Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS AND BEYOND

  • FRANZ HUBER (a1)
Abstract
Abstract

Recent accounts of actual causation are stated in terms of extended causal models. These extended causal models contain two elements representing two seemingly distinct modalities. The first element are structural equations which represent the “(causal) laws” or mechanisms of the model, just as ordinary causal models do. The second element are ranking functions which represent normality or typicality. The aim of this paper is to show that these two modalities can be unified. I do so by formulating two constraints under which extended causal models with their two modalities can be subsumed under so called “counterfactual models” which contain just one modality. These two constraints will be formally precise versions of Lewis’ (1979) familiar “system of weights or priorities” governing overall similarity between possible worlds.

Copyright
Corresponding author
*DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO JACKMAN HUMANITIES BUILDING 170 ST. GEORGE ST.TORONTO CANADA, ON M5R 2M8 E-mail: franz.huber@utoronto.ca
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

R Briggs . (2012). Interventionist counterfactuals. Philosophical Studies, 160, 139166.

H Field . (1978). A note on Jeffrey conditionalization. Philosophy of Science, 45, 361367.

C. Glymour , D. Danks , B. Glymour , F. Eberhardt , J. Ramsey , R. Scheines , P. Spirtes , C. M. Teng , & J Zhang . (2010). Actual causation: A stone soup essay. Synthese, 175, 169192.

N Hall . (2007). Structural equations and causation. Philosophical Studies, 132, 109136.

J. Y. Halpern , & J Pearl . (2005b). Causes and explanations: A structural-model approach. Part II: Explanations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56, 889911.

E Hiddleston . (2005). Causal powers. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 56, 2759.

C. R Hitchcock . (2001). The intransitivity of causation revealed in equations and graphs. Journal of Philosophy, XCVIII, 273299.

C. R Hitchcock . (2007). Prevention, preemption, and the principle of sufficient reason. Philosophical Review, 116, 495532.

D. K Lewis . (1973a). Causation. Journal of Philosophy, 70, 556567.

D. K Lewis . (1979). Counterfactual dependence and time’s arrow. Noûs 13, 455476.

D. K Lewis . (2000). Causation as influence. Journal of Philosophy, 97, 182197.

J Pearl . (2009). Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Inference (second edition).Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

P. P Shenoy . (1991). On Spohn’s rule for revision of beliefs. International Journal of Approximate Reasoning, 5, 149181.

W Spohn . (1988). Ordinal conditional functions: A dynamic theory of epistemic states. In W. L. Harper , and B. Skyrms , editors. Causation in Decision, Belief Change, and Statistics II. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer, pp. 105134.

W Spohn . (2006). Causation: An alternative. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57, 93119.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • ISSN: 1755-0203
  • EISSN: 1755-0211
  • URL: /core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Full text views

Total number of HTML views: 0
Total number of PDF views: 12 *
Loading metrics...

Abstract views

Total abstract views: 145 *
Loading metrics...

* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 28th June 2017. This data will be updated every 24 hours.