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AXIOMATIZING SEMANTIC THEORIES OF TRUTH?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 January 2015

MARTIN FISCHER ,
VOLKER HALBACH ,
JÖNNE KRIENER  and
JOHANNES STERN
MARTIN FISCHER*
Affiliation:
MCMP, LMU München
VOLKER HALBACH*
Affiliation:
University of Oxford
JÖNNE KRIENER*
Affiliation:
Birkbeck College, London
JOHANNES STERN*
Affiliation:
MCMP, LMU München
*
*LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN MUNICH CENTER FOR MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY GESCHWISTER-SCHOLL-PLATZ 1 80539, MÜNCHEN, GERMANY E-mail: M.Fischer@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
†NEW COLLEGE OXFORD, OX1 3BN, UK E-mail: volker.halbach@philosophy.ox.ac.uk
‡DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, BIRKBECK COLLEGE LONDON, WC1E 7HX, UK E-mail: jkriener@runbox.com
LUDWIG-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT MÜNCHEN MUNICH CENTER FOR MATHEMATICAL PHILOSOPHY GESCHWISTER-SCHOLL-PLATZ 1 80539, MÜNCHEN, GERMANY E-mail: Johannes.Stern@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
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Abstract

We discuss the interplay between the axiomatic and the semantic approach to truth. Often, semantic constructions have guided the development of axiomatic theories and certain axiomatic theories have been claimed to capture a semantic construction. We ask under which conditions an axiomatic theory captures a semantic construction. After discussing some potential criteria, we focus on the criterion of ℕ-categoricity and discuss its usefulness and limits.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , June 2015 , pp. 257 - 278
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2014 

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