Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 September 2019
In this piece I characterise global expressivism, as I understand it, by contrasting it with five other views: the so-called Canberra Plan; Moorean non-naturalism and platonism; ‘relaxed realism’ and quietism; local expressivism; and response-dependent realism. Some other familiar positions, including fictionalism, error theories, and idealism, are also mentioned, but as sub-cases to one of these five.
2 See, e.g., Macarthur, David and Price, Huw, ‘Pragmatism, Quasi-realism and the Global Challenge’, in Misak, Cheryl, ed., The New Pragmatists (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 91–120Google Scholar.
7 Haukioja, J., Review of Braddon-Mitchell, David and Nola, Robert (eds.), Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism, MIT Press, 2009Google Scholar. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 14.08.2009.
10 Peter Menzies and Huw Price, ‘Is Semantics in the Plan?’, in D. Braddon-Mitchell and R. Nola, op. cit. note 2; Price, Huw, ‘The Semantic Foundations of Metaphysics’, in Ravenscroft, Ian, ed., Minds, Worlds and Conditionals: Essays in Honour of Frank Jackson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 111–140CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
15 Ramsey, F. P., ‘General Propositions and Causality’, in Mellor, D. H., ed., Foundations: Essays in Philosophy, Logic, Mathematics and Economics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), 133–51Google Scholar, at 134.
16 McGrath, Sarah, ‘Relax? Don't Do It! Why Moral Realism Won't Come Cheap’, Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9 (2014), 186–214CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at 187. The works cited are Dworkin, Ronald, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Parfit, Derek, On What Matters, Volume 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011)Google Scholar; and Scanlon, Thomas, Being Realistic About Reasons (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
17 Op. cit., 187.
18 See McDowell, John, Mind and World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994)Google Scholar; Campbell, John, ‘A simple view of colour’, in Haldane, J. and Wright, C., eds., Reality: Representation and Projection. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 257–268Google Scholar; Caro, Mario De and Macarthur, David, eds., Naturalism and Normativity (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010)Google Scholar; and Hale, Bob and Wright, Crispin, The Reason's Proper Study : Essays Towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
23 Macarthur, David and Price, Huw, ‘Pragmatism, Quasi-realism and the Global Challenge’, in Misak, Cheryl, ed., The New Pragmatists (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 91–120Google Scholar.
25 Versions of that argument may be found in McDowell, John, ‘Anti-realism and the Epistemology of Understanding’, in Bouveresse, J. and Parret, H., eds, Meaning and Understanding (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1981), 225–248Google Scholar; Boghossian, Paul, ‘The Status of Content’, Philosophical Review 99 (1990), 157–184CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Wright, Crispin, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1992)Google Scholar; and Humberstone, Lloyd, ‘Critical Notice of F. Jackson, Conditionals’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991), 227–234CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
26 As I put it in Facts and the Function of Truth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), the problem isn't in getting the projectivist project (as we then called it) on the road; it is in stopping it anywhere short of a global conclusion.
27 A powerful framework to develop this idea is that of Brandom, Robert, Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. When Brandom asks what one has to be able to do, in order to say particular things, this is an enquiry about the pragmatic grounds of a discourse, in my terminology.
28 Price, Huw, ‘Two Paths to Pragmatism’, in Menzies, Peter, ed., Response-Dependent Concepts (Canberra: Philosophy Program, RSSS, ANU), 46–82Google Scholar; updated version reprinted as ‘Two Paths to Pragmatism II’, in R. Casati and C. Tappolet, eds., European Review of Philosophy 3 (1998), 109–147.
29 See also the discussion in Price, Huw ‘Epilogue: Ramsey's Ubiquitous Pragmatism’, in Misak, Cheryl and Price, Huw, eds., The Practical Turn: Pragmatism in the British Long Twentieth Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 149–162Google Scholar, at 155–156.
30 See my ‘Prospects for Global Expressivism’, in Price, Huw, Blackburn, Simon, Brandom, Robert, Horwich, Paul, and Williams, Michael, Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 147–194CrossRefGoogle Scholar, especially Section 5; and Price, Huw, ‘Wilfrid Sellars meets Cambridge Pragmatism’, in Pereplyotchik, David and Barnbaum, Deborah, eds., Sellars and Contemporary Philosophy (New York and London: Routledge, 2017), 123–140Google Scholar.
31 There may be more to be said about whether the response of this section leaves any real disagreement between GE and LE. Matthew Simpson, ‘What is Global Expressivism?’, Philosophical Quarterly, forthcoming, argues that it does not. In one sense this conclusion is congenial to me, for I don't want there to be a coherent alternative to GE in this neighbourhood. But it does seem overly charitable to traditional proponents of LE, who didn't have the e-representation/i-representation distinction on which the irenic resolution depends.
32 See their respective contributions to Haldane, J. and Wright, C., eds., Reality, Representation, and Projection, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)Google Scholar: Wright's ‘Realism: The Contemporary Debate—W(h)ither Now?’, 63–84; and Johnston's ‘Objectivity Refigured: Pragmatism Without Verificationism’, 85–130.
34 Huw Price, ‘Two Paths to Pragmatism’, op. cit., note 28.
36 Op. cit., 4.
37 Op. cit., 12.
38 In Huw Price ‘Epilogue: Ramsey's Ubiquitous Pragmatism’, op. cit. note 29, and ‘Wilfrid Sellars meets Cambridge Pragmatism’, op. cit. note 30.
39 Op. cit. note 13, 141.
41 See Huw Price ‘Epilogue: Ramsey's Ubiquitous Pragmatism’, op. cit. note 28, 152–156.