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THE LOGIC OF JUSTIFICATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2008

SERGEI ARTEMOV
SERGEI ARTEMOV*
Affiliation:
Programs in Computer Science, Mathematics, and Philosophy, Graduate Center CUNY
*
*PROGRAMS IN COMPUTER SCIENCE, MATHEMATICS, AND PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE CENTER CUNY 365 FIFTH AVENUE NEW YORK, NY 10016 E-mail:sartemov@gc.cuny.edu
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Abstract

We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t: F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. We state a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is a robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic. As a case study, we offer a resolution of the Goldman–Kripke ‘Red Barn’ paradox and analyze Russell’s ‘prime minister example’ in Justification Logic. Furthermore, we formalize the well-known Gettier example and reveal hidden assumptions and redundancies in Gettier’s reasoning.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 1 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 477 - 513
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2008

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References

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