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Truthmakers, Realism and Ontology1

Abstract

Together, these entail that for every true proposition p, there exists some thing which could not exist and p be false.

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Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements
  • ISSN: 1358-2461
  • EISSN: 1755-3555
  • URL: /core/journals/royal-institute-of-philosophy-supplements
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