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Mind and Illusion


Much of the contemporary debate in the philosophy of mind is concerned with the clash between certain strongly held intuitions and what science tells us about the mind and its relation to the world. What science tells us about the mind points strongly towards some version or other of physicalism. The intuitions, in one way or another, suggest that there is something seriously incomplete about any purely physical story about the mind.

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Frank Jackson , ‘Epiphenomenal Qualia’, Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982), 127–36

Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker , ‘Conceptual Analysis, Dualism and the Explanatory Gap’, Philosophical Review 108 (1999), 146

David J. Chalmers and Frank Jackson , ‘Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation’, Philosophical Review 110(2001), 315–61

Frank Jackson , Critical Notice of Susan Hurley, Natural Reasons, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (1992), 475–87

Gilbert Harman , ‘The Intrinsic Quality of Experience’, Philosophical Perspectives 4 (1990), 3152

John Foster , The Nature of Perception (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)

Alex Byrne , ‘Intentionalism Defended’, Philosophical Review 110 (2001), 199240

Richard G. Heck Jr., ‘Nonconceptual Content and the Space of Reasons’, Philosophical Review 109 (2000), 483523

Alex Byrne , ‘Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts’, Philosophical Studies 86 (1997), 103–129, see p. 117

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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
  • ISSN: 1358-2461
  • EISSN: 1755-3555
  • URL: /core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements
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