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AN ARGUMENT FOR CONJUNCTION CONDITIONALIZATION

  • LEE WALTERS (a1) and J. ROBERT G. WILLIAMS (a2)
Abstract
Abstract

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents automatically true? That is, is Conjunction Conditionalization: (X ∧ Y) ⊃ (X > Y) valid? Stalnaker and Lewis think so, but many others disagree. We note here that the extant arguments for Conjunction Conditionalization are unpersuasive, before presenting a family of more compelling arguments. These arguments rely on some standard theorems of the logic of counterfactuals as well as a plausible and popular semantic claim about certain semifactuals. Denying Conjunction Conditionalization, then, requires rejecting other aspects of the standard logic of counterfactuals or else our intuitive picture of semifactuals.

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Corresponding author
*SOMERVILLE COLLEGE OXFORD, OX2 6HD, UK E-mail: lee.walters@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS WOODHOUSE LANE, LEEDS LS2 9JT, UK E-mail: j.r.g.williams@leeds.ac.uk
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