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We present an extension of the basic revision theory of circular definitions with a unary operator, □. We present a Fitch-style proof system that is sound and complete with respect to the extended semantics. The logic of the box gives rise to a simple modal logic, and we relate provability in the extended proof system to this modal logic via a completeness theorem, using interpretations over circular definitions, analogous to Solovay’s completeness theorem for GL using arithmetical interpretations. We adapt our proof to a special class of circular definitions as well as to the first-order case.

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The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • ISSN: 1755-0203
  • EISSN: 1755-0211
  • URL: /core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic
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