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ON THE LOGIC OF FACTUAL EQUIVALENCE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2015

FABRICE CORREIA
FABRICE CORREIA*
Affiliation:
Université de Neuchâtel
*
*INSTITUT DE PHILOSOPHIE UNIVERSITÉ DE NEUCHÂTEL ESPACE LOUIS-AGASSIZ 1 2000 NEUCHÂTEL SWITZERLAND E-mail:fabrice.correia@unine.ch
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Abstract

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Say that two sentences are factually equivalent when they describe the same facts or situations, understood as worldly items, i.e. as bits of reality rather than as representations of reality. The notion of factual equivalence is certainly of central interest to philosophical semantics, but it plays a role in a much wider range of philosophical areas. What is the logic of factual equivalence? This paper attempts to give a partial answer to this question, by providing an answer the following, more specific question: Given a standard propositional language with negation, conjunction and disjunction as primitive operators, which sentences of the language should be taken to be factually equivalent by virtue of their logical form? The system for factual equivalence advocated in this paper is a proper fragment of the first-degree system for the logic of analytic equivalence put forward in the late seventies by R. B. Angell. I provide the system with two semantics, both formulated in terms of the notion of a situation’s being fittingly described by a linguistic item. In the final part of the paper I argue, contra a view I defended in my “Grounding and Truth-Functions” (2010), that the logic for factual equivalence I advocate here should be preferred to Angell’s logic if one wishes to follow the general conception of the relationships between factual equivalence and the notion of grounding put forward in the 2010 paper.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Symbolic Logic , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 103 - 122
Copyright
Copyright © Association for Symbolic Logic 2015 

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