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SUPERVALUATION ON TREES FOR KRIPKE’S THEORY OF TRUTH

  • CASPER STORM HANSEN
Abstract

A method of supervaluation for Kripke’s theory of truth is presented. It differs from Kripke’s own method in that it employs trees; results in a compositional semantics; assigns the intuitively correct truth values to the sentences of a particularly tricky example of Gupta’s; and – it is argued – is acceptable as an explication of the correspondence theory of truth.

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*NORTHERN INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN, ABERDEEN, AB24 3UB, UK E-mail: casper_storm_hansen@hotmail.com
References
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The Review of Symbolic Logic
  • ISSN: 1755-0203
  • EISSN: 1755-0211
  • URL: /core/journals/review-of-symbolic-logic
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