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Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value

  • Duncan Pritchard (a1)
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Achinstein P. (1983) The Nature of Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Brogaard B. (2007) “I Know. Therefore, I Understand”, typescript.
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Elgin C. (2004) “True Enough”, Philosophical Issues 14, 113–31.
Elgin C. (Forthcoming). “Is Understanding Factive?”, Epistemic Value, (eds.) Haddock A., Millar A. & Pritchard D. H., Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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Greco J. (2000) Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
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Greco J. (2007) “The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge”, typescript.
Greco J. (Forthcominga) “The Value Problem”, in The Value of Knowledge, (eds.) Haddock A., Millar A., & Pritchard D. H., Oxford University Press, Oxford.
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Pritchard D. H. (2005) Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Pritchard D. H. (2006) “Knowledge, Luck and Lotteries”, in New Waves in Epistemology, (eds.) Hendricks V. F. & Pritchard D. H., Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Pritchard D. H. (2007 a) “Anti-Luck Epistemology”, Synthese 156.
Pritchard D. H. (2007 b) “Recent Work on Epistemic Value”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44, 85110.
Pritchard D. H. (2007 c) “Sosa On Epistemic Value”, 2nd On-Line Philosophy Conference, http://experimentalphilosophy.typepad.com/2nd_annual_online_philoso/2007/05/ernest_sosa.html
Pritchard D. H. (2007 d) “The Value of Knowledge”, typescript.
Pritchard D. H. (Forthcominga). “A Defence of Quasi-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony”, Philosophica.
Pritchard D. H. (Forthcomingb) “Greco on Knowledge: Virtues, Contexts, Achievements”, The Philosophical Quarterly.
Pritchard D. H. (Forthcomingc) “Knowing the Answer, Understanding and Epistemic Value”, Grazer Philosophische Studien.
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Zagzebski L. (1999) “What is Knowledge?”, in The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, (eds.) Greco J. & Sosa E., 92116, Blackwell, Oxford.
Zagzebski L. (2001) “Recovering Understanding”, in Knowledge, Truth and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility and Virtue, (ed.) Steup M., Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Zagzebski L. (2003) “The Search for the Source of the Epistemic Good”, Metaphilosophy 34, 1228; and reprinted in Moral and Epistemic Virtues, (eds.) M. S. Brady & D. H. Pritchard, 13–28, Blackwell, Oxford (2003).
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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
  • ISSN: 1358-2461
  • EISSN: 1755-3555
  • URL: /core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements
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