRADICTIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 August 2017

BOB BEDDOR*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, National University of Singapore
SIMON GOLDSTEIN*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE SINGAPORE E-mail: phibrs@nus.edu.sg
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY LINGNAN UNIVERSITY HONG KONG E-mail: simon.d.goldstein@gmail.com

Abstract

What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2017 

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