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CONTRACTIONS OF NONCONTRACTIVE CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 December 2014

ROHAN FRENCH  and
DAVID RIPLEY
ROHAN FRENCH*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Monash University
DAVID RIPLEY*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut
*
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY WELLINGTON RD MONASH UNIVERSITY CLAYTON, VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA E-mail:rohan.french@gmail.com
†DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY 101 MANCHESTER HALL, 344 MANSFIELD RD UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, STORRS CT 06269 USA E-mail: davewripley@gmail.com
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Abstract

Some theorists have developed formal approaches to truth that depend on counterexamples to the structural rules of contraction. Here, we study such approaches, with an eye to helping them respond to a certain kind of objection. We define a contractive relative of each noncontractive relation, for use in responding to the objection in question, and we explore one example: the contractive relative of multiplicative-additive affine logic with transparent truth, or maalt.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 506 - 528
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2014 

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