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SUPERVALUATION ON TREES FOR KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 December 2014

Abstract

A method of supervaluation for Kripke’s theory of truth is presented. It differs from Kripke’s own method in that it employs trees; results in a compositional semantics; assigns the intuitively correct truth values to the sentences of a particularly tricky example of Gupta’s; and – it is argued – is acceptable as an explication of the correspondence theory of truth.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2014 

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References

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