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BELIEVING EPISTEMIC CONTRADICTIONS

  • BOB BEDDOR (a1) and SIMON GOLDSTEIN (a2)
Abstract
Abstract

What is it to believe something might be the case? We develop a puzzle that creates difficulties for standard answers to this question. We go on to propose our own solution, which integrates a Bayesian approach to belief with a dynamic semantics for epistemic modals. After showing how our account solves the puzzle, we explore a surprising consequence: virtually all of our beliefs about what might be the case provide counterexamples to the view that rational belief is closed under logical implication.

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Corresponding author
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE SINGAPORE E-mail: phibrs@nus.edu.sg
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY LINGNAN UNIVERSITY HONG KONG E-mail: simon.d.goldstein@gmail.com
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