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PLURALISM IN LOGIC

  • HARTRY FIELD (a1)
Abstract

A number of people have proposed that we should be pluralists about logic, but there are several things this can mean. Are there versions of logical pluralism that are both high on the interest scale and also true? After discussing some forms of pluralism that seem either insufficiently interesting or quite unlikely to be true, the paper suggests a new form which might be both interesting and true; however, the scope of the pluralism that it allows logic is extremely narrow.

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*PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, 5 WASHINGTON PLACE, NEW YORK, NY 10003. E-mail: hf18@nyu.edu
References
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G Boolos . (1985). Nominalist platonism. Philosophical Review, 94, 327–344.

R Carnap . (1934). Logische Syntax der Sprache. Translated into English by A. Smeaton (1959), as The Logical Syntax of Language. Paterson, NJ: Littlefield Adams. Page reference to this version.

H Field . (2008). Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

H Field . (2009a). Epistemology without metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 143, 249–90.

G Kreisel . (1967). Informal rigor and completeness proofs. In I. Lakatos , editor. Problems in the Philosophy of Mathematics, 138–71. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland.

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The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • ISSN: 1755-0203
  • EISSN: 1755-0211
  • URL: /core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic
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