¹ I say ‘Rawlsian-style’ rather than ‘Rawlsian’ since I think there is much of value in the method Rawls employs, but much less of value in the assumptions he makes and the conclusions he thereby endorses, as discussed in The Law of Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999)Google ScholarPubMed. Importantly, the method I describe provides a way we can try to help people think through what it would be reasonable to agree to in the choosing situation I go on to outline.

² Many people raise questions of the following kinds when talk of social contracts is introduced: Is the contract supposed to be actual or hypothetical? If only hypothetical then why does a purely hypothetical contract have any binding force anyway? And if it has no binding force, then why adhere to it? I see talking in terms of social contracts as a way to specify what expectations various parties to the contract may reasonably have of each other: it is simply a way of fleshing out what those reasonable expectations might be. So, in answer to the questions listed: no, the contract developed assuming the ideal world presupposition is neither an actual contract nor a purely hypothetical one. It is a way to sift through what (actual) parties might reasonably expect of one another, by imagining a certain (hypothetical) choosing situation. Talking about social contracts is a way to talk about, and so uncover, the reasonable expectations people might have of one another (especially in situations of ongoing cooperation).

³ They will also have information about those who dissent from these common views.

⁴ Here I do not mean what Rawls calls ‘the basic structure’ since there is anyhow so much confusion in Rawls's own account of what this is. (See, for instance, Cohen, G. A., If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000], especially 134–147Google Scholar.) Rather the basic framework covers the basic rules of interaction, both individual and institutional, governing human beings in the world.

⁵ Delegates will be given detailed information about the resources available to finance provisions for currently existing generations. They will also be provided with our current state of knowledge concerning the rate at which resources may be used to ensure sustainability.

⁶ Perhaps someone may wonder whether there is only one important principle at issue here, the principle concerning protection from real opportunities for serious harms, since the freedoms highlighted are important because being deprived of them can lead to serious harm. I prefer my formulation because it brings into better view two key features that would be selected in the normative thought experiment.

⁷ Delegates would want certain minimum guarantees about what counts as permissible treatment. Heading the list of guarantees we would choose would be guarantees against assault, torture, imprisonment without trial or sufficient warrant, extreme coercion of various kinds (such as slavery) and so forth. But as I have also suggested, it would be reasonable for them to add some freedoms governing dissent, conscience, speech, association, and movement.

Would this idea really need further justification? Perhaps someone might press for one, especially someone concerned with the idea that those not from liberal democracies might not see this emphasis on freedom as so important or even reasonable. So let me say more about why I think the level of attention I give to freedom can be expected to be universal. If you do not know anything about what sort of position you will occupy under the new arrangements, why would you allow some people to have more freedom of a very basic kind than others? Unless you agree that everyone should have equal basic freedom, you might end up (say) giving some people more basic freedom than you have: you might deny yourself the freedom to go about your business free from assault, though others enjoy this liberty. Given their lack of knowledge about their particular interests, contractors would be most rational in agreeing to equal basic liberties. Similarly, it would not be rational to agree to adopt (say) racist or sexist practices, or practices that favour certain religions over others, since one may find oneself at the receiving end of such practices once the conference concludes. It would be more rational not to place constraints on one's liberties and opportunities, since it would be rational to have more rather than less freedom to pursue whatever your goals turn out to be.

⁸ Indeed, what could be a more fundamental harm than being deprived of one's livelihood or the ability to eke out a livelihood for oneself and one's dependents?

⁹ I have suggested that a rough guiding principle we would choose is to have social and political arrangements that allow reasonable opportunities for us to be enabled to meet our basic needs. But wouldn't we want more? Would we find it reasonable to endorse something like a Global Difference Principle, or more substantive equality? As I go on to discuss in the next section, a needs-based principle is in fact most often chosen (in relevant experiments) and this for compelling reasons as we see.

¹⁰ Questions about the kind of favouritism we may show to co-members of our group can only be addressed once there is commitment to the basic framework with all its protections. Assuming this is the case and we have a suitably well organised basic structure in which vital interests are protected, all have prospects for decent lives and as much control over those lives as is consistent with protection of vital interests, it may be permissible to favour other interests of compatriots and in other ways be partial to members of one's group in conferring further benefits, so long as this is not in conflict with provision of the basic agreed framework. Theoretically, at the very least, there is some permissible space for favouring our compatriots in certain matters, but the extent of the favouritism we may show must be governed by the commitment we all have to support the basic framework and does not include (for instance) favouring the non-basic interests of compatriots above more needy non-compatriots, since this would not be selected in the normative thought-experiment.

¹¹ Frohlich, Norman and Oppenheimer, Joe, Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory (Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 1992)Google Scholar.

¹² Ibid., 201.

¹³ Ibid., 35.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ The tasks consisted of correcting spelling mistakes.

¹⁸ Ibid., 56–7.

¹⁹ Ibid., 59.

²⁰ Typical of the points made on this issue were these two sets of comments:

1. ‘I would like to see that everyone at least has the basic things. After that I don't really care. [If the floor is too low] … a lot of people are going to be starving, and they will be without shelter and housing’ (Transcripts, 99).

2. ‘If you have people that are really poor, … they have a tendency to just stay there because you know there isn't enough nutrition, they can't get an education, and all these kinds of things. But if you put it on a certain minimum, then they have a chance to get out of that situation. They have a chance.’ (Transcripts, 72).

²¹ Ibid., 61–62.

²² Ibid., 63.

²³ Since there was such a high level of support for a floor-constraint principle, can we say the principle is a fair rule? Frohlich and Oppenheimer go on to extensive discussion to check whether various factors may have undermined the execution and design of the experiments and so what we can say about the results. They argue that the subjects are not so homogenous in values or background that the resulting choices simply reflect that homogeneity rather than universal preference, (ibid., 74)

They seem particularly concerned that they are not just reporting people's antecedent preferences. They show how the experiments did make a difference to participants’ views, since their rankings, preferences and confidence levels all change during the experiments. After extensive analysis they conclude that ‘the shifts in both preference and confidence are clear evidence of considerable movement caused by both the learning and decision phases’ (ibid., 104).

²⁴ Ibid., 118.

²⁵ de la Cruz-Dona, Rena and Martina, Alan, Diverse Groups Agreeing on a System of Justice in Distribution: Evidence from the Philippines (Australia National University, Canberra: Mimeo, 2000)Google Scholar; Jackson, Michael and Hill, Peter, ‘A Fair Share,’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 7 (1995), 69–179Google Scholar; Lissowkski, Grzegorz, Tyszka, Tadeusz and Okrasa, Wlodmierz, ‘Principles of Distributive Justice: Experiments in Poland and America,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (1991), 98–119Google Scholar; Tatsuyoshi, , Saijo, , Takahashi, Shusuke, and Turnbull, Stephen, ‘Justice in Income Distribution: An Experimental Approach’ Mimeo presented at the 1996 ISA, San Diego, 04 18, 1996Google Scholar. Other experimental evidence for the salience of needs in issues in distributive justice can also be found in a host of other places, such as, Bar-Hillel, Maya and Yaari, Menahem, ‘Judgements of distributive justice,’ in Mellers, Barbara and Baron, Jonathan, Psychological perspectives on justice: Theory and applications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 55–84Google Scholar; Lamm, Helmut and Schwinger, Thomas, ‘Norms concerning Distributive Justice: Are Needs Taken into Consideration in Allocation Decisions?’ Social Psychology Quarterly 43 (1980), 425–429Google Scholar; and Miller, David, ‘Distributive Justice: What the People Think,’ Ethics 102 (1992), 555–593Google Scholar, especially, 570 - 576.

²⁶ Consider, for instance, the recommendations that were captured in the Earth Charter (eg Principle 9), and the Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development (eg Principle 18). The general thrust of the Millennium Development Goals is also (arguably) an example of this focus.

²⁷ For more on arguments targeting libertarians see (for instance) Brock, Gillian, ‘Is Redistribution to Help the Needy Unjust?’, Analysis 55 (1995), 50–60Google Scholar, reprinted in Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs, Brock, Gillian (ed.) (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 173–183Google Scholar.

²⁸ While I think we can derive the other conditions all conceptually, by thinking about the nature of human agency and what must be required for its development and the exercise of it, getting at this last need may be more a matter of looking at empirical evidence. There is a huge amount of empirical evidence that not meeting this need can significantly impair one's psychological health see, for instance, Kellmer-Pringle, M., The Needs of Children, 2nd edn (London: Hutchinson, 1980)Google Scholar, Seligman, M., Helplessness (New York: Freeman, 1980, especially 137)Google Scholar; Brown, George and Harris, Tirril, Social Origins of Depression (London: Tavistock, 1978)Google Scholar; Naroll, Raoul, The Moral Order: an Introduction to the Human Situation (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1983)Google Scholar.

²⁹ Doyal, Len and Gough, Ian, A Theory of Human Need (Basingstoke: MacMillan Education Ltd, 1991)CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed.

³⁰ Ibid., 190.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Miller, David holds such a view in On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), see for instance 76–77Google Scholar.

³⁴ ‘Oil and Corruption’ New Zealand Herald editorial, 9th 04, 2002, 10Google ScholarPubMed.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Miller, David, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’, The Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (2001), 453–471CrossRefGoogle Scholar.