Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-gtxcr Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-23T09:17:34.868Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

‘Let's Look at It Objectively’: Why Phenomenology Cannot be Naturalized

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2013

Dermot Moran
Dermot Moran*
Affiliation:
University College Dublindermot.moran@ucd.ie
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

In recent years there have been attempts to integrate first-person phenomenology into naturalistic science. Traditionally, however, Husserlian phenomenology has been resolutely anti-naturalist. Husserl identified naturalism as the dominant tendency of twentieth-century science and philosophy and he regarded it as an essentially self-refuting doctrine. Naturalism is a point of view or attitude (a reification of the natural attitude into the naturalistic attitude) that does not know that it is an attitude. For phenomenology, naturalism is objectivism. But phenomenology maintains that objectivity is constituted through the intentional activity of cooperating subjects. Understanding the role of cooperating subjects in producing the experience of the one, shared, objective world keeps phenomenology committed to a resolutely anti-naturalist (or ‘transcendental’) philosophy.

Type
Papers
Information
Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements , Volume 72: Phenomenology and Naturalism , July 2013 , pp. 89 - 115
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Varela, Francisco J., ‘The Naturalization of Phenomenology as the Transcendence of Nature. Searching for Generative Mutual Constraints’, Alter 5 (1997), 355–81Google Scholar; Roy, Jean-Michel, Petitot, Jean, Pachoud, Bernard, and Varela, Francisco J., ‘Beyond the Gap: An Introduction to Naturalizing Phenomenology’, in Petitot, J., Varela, Francisco J., Pachoud, B., and Roy, J.-M. (eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 1–83Google Scholar. See also in Zahavi, Dan, ‘Naturalizing Phenomenology’, in Gallagher, S. and Schmicking, D. (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010), 2–19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 See, for instance, Chalmers, David, ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap’, in Alter, T., and Walter, S. (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)Google Scholar and Garcia-Carpintero, Manuel, ‘Qualia that It is Right to Quine’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2003), 357–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See Keil, Geert, ‘Naturalism’ in Moran, Dermot (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy (London & NY: Routledge, 2008), 254–307Google Scholar. Aside from denying their very existence, at least part of the naturalist argument to accommodate qualia turns on whether qualia are representations or information- or content-bearing states. The assumption here is that objective third-person information can be extracted even from first-person states.

4 See Moran, D., Introduction to Phenomenology (London & New York: Routledge, 2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D., The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science (London & New York: Routledge, 2008)Google Scholar. Broadly speaking phenomenology can be divided into descriptive, hermeneutical, and existential.

5 Husserl, E., Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, Husserliana IV, Biemel, Marly (ed.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1954 reprinted 1991)Google Scholar, trans. Rojcewicz, R. and Schuwer, A. as Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989)Google Scholar. Hereafter ‘Ideas II’ followed by English pagination, Husserliana (‘Hua’) volume and German pagination.

6 Husserl, E., Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie, Husserliana VI, Biemel, W. (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1954)Google Scholar, trans. Carr, D., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970)Google Scholar. Hereafter ‘Crisis’ followed by English pagination and Husserliana volume and page number.

7 Husserl, E., Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, Husserliana I, Strasser, Stephan (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1950)Google Scholar, trans. Cairns, D.; Cartesian Meditations (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993)Google Scholar. Hereafter ‘CM’ with English pagination followed by the Husserliana volume and page number. The citation here is CM, 75–6; Hua I 109–10.

8 Husserl, E., ‘Philosophy as Rigorous Science,’ trans. Brainard, M., New Yearbook for Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy 2 (2002), 249–95Google Scholar; originally Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Kultur 1 (1910–1911), 289–341, reprinted in Husserl, E., Aufsätze und Vorträge 1911–1921, Husserliana XXV, Sepp, H. R. and Nenon, T. (eds.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986), 3–62Google Scholar. Hereafter ‘PRS’ with English pagination, followed by Husserliana volume and page number.

9 PRS, 253; Hua XXV, 8.

10 PRS, 253; Hua XXV, 8.

11 Crisis, 194; Hua VI, 197.

12 Husserl, E., Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07, Husserliana XXIV, Melle, U. (ed.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1985)Google Scholar; trans. Hill, Claire Ortiz, Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge. Lectures 1906/07 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008)Google Scholar. Hereafter ‘ELE’ followed by English pagination and the Husserliana volume and page number.

13 ELE, 173; Hua XXIV, 177.

14 ELE, 173; Hua XXIV, 177.

15 E. Husserl, letter to Rickert, 20 December 1915, in Briefwechsel, K. Schuhmann (ed.) in collaboration with E. Schuhmann. Husserliana Dokumente, 10 Volumes (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994)Google Scholar, vol. 5, 178. See also Kern, Iso, Husserl und Kant. Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 35Google Scholar.

16 See Jonas Cohn's letter of 31 March 1911 to Husserl, in Husserl, 1994, vol. 5, 17. On Husserl's relationship with Cohn, see Klockenbusch, Reinald, Husserl und Cohn. Widerspruch, Reflexion und Telos in Phänomenologie und Dialektik, Phaenomenologica 117 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989)Google Scholar.

17 Crisis, 299; Hua VI, 348.

18 Husserl, E., Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation with Heidegger (1927–31), The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article, The Amsterdam Lectures “Phenomenology and Anthropology” and Husserl's Marginal Note in Being and Time, and Kant on the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Sheehan, T. and Palmer, R.E.; Husserl Collected Works VI (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), 238Google Scholar; Hua IX 331. Hereafter ‘Trans. Psych.’ followed by English pagination and Husserliana volume and page number.

19 Crisis, 150; Hua VI, 153.

20 Crisis, 337; Hua VI, 271.

21 The full commitment of Husserl to transcendental idealism can be seen from the texts gathered in Husserl, E., Transzendentaler Idealismus. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1908–1921), Husserliana XXXVI, Rollinger, R. and Sowa, R. (eds.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar and also in Husserl's Afterword to Boyce Gibson's translation of Ideas I, see Husserl, E., ‘Nachwort zu meinen Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie’, Jahrbuch für Philosophic und phänomenologische Forschung vol. XI (1930), 549–70Google Scholar; reprinted in Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Buch, Drittes: Die Phänomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaften, Husserliana V, Biemel, M. (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952), 138–62Google Scholar; trans. as ‘Epilogue’, in Ideas II, 405–30.

22 E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie 1. Halbband: Text der 1–3. Auflage, Husserliana III/1, Schuhmann, K. (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977)Google Scholar, trans. Kersten, Fred, Ideas pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1983)Google Scholar. Hereafter ‘Ideas I’ followed by English page number of Husserliana volume and page number.

23 Husserl, E., ‘Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy’, trans. Klein, T.E. and Pohl, W.E.. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 5 (1974), 9–56Google Scholar.

24 Husserl, E., Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft. Mit ergänzenden Texten, Husserliana XVII, Janssen, Paul (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974)Google Scholar, trans. Cairns, Dorion, Formal and Transcendental Logic (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1969)Google Scholar. Hereafter ‘FTL’ followed by the English page and the Husserliana volume and page number. The citation here is FTL, 234; Hua XVII, 241.

25 E. Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Text der 1. und der 2. Auflage. Hrsg. E. Holenstein, Husserliana XVIII (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975); Logische Untersuchungen. Zweiter Band: Untersuchungen zur Phänomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. In zwei Bänden. Hrsg. Ursula Panzer, Volume XIX (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1984). The English translation is Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, edited with a New Introduction by Dermot Moran and New Preface by Michael Dummett, 2 vols. (London & New York: Routledge, 2001).

26 Curiously Husserl sees Hume as a transcendental thinker and even thinks the transcendental motif as kept alive in a strange way even in Mill, and especially in Avenarius (Crisis, 195; Hua VI 198).

27 PRS, 253; Hua XXV, 8.

28 Crisis §14.

29 Crisis, 62–63; Hua VI, 63–64.

30 Crisis, 63; Hua VI, 63.

31 Crisis, 315–16; Hua VI 294.

32 E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Teil, Erster: Kritische Ideengeschichte, Husserliana VII, Boehm, R. (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1965), 150Google Scholar.

33 Crisis, 85; Hua VI, 85.

34 Hua VII, 155.

35 The German reads: ‘So löst der Bewußtseinsnaturalismus die Subjektivität in ähnlicher Weise in Bewußtseinsatome auf, in letzte sachliche Elemente, unter bloß sachlichen Gesetzen der Koexistenz und Sukzession’ (Hua VII 158).

36 Husserl, Kant and the Idea of Transcendental Philosophy', 17–18.

37 Crisis, §68, 234; Hua VI, 236.

38 Crisis, 232; Hua VI, 235.

39 Hua III/1, 395.

40 Ideas I, xxii; Hua III/1, 8.

41 Ideas I, 35; Hua III/1, 41.

42 Ideas I, §20.

43 Ideas III, 33; Hua V, 38, cf. 43; V, 50.

44 See Maakreel, R.A. and Luft, S. (eds.), Neo-Kantianism in Contemporary Philosophy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana U. P., 2010)Google Scholar.

45 See, inter alia, Sperber, D., Explaining Culture: A Naturalistic Approach (London: Blackwell, 1996)Google Scholar and Barkow, J., Kosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (eds.), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

46 See Moran, D., Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An Introduction, Cambridge Introductions to Key Philosophical Texts Series (Cambridge & New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), especially 178–217CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

47 See Husserl, E., Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925, Husserliana IX, Biemel, W. (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968)Google Scholar, trans. Scanlon, John, Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures, Summer Semester 1925 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977)Google Scholar, esp. §16.

48 Crisis, 362; Hua VI, 372.

49 Crisis, 367; Hua VI, 377.

50 Crisis, 52; Hua VI, 52. Husserl usually employs the verb ‘to sediment’ (sedimentieren) or the verbal noun ‘sedimentation’ (Sedimentierung), see, e.g., Crisis, 149; Hua VI, 152; Crisis, 246; Hua VI, 249; Crisis, 362; Hua VI, 373.

51 Crisis §40.

52 Crisis, 362; VI, 373.

53 My translation, Hua VII, 125. The German reads: ‘Ohne Überwindung des “Psychologismus” und des Objektivismus (<ohne> Positivismus in einem guten Sinn) überhaupt ist freilich keine Philosophie der Vernunft möglich – und das sagt ebensoviel wie eine Philosophie schlechthin. Aber ohne die Überwindung des Sensualismus, des Bewußtseins-Naturalismus, ist nicht einmal eine Psychologie als echte objektive Wissenschaft möglich. Eine Psychologie, die das Grundfeld aller psychologischen Erfahrungstatsachen, das des Bewußtseins, nur in naturalistischer Mißdeutung, also seinem ursprünglichen Wesen nach überhaupt nicht kennt, werden wir uns weigern müssen, als eigentliche Wissenschaft anzuerkennen,’ in Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24), 215.

54 Crisis, 208; Hua VI, 212.

55 Crisis, 205; Hua VI, 209.

56 Ideas I, 129; Hua III/1, 107; see also Hua XXXIV, 258 where he accuses anthropologism of ‘falsely absolutizing a positivistic world’.

57 Nagel, T., The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

58 Crisis, 165; Hua VI, 168.

59 See Husserl, E., ‘Pure Phenomenology: Its Method and Field of Investigation’, trans. Jordan, Robert Welsh, in Husserl. Shorter Works, McCormick, P. and Elliston, F. (eds.) (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 10–17Google Scholar.

60 See Meillassoux, Quentin, After Finitude: An Essay On The Necessity Of Contingency, trans. Brassier, R. (London: Continuum, 2008)Google Scholar.

61 Fink, Eugen, ‘Vergegenwärtigung und Bild I’, in Fink, E., Studien zur Phänomenologie 1930–1939, Leo Van Breda, Herman (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966)CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 11, my translation.

62 See, for instance, Paul Natorp, ‘On the Subjective and Objective Grounding of Knowledge’, trans. L Phillips and D. Kolb, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 12 (1981), 245–266CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

63 See, for instance, Longino, H., Values and Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

64 Husserl, E., Ding und Raum. Vorlesungen 1907, Husserliana XVI, Claesges, U. (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973)Google Scholar, trans. Rojcewicz, R.; Thing and Space: Lectures of 1907, Husserl Collected Works VII (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Hereafter ‘DR’ with the English pagination followed by the Husserliana volume and page number.

65 DR, 44; XVI, 51.

66 Husserl, E., Analysen zur passiven Synthesis. Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten (1918–1926), Husserliana XI, Fleischer, M. (ed.) (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988)Google Scholar, 11; trans. Steinbock, A.J. as Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis. Lectures on Transcendental Logic, Husserl Collected Works Volume IX (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 48Google Scholar. Hereafter ‘APS’ with the English pagination followed by the Husserliana volume and page number.

67 APS, 38; Hua XI, 3.

68 Ideas I, 362; Hua III/1, 315.

69 DR, 55; Hua XVI, 65.

70 Crisis, 251; Hua VI, 254–55.

71 Ideas II, 192; Hua IV, 183.

72 Crisis 139–40; Hua VI, 142–43.

73 See Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis (1929); translated as ‘The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle’, in Sarkar, S. (ed.), The Emergence of Logical Empiricism: from 1900 to the Vienna Circle (New York, NY: Garland Publishing, 1996), 321–40Google Scholar.

74 ‘The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle’, quoting Russell, B., Our Knowledge of the External World (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1914, reprinted 1922)Google Scholar, 14.

75 See, for instance Churchland, P.S., Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986)Google Scholar.

76 Ideas II, 311; Hua IV, 297.

77 Crisis, 204; VI, 208.

78 CM, 85; Hua I, 118.

79 CM, 137; Hua I, 164.

80 CM §60.

81 It has to be recognised that a number of naturalist philosophers, e.g. John R. Searle, have attempted an account of social constitution that remains within the naturalist perspective. Searle, for instance, defends the existence of a mind-independent world and argues that ‘it simply does not follow from the fact that all cognition is within a cognitive system that no cognition is ever directly of a reality that exists independently of all cognition’, Searle, J.The Construction of Social Reality (London: Allen Lane, 1995), 175Google Scholar. But it is precisely the claim of phenomenology that the ‘mind-independent world’ is an achievement of transcendental constitution.

82 Husserl, E., Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Texte aus dem Nachlass. Zweiter Teil. 1921–1928, Husserliana XIV, Kern, Iso (ed.) (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1973), 90Google Scholar.

83 Hua XXXIX 320, my translation. See Husserl, E., Die Lebenswelt. Auslegungen der vorgegebenen Welt und ihrer Konstitution. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1916–1937), Husserliana XXXIX, Sowa, R. (ed.) (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008)Google Scholar, see especially 404.

84 Trans. Phen., 98; Hua IX, 250.