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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 April 2018
This article examines the origins and influence of ideological index scores—where liberal and conservative interest groups rate legislator performance on selected roll call votes. Two such groups founded in the mid-twentieth century—the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) and the Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA)—were crucial to the development of this type of metric, transforming roll call analysis from detailed tabular scorecards into streamlined percentage scores showing how often a lawmaker voted “right.” ADA and ACA scores have been heavily utilized in political science as proxies for liberalism and conservatism and used to demonstrate the growing polarization of the congressional parties. Archival evidence suggests, however, that those scores were intended to create the very phenomenon they have been used to measure. They were deeply political rather than objective metrics, which the ADA and ACA used to guide their electoral activities in accordance with an increasingly partisan strategic plan. Each group directed campaign resources toward incumbent lawmakers they rated highly, but they did so unevenly—with the ADA favoring liberal Democrats over Republicans and the ACA showing a preference for conservative Republicans over time. By rewarding favored lawmakers in their preferred party, and using scores to highlight and discourage ideological outliers, they hoped to reshape the parties along more distinct and divided ideological lines—to create more “responsible” parties, as prominent political scientists then desired.
Acknowledgments: I am grateful to the Friends of the University of Wisconsin–Madison Libraries for a grant supporting the archival research drawn upon here, and to Al Friedman and Susan Tikalsky for their hospitality during my time in Wisconsin. I am especially grateful to Selwyn College for the Keasbey research fellowship that allowed me to focus on writing this article. I appreciate the helpful feedback that I have received from the editors and anonymous reviewers, and from Adam Sheingate, who commented on an earlier version at the Policy History Conference in 2016.
1. Throughout this article, I use “interest group” in the sense proposed by Truman (1971), as a group forged by shared attitudes rather than a specific type of underlying interest. Such a definition encompasses traditional economic interests, as well as groups organized around specific policy areas or larger ideological commitments—sometimes labeled “issue,” “advocacy,” or “ideological” groups in the wider literature. See Truman, David B., The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion (Berkeley, CA: Institute of Governmental Studies, 1993; reprinted from 1971 2nd edition), 33Google Scholar, 37.
2. For an overview of the use of scores in the battle between informational and partisan theories of congressional organization, see Adler, E. Scott, Why Congressional Reforms Fail: Reelection and the House Committee System (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 48Google Scholar. Both ADA and ACA scores are included in the University of Michigan's Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) data set of interest group scores from 1960 to 1982, which has been heavily utilized in this literature. On interest group ratings and polarization, see Poole, Keith T. and Rosenthal, Howard, “Roll Call Voting and Interest Group Ratings,” in Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting, ed. Poole, Keith T. and Rosenthal, Howard (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 165–83Google Scholar.
3. On methodological issues, see, for example, Snyder, James M. Jr., “Artificial Extremism in Interest Group Ratings,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17, no. 3 (August 1992): 319–45CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4. Cox, Gary W. and McCubbins, Matthew D., Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 60CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5. The most prominent example is the famous 1950 report by the American Political Science Association's Committee on Political Parties, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System,” pt. 2, American Political Science Review 44, no. 3 (1950): 1–96Google Scholar.
6. Personal Papers of V. O. Key, lecture no. 7, “Political Tactics and Aims of Organized Labor,” updated February 18, 1957, accession no. 2000-078, box 9, “Writings: “Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups,” folder, “Chap. III, ‘Workers,’ MSS Notes and Revisions,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, MA (hereafter cited as V. O. Key Papers).
7. Clemens, Elisabeth S., The People's Lobby: Organizational Innovation and the Rise of Interest Group Politics in the United States, 1890–1925 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 124Google Scholar.
8. Rozell, Mark J., Wilcox, Clyde, and Franz, Michael M., Interest Groups in American Campaigns: The New Face of Electioneering, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 114Google Scholar. They cite Hrebenar, Ronald J., Interest Groups Politics in America, 3rd ed. (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), 187Google Scholar, but Hrebenar offers no original source for the date of the Farmers Union scorecard.
9. See the testimony of Samuel Gompers and Frank Morrison before the House Select Committee appointed under Resolution 198, Charges Against Members of the House and Lobby Activities of the National Association of Manufacturers of the United States and Others, vol. 4, 63rd Congress (1913), 2478, 2505, 2547 (hereafter cited as Garrett Committee Hearings).
10. Clemens, People's Lobby, 124–25 (emphasis in original).
11. Ibid., 125.
12. Ibid.
13. Garrett Committee Hearings, 2420.
14. Richard J. McKinney, “An Overview of the Congressional Record and Its Predecessor Publications: A Research Guide,” Law Librarians’ Society of Washington, DC, accessed May 10, 2016, http://www.llsdc.org/congressional-record-overview#15.
15. The first such example appears to be Boeckel, Richard M. and Hull, Raymond, “Record Votes in the Seventy-Second Congress,” Editorial Research Reports 1, no. 23 (June 30, 1932), 423–43Google Scholar. These “record votes” reports subsequently appeared on an annual basis.
16. Ibid., 443.
17. Labor's Non-Partisan League, The Voting Record of Senators and Congressmen on Major Labor, Farm, and Other Social Legislation (Washington, DC: 1938)Google Scholar, New York Public Library.
18. “LNPL Watches Votes Cast by Congressmen,” CIO News, February 26, 1938, p. 3. How extensively these voting records were actually distributed is unclear.
19. Discussing the voting record in a March article, the CIO News reported that LNPL would also “broadcast generally a list of Congressmen and Senators it endorses for re-election,” doing so “some time within the next few weeks” (“Labor Enters Politics: Non-Partisan League Gains Power in Many States,” CIO News, March 26, 1938, p. 5). That later announcement appears to have been the list of “grades”—both “A” for those supported and “D” for those opposed—which was reported in, for example, George E. Reedy, “Lewis Launches Congress Purge, Issues Blacklist,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 16, 1938, pp. 1, 4; “Lewis League Gives Indorsement to 42 Members of House,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 17, 1938, pp. 1, 18; “LNPL Lists Ratings of 80 Congressmen,” CIO News, July 23, 1938, p. 5.
20. The scorecard was published on March 6, 1938, but LNPL did not announce its “grades”—and, by extension, its campaign recommendations—until July 15 and 16. These grades did not appear on the scorecard itself, nor was the scorecard explicitly mentioned in the announcement of the graded candidates, and the two appear to have had only a loose relationship. Judging from a CIO News report, the grades did take into account most of the issues in the scorecard, but they also factored in “other items on which there was no record vote but on which attitudes of some Congressmen were made known” (“LNPL Lists Ratings of 80 Congressmen,” p. 5). The records of lawmakers receiving “A” grades, moreover, varied from complete support for the LNPL's stances to voting in line with its recommendations just six times out of twelve (eight times if absences and pairing arrangements are factored in). The records of those receiving “D” grades, meanwhile, ranged from complete opposition to moderate support, voting in line with the LNPL stance as many as seven times. Furthermore, those with the worst overall records according to the scorecard were not always singled out for a “D” grade and overt LNPL opposition. Rather, the key criterion for grading was a lawmaker's support or opposition to the Wages and Hours Bill, with committee positions and electoral vulnerability also factoring in to the specific selections. Thus all the House incumbents receiving “A” grades had voted against recommittal of that bill in 1937, while all those receiving “D” grades had voted to recommit. On the importance of the Wages and Hours Bill, see, for example, “CIO Puts Out a Congress ‘Blacklist,’” The Emporia Gazette, July 16, 1938, p. 1; Reedy, “Lewis Launches Congress Purge.”
21. The UDA was formed at a meeting in New York on May 10, 1941. “Four Years of UDA” [n.d., ca. 1945], p. 1, Americans for Democratic Action Records 1932–1965 [MSS 3], Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 15, “Go-Ke,” folder 1-15-7, “History of the UDA,” Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereafter cited as ADA Records).
22. Amlie served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1931 to 1932 as a Republican and from 1935 to 1938 as a member of the Wisconsin Progressive Party. He also had a background in socialist politics and had been involved with the Non-Partisan League in the late ’teens and early ’20s, before serving as chairman of the Farmer-Labor Political Federation in the early 1930s—hoping at that time to launch a national third party in the United States. Amlie retired from Congress having failed to win the Progressive nomination for U.S. Senator in 1938, at which point he sought a federal position. He was nominated to the Interstate Commerce Commission by President Roosevelt, but his appointment was blocked by a group of conservative former colleagues, and Amlie ultimately requested the nomination be withdrawn. See Robert E. Long, “Thomas Amlie: A Political Biography” (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 1969); Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Withdrawal of the Nomination of Thomas R. Amlie for the Interstate Commerce Commission,” April 17, 1939, The American Presidency Project, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15745.
23. “What Is the Union for Democratic Action? A Memorandum for Fair-Minded Participants in the Coming Congressional Elections” (1942), p. 6, Thomas Ryum Amlie Papers [MSS 452], public papers, box 85, folder 11, “Union for Democratic Action (UDA)—General, 1942–1947 + n.d.,” Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereafter cited as Amlie Papers).
24. Tom Amlie to Arnold Zander (President of S.C. & M. Employees), November 7, 1952, CIO Political Action Committee (PAC) Collection Papers, 1943–1960s, accession no. 647, box 11, folder 19, “Dudley Correspondence—Democratic National Committee, 1947–56, 1 of 4,” Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI (hereafter cited as CIO-PAC Papers).
25. Thomas R. Amlie to unnamed recipient, October 28, 1942, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 1, UDA Admin. file, “Ad-Ba,” folder 1-1-4, “Amlie, Thomas R., Corr., 1942 Feb–Dec.”
26. Ibid.
27. Thomas R. Amlie to James Loeb, Jr., March 27, 1942, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 1, UDA Admin. file, “Ad-Ba,” folder 1-1-4, “Amlie, Thomas R., Corr., 1942 Feb–Dec.”
28. “A Congress to Win the War,” pt. 2, The New Republic (May 18, 1942): 683, Amlie Papers, box 72, folder 2, “‘A Congress to Win the War’ (The New Republic Supplement), Published version, May 1942.”
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid., 684, 698.
31. Ibid., 706–10. The supplement identified 26 representatives (16 Republicans, 10 Democrats) and three senators (two Republicans, one Democrat) as key “obstructionists.” Those listed included Representatives Eugene Cox (D-GA), Martin Dies (D-TX), Everett Dirksen (R-IL), Hamilton Fish (R-NY), Leland Ford (R-CA), Clare E. Hoffman (R-MI), John Rankin (D-MS), Howard Smith (D-VA), and Joseph Starnes (D-AL), among others. The three senators were C. Wayland “Curly” Brooks (R-IL), Arthur Capper (R-KS), and W. Lee “Pappy” O'Daniel (D-TX).
32. Ibid., 684–94.
33. Most notably, the Senate domestic measures were significantly different from those used for the House, including the motion to recommit the president's 1937 court-packing bill, for example, and the vote on his 1938 Government reorganization plan (on neither of which the House took floor action).
34. “A Congress to Win the War,” 705. Thirty-two senators were up for reelection in all (twenty-three Democrats, eight Republicans, and one independent).
35. Ibid., 699.
36. Ibid. “Progressive” appears on pp. 696 and 707, for example, and “liberal” (in an ideological sense) appears on p. 697, but references to freedom, liberty, and democracy are more common. “war for liberty” appears on p. 711.
37. See, for example, Rep. Frank B. Keefe (R-WI), “Washington News Letter” (1942) and Willard Edwards, “Hoffman Blasts Hitler Approach in Purge Scheme,” Chicago Tribune, May 20, 1942. Both in Amlie Papers, box 85, folder 11, “Union for Democratic Action (UDA)—General, 1942–1947 + n.d.”
38. “Dies Committee Smears UDA as ‘Red,’” UDA Bulletin (June 1942), 3, Amlie Papers, box 85, folder 7, “Union for Democratic Action (UDA)—Bulletins and Press releases, 1942–1946 + n.d.” The Chicago Tribune and Hearst papers also published charges about the UDA's Communistic leanings. See “What Is the Union for Democratic Action?” Amlie Papers, 3.
39. “A Congress to Win the War,” 684. Ten of the House measures were actually drawn from the previous 76th Congress, elected in 1938 and convening in early 1939, while thirteen of the Senate measures preceded the current 77th Congress. Of these, three of the domestic votes took place in 1937, during the 75th Congress.
40. See, for example, Elton Raymond Shaw, “The New Republic Goes Haywire,” reprinted in the Congressional Record 88, no. 102 (May 28, 1942), ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 22, “Ne-Ne,” folder 1-22-2, “New Republic Supplement Corr., 1942, Ap–May.”
41. Arthur Sears Henning, “New Deal-Red Alliance to Get Test at Polls,” Chicago Tribune, May 18, 1942; Amlie Papers, box 85, folder 11, “Union for Democratic Action (UDA)—General, 1942–1947 + n.d.”
42. Other than the conversion of public power projects to military purposes, the connection between other domestic issues and war preparedness was much more tenuous, though the UDA tried valiantly to make the case. See “A Congress to Win the War,” esp. 694, 699, 704–705.
43. Shaw, “The New Republic Goes Haywire.”
44. Remarks of Rep. Clare Hoffman (R-MI), Congressional Record—House, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 28, 1942, p. 4726. See also William Strand, “Rep. Knutson Flays ‘Smear’ by Leftists” [unknown source/date], Amlie Papers, box 85, folder 11, “Union for Democratic Action (UDA)—General, 1942–1947 + n.d.”
45. Morris H. Rubin, “Dividing America's Progressives—New Republic and Union for Democratic Action Produce a Roll Call Which Makes Tories Look Like Liberals and Vice Versa,” The Progressive, May 23, 1942. Reproduced in Congressional Record—House, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 28, 1942, p. 4731, inserted by Rep. Clare Hoffman (R-MI).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Thomas R. Amlie to unknown recipients [1942], ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 1, “Ad-Ba,” folder 1-1-4, “Amlie, Thomas R., Corr., 1942 Feb–Dec.”
50. Ibid.
51. “A Congress to Win the War,” 697, 707. A “small band of Northwestern progressives” who had previously voted their isolationist districts were credited with this “change of heart” (p. 697), while Rep. Howard Smith's voting record was characterized as one of “black reaction” (p. 707). The exclusion of New York Representative Vito Marcantonio from the purge list, the American Labor Party's sole congressman, was especially telling for the UDA's critics. Marcantonio had opposed the Administration's international policy during the Nazi-Soviet pact, but as a domestic liberal, he appeared to get a pass from the UDA. In contrast, Representative James Van Zandt (R-PA), a Naval reservist who had been called to active duty during the session and served in both the Pacific and Atlantic, was listed as an “obstructionist” for his prior involvement with the America First Committee. Van Zandt's domestic conservatism could not be overlooked (p. 709).
52. “What Is the Union for Democratic Action?” 1.
53. “A Congress to Win the War,” 706.
54. Ibid., 696.
55. See “A Congress to Win the War and the Peace,” The New Republic, May 8, 1944, p. 7, Amlie Papers, box 72, folder 2, “‘A Congress to Win the War’ (The New Republic Supplement), published version, May 1942”; James Loeb, Jr., Memorandum to Dan Mebane of The New Republic, December 27, 1943, 1, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 22, “Ne-Ne,” folder 1-22-5, “New Republic Supplement 1944, Corr., 1943, 1944–Ap.”
56. Thomas R. Amlie to unnamed recipient, October 28, 1942, 3, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 1, UDA Admin. file, “Ad-Ba,” folder 1-1-4, “Amlie, Thomas R., Corr., 1942 Feb–Dec.” See also Loeb's Memorandum to Dan Mebane.
57. Thomas R. Amlie to unnamed recipient, October 28, 1942, 3, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 1, UDA Admin. file, “Ad-Ba,” folder 1-1-4. “Amlie, Thomas R., Corr., 1942 Feb–Dec.”
58. Thomas R. Amlie to Lyndon Johnson, n.d. [likely summer 1942], 2, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 1, UDA Admin. file, “Ad-Ba,” folder 1-1-4, “Amlie, Thomas R., Corr., 1942 Feb–Dec.”
59. Ibid.
60. Amlie to Johnson [1942], 1. Johnson had played a significant, if behind-the-scenes, role in coordinating the Democrats’ 1940 congressional campaign (through the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee), and Amlie had heard—erroneously, as it turned out—that he would do so again in 1942.
61. In mid-July, in publicizing its “grades,” LNPL announced opposition to approximately 40 House members, and support for approximately 42. Of the 40 opposed, 26 were Democrats, and 14 were Republicans. Of the 42 candidates supported, 32 were Democrats, four were Democratic-Farmer-Labor, five were Wisconsin Progressives, and one was a Republican. See “Lewis League Gives Indorsement to 42 Members of House,” 1, 18; and Reedy, “Lewis Launches Congress Purge,” 1.
62. On the importance of the wage-hour recommittal vote to LNPL's 1938 grades, see note 21. In contrast to the Administration's main concerns, neither the court-packing nor executive reorganization bill, in fact, appeared in LNPL's earlier scorecard, nor were they mentioned as factors influencing its grading. Nonetheless, of the Administration's main electoral targets, as identified in Dunn, Susan, Roosevelt's Purge: How FDR Fought to Change the Democratic Party (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2010)Google Scholar, LNPL also expressed opposition to Senator Walter George of South Carolina and Millard Tydings of Maryland, though Tydings had actually voted for the Wages and Hours Bill. In this case, LNPL's opposition seems driven more by their support for Tydings’ opponent—Rep. David J. Lewis of Maryland—a former coal miner with strong ties to the labor movement. They also expressed some opposition to Senator Ellison D. Smith of South Carolina, an opponent of the Wages and Hours Bill, though he did not appear to be included in the original announcement of LNPL targets. It is not clear how active LNPL was across these Senate contests, and their announcements and activities were more heavily oriented to House candidates. Notably, they did not formally oppose Representative John O'Connor of New York, chairman of the Rules Committee and the only congressman targeted in Roosevelt's “purge,” since he had voted against recommitting the Wages and Hours Bill. Ultimately, though LNPL's efforts drew some attention, it was the role of the Works Progress Administration in the administration's purge campaign which generated the most criticism in 1938. See Labor's Non-Partisan League, The Voting Record of Senators and Congressmen; Dunn, Roosevelt's Purge. On LNPL opposition to George and Tydings, see Reedy, “Lewis Launches Congress Purge,” 4. For Smith as another target, see “Blacklisted Legislators Show Divided Reactions,” Philadelphia Inquirer, July 17, 1938, p. 16. On LNPL's electoral activities in 1938, see Labor's Non-Partisan League: Its Origin and Growth (Washington, DC: Labor's Non-Partisan League, 1938), 22Google Scholar, The Len and Caroline Abrams DeCaux Collection, accession no. 332, series 4, box 15; “LNPL and PAC Related Reference Materials,” folder 5, “Plan for 1940 Congressional Campaign,” Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit, MI.
63. Dunn credits the “purge” with only one success, the primary defeat of Rep. John O'Connor (p. 215), while Key (1942) notes that only three of the LNPL's House targets were defeated (p. 86). See V. O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New York: Crowell, 1942), 86. On criticisms of the “purge,” including a charge of “invasion,” see Dunn, Roosevelt's Purge, esp. 224–25. Of the LNPL, see, for example, “Blacklisted Legislators Show Divided Reactions.”
64. LNPL supported several Wisconsin Progressive Party candidates in 1938 (including Tom Amlie in his Senate primary), as well as a lone Republican, and internal documents emphasized its nonpartisan policy, where “labor threw its support to those candidates in either major party who stood for social progress” (Labor's Non-Partisan League: Its Origin and Growth, 24). LNPL had also been central to the formation of a third party in New York in 1936—the American Labor Party—and some observers saw LNPL itself as the potential basis for a nationwide third party. See, for example, Taft, Philip, “Labor's Changing Political Line,” Journal of Political Economy 45, no. 5 (1937): 644Google Scholar.
65. John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers was the central figure pushing for LNPL endorsement of Republican presidential nominee Wendell Willkie. On this endorsement and the strategic rationale behind it, see Key, Politics, Parties, 87.
66. For more on the evolution of labor strategy in the 1930s, and the specific role of LNPL, see Emily J. Charnock, “From Ghosts to Shadows: Parties, Interest Groups, and the Rise of Political Action” (unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Virginia, 2013), esp. chapters 4 and 5.
67. “A Congress to Win the War,” 696.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid., 697.
70. Henning, “New Deal-Red Alliance”; Frank R. Kent, “The Great Game of Politics—New Dealers Seen Moving Political Front Forward in Effort to Purge Howard Smith and Gore,” Washington Star, May 28, 1942 (“New Deal blacklist” appears here), reproduced in Congressional Record—House, 77th Cong., 2nd Sess., May 28, 1942, 4731–32, inserted by Rep. Clare Hoffman (R-MI).
71. Burns, James MacGregor, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (1940–1945) (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), 273Google Scholar.
72. Thomas R. Amlie, “Organized Labor and the Congressional Elections to Be Held on November 3, 1942” [memo dated September 21, 1942], 5, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 1 “Ad-Ba,” folder 1-1-4, “Amlie, Thomas R., Corr., 1942 Feb–Dec.”
73. Ibid. Democratic responses to a subsequent 1944 UDA/TNR supplement followed a similar pattern. DNC Publicity Director Paul Porter, for example, wrote to his UDA counterpart that he would use the 1944 supplement extensively but could not actively distribute it. Paul Porter to Mrs. James R. Warburg, May 15, 1944, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 22, “Ne-Ne,” folder 1-22-7, “New Republic Supplement 1944, Mrs. James Warburg file, Corr., 1944, Feb–May.”
74. “A Congress to Win the War and the Peace,” 13.
75. Ibid., 5.
76. Ibid., 14.
77. Of the 18 votes selected for roll call analysis in this edition, only three related to “Foreign Affairs” (compared to ten of 20 in 1942). The 15 other domestic votes were grouped into meaningful subcategories such as “Social Legislation and Agriculture” and “Labor” this time around.
78. Looking at Democrats from former Confederate states, the average score of House members dropped from 76% to 53%, for example, calculated using information presented in the supplement (absences and general pairs—in which lawmakers’ positions on an issue are not recorded—are excluded from the denominator in calculating these percentages). The average score for Georgia's House delegation (whose membership was unchanged between the two editions), dropped from 75% in 1942 to 46% in 1944. Similarly, the South Carolina and Virginia delegations, whose composition also remained the same, dropped from a 76% and 68% in 1942 to 62% and 53% in 1944. On the Senate side, 1942 data are only available for senators running for reelection, while the 1944 supplement included all senators. Of Southern Democratic senators, only the record of Carter Glass (D-VA) appeared improved by 1944, on a percentage basis, and then only because he was paired on nine of eighteen votes, without recording a stance on the issue, thus reducing the denominator for calculation.
79. Phyllis Warburg to Helen Fuller, April 7, 1944, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 22, “Ne-Ne,” folder 1-22-7, “New Republic Supplement 1944, Mrs. James Warburg file, Corr., 1944, Feb–May.”
80. Minutes of UDA Board of Directors Meeting, July 7, 1944, Amlie Papers, box 85, folder 10, “Union for Democratic Action (UDA)—Executive Board & Committee Meetings, 1942–1946.”
81. Amlie continued to be involved with the UDA, however; for example, he was still a member of its Board of Directors in July 1944. See “Minutes of UDA Board of Directors Meeting,” July 7, 1944, Amlie Papers, box 85, folder 10, “Union for Democratic Action (UDA)—Executive Board & Committee Meetings, 1942–1946.”
82. PAC's scorecard, based on twenty measures of concern to labor, is noted in Special Committee on Un-American Activities, “Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States—Report on the C.I.O. Political Action Committee,” 78th Congress, 2nd Sess., House Report No. 1311, March 29, 1944 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 35.
83. NCPAC radio script, “Senator Taft” [1944], Amlie Papers, box 84, folder 10, “CIO-PAC—Congressmen's Records, 1944 + n.d.”
84. NCPAC, “Write Today,” no. 1, August 9, 1944, Amlie Papers, box 85, folder 5, “National Citizens Political Action Committee (NCPAC), 1944–1945 + n.d.”
85. HUAC claimed that the Communist Party was circulating an identical voting chart to that of CIO-PAC, for example. See HUAC Report on the CIO-PAC (H.R. Rep. No. 1311), March 29, 1944, p. 35.
86. See, for example, NCPAC, “Write Today,” no. 10, October 11, 1944, Amlie Papers, box 85, folder 5, “National Citizens Political Action Committee (NCPAC), 1944–1945 + n.d.”
87. The vice president of a Nevada union used CIO measures to evaluate the state's [senior] senator, Pat McCarran, for example, calculating that “McCarran's batting average is a bare fifty percent,” given his “8 minus and 8 plus votes, with 2 absent votes, which in all probability would have been negative.” “The Record of Pat McCarran,” sent by Ralph H. Rasmussen to Members of the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers in the State of Nevada, June 21, 1944, p. 11, American Federation of Labor Records, 1888–1955 [MSS 117A], Series 11: Files of the Office of the President, 1881–1952, file C: William Green Papers, 1934–1951, box 26, “Political Collaboration with the C.I.O., 1937–1947,” folder 4, “Correspondence Political 1944–1947,” Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI.
88. The PAC's national headquarters only made endorsement recommendations at the national level, for president and vice president (ultimately, the CIO executive committee made the actual endorsement, based on the PAC's recommendation). For all other offices the national PAC served only to provide information and guidance to state and local PACs (often created around congressional districts). Testimony of Jack Kroll, “Campaign Expenditures—CIO Political Action Committee,” part 2 of Hearings before the Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures (hereafter cited as Priest Committee Hearings), U.S. House of Representatives, 79th Congress, 2nd Sess., October 14, 1946 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), 96–97.
89. As national PAC research director Mary Goddard observed in the early 1950s, “years of experimentation have brought general agreement that the most useful kind of voting record for political action are master records containing a maximum number of votes for each year together with a full but concise description of the meaning of the vote.” Mary Goddard, “Research for Political Action” (n.d., but likely early 1950s), CIO-PAC Papers, box 17, folder 22, “Political Research by Labor Unions.”
90. See various PAC voting records in CIO-PAC Papers, box 11, folder 26, “Congressional Correspondence—1944–51.” By the early 1950s, the PAC did adopt right/wrong notation, but only after its use by the AFL's new political action committee, Labor's League for Political Education, as discussed later. See, for example, P.A.C., “Senate. Eighty-First Congress 1949–50. Domestic Issues,” June 1951, CIO-PAC papers, box 12, folder 4, “PAC Congressional Voting Record Newsletter, 1950–52.”
91. Kroll Testimony, Priest Committee Hearings, pt. 2, 93. See also p. 99.
92. See “Congressional Quarterly Score Card—Three Exclusive Records,” in Congressional Quarterly, “Individual Voting Records, U.S. Senate, 1949, Complete Voting Record of Senator Kerr,” n.d., p. 4, ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 7, “1952 Elections to 1954 Elections,” folder 6-7-1, “Voting Records and Candidacies, 1952, Jan, Feb, Ap–June.”
93. In 1949, CQ also added “On the Record” scores to its Almanac, measuring how often lawmakers took a public position on an issue—whether by voting or otherwise declaring their stance through a pairing arrangement or in response to CQ queries. More significantly, in 1953 they began to calculate a “presidential support” score, measuring how often legislators voted in accordance with the president's publicly declared positions, building from the presidential “scoreboard” they had produced in previous Almanacs, showing how much of the president's program had been accomplished. In 1957, “Economy Voting” scores were a further addition, measuring the extent to which lawmakers “supported or opposed economy efforts on roll-call votes directly affecting Federal Government spending.” This became a broader “Federal Role” score from 1960, evaluating a larger subset of votes which touched on issues of “federal responsibility and power.” A final important addition was the “conservative coalition score” in 1959—identifying votes in which a majority of Southern Democrats and Republicans opposed a majority of Northern Democrats, and measuring the extent to which lawmakers voted with that coalition. See Congressional Quarterly Almanac 6 (1949), 54; volume 9 (1953), 77–79; volume 13 (1957), 96; volume 15 (1959), 141; and volume 16 (1960), 131.
94. See, for example, Labor's League for Political Education, “The Record They Stand On!” (1948), CIO-PAC Papers, box 12, folder 6, “Congressional Voting Records, 1945–58.” “Acid test” appears in the Minutes of the National Committee of Labor's League for Political Education, November 17, 1948, p. 1, V. O. Key Papers, box 9, “Writings: “Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups,” folder, “Chapter III—4th ed. Materials Used, folder 2 of 2.”
95. In a 1946 midterm analysis, the votes of defeated liberal legislators on 15 key issues were noted as 14-1, for example, or 15-0 (“with the approved votes listed first”). “Who Have Been Lost?” UDA Congressional Newsletter, November 14, 1946, p. 2, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 23, “Ne-New York, Ad-Co,” folder 1-23-2, “Newsletter, Corr. 1943, Oct–1947, Feb.”
96. “Elections: 1946: Your Chance to Change Congress Now,” The New Republic, Special supplement (February 11, 1946): 203–31. UDA authorship is not acknowledged in this supplement, but it praises the UDA and urges progressives to join. Preparatory work for a third (1946) UDA/TNR supplement was also located in Americans for Democratic Action Records, Additions 1943–1995 (M97-135) (hereafter cited as ADA Records—Additions), box 1, “Union for Democratic Action, 1945–1947,” folder 1/3—“Election Charts 1946 [UDA],” Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison.
97. On the founding of ADA by “disaffected liberals,” fearing for the legacy of the New Deal under Truman, while rejecting Wallace as an alternative, see Milkis, Sidney M., The President and the Parties: The Transformation of the American Party System since the New Deal (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 156–57Google Scholar. See also Libros, Hal, Hard Core Liberals: A Sociological Analysis of the Philadelphia Americans for Democratic Action (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1975), 12–18Google Scholar.
98. National Board of Directors Meeting, Union for Democratic Action, Minutes, January 5, 1947, ADA Records—Additions, box 1, “Union for Democratic Action, 1945–1947,” folder 1/5 “UDA Minutes.”
99. “Four Years of UDA” [n.d., ca. 1945], p. 4, ADA Records, Series 1: Union for Democratic Action Administrative file, box 15, “Go-Ke,” folder 1-15-7, “History of the UDA.”
100. Milkis, The President and the Parties, 156–57.
101. For a summary of the ADA's political activities, see Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, “Americans for Democratic Action—Its Origin, Aims, and Character—And Its Designs upon the Democratic Party,” April 19, 1955, p. 18, ADA Records, Series 2: Administrative file, 1946–1965, box 24 (Admin. file, “A”–ADA), folder 2-24-8, “Americans for Democratic Action—Its Origin, Aims, and Character and Its Designs upon the Democratic Party, Editions of 1955 and 1958.”
102. Ibid., 19.
103. See “Report Card for 80th Congress,” ADA World, August 26, 1947; ADA World, Special Supplement, July 1948. Both in Wisconsin Historical Society Library, Madison, WI, microforms, reel P36307.
104. On the ADA's campaign in Hébert's Louisiana 1st district, see Bell, Jonathan, The Liberal State on Trial: The Cold War and American Politics in the Truman Years (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 153–54Google Scholar.
105. Address of Congressman F. Edward Hébert, Radio Station W.N.O.E., no. 9, August 30, 1948, p. 6. See also Address No. 4, August 13, 1948, p. 1, Transcribed by the Textile Workers Union of America, both in ADA Records, Series 7: Public Relations file, box 91, folder 7-91-1, “Primaries, Campaigns, Elections, 1948.”
106. F. Edward Hébert, Address no. 3, August 9, 1948, p. 1, ADA Records, Series 7: Public Relations file, box 91, folder 7-91-1, “Primaries, Campaigns, Elections, 1948.”
107. On the ADA spearheading the platform fight for a more liberal civil rights plank at the 1948 Democratic National Convention, see Berry, Jeffrey M., The New Liberalism: The Rising Power of Citizen Groups (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 10Google Scholar.
108. F. Edward Hébert, Address no. 1, August 2, 1948, p. 3, ADA Records, Series 7: Public Relations file, box 91, folder 7-91-1, “Primaries, Campaigns, Elections, 1948.”
109. Amlie, Thomas R., Let's Look at the Record (Madison, WI: Capital City Press, 1950)Google Scholar, Amlie Papers, box 73, folder 3, “‘Let's Look at the Record’—Published Version, 1950.”
110. Ibid., 19–20.
111. Ibid., 20.
112. Ibid., 7.
113. Ibid. Amlie noted that representatives such as Helen Douglas of California and Henry Jackson of Washington (both Democrats), among others, had “voting records that are from 95 to 100 per cent liberal on the roll calls that have been used,” while others such as Robert Rich of Pennsylvania and John Taber of New York (both Republicans) had “voting records that are from 95 to 99 per cent conservative.”
114. Arthur Krock, for example, the famed New York Times columnist, first wrote about such scores in 1951, and several times thereafter. In his first piece, Krock showed a preference for golfing over baseball analogies in describing them, noting that Senator McFarland “shot a 96” in terms of his individual party unity score. See Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: Why the Coalition Has Ruled Congress,” New York Times, July 19, 1951. In 1953, Krock also referred to the presidential support score as a “superficial box-score” and offered an extensive analysis of CQ data. See Arthur Krock, “In the Nation: The Legislative and Party Record of Congress So Far,” New York Times, July 7, 1953.
115. “Congressional Supplement,” ADA World, September 1953, 1A. Wisconsin Historical Society Library, microforms, reel P36307.
116. Ibid.
117. “ADA Releases Political and Regional Study of 83rd Congress on Key Liberal v. Conservative Issues,” September 24, 1953, ADA Records—Additions, Public Relations files, box 30, folder 30-21, “Press Releases—1948–59.” Individual scores are not provided for House members in the press release, rather, a percentage score is given for the state delegation in Congress.
118. “ADA Releases Political and Regional Study of 2nd Session, 83rd Congress on Key Liberal vs. Conservative Issues,” October 1, 1954, ADA Records—Additions, Public Relations files, box 30, folder 30-21, “Press Releases—1948–59.”
119. “Congressional Supplement,” ADA World, September 1954, Wisconsin Historical Society Library, microforms, reel P36307.
120. Several instances are noted in Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, “Americans for Democratic Action.”
121. Howe, Quincy and Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., eds., Guide to Politics 1954 (New York: Dial Press, 1954)Google Scholar. On Moynihan doing “the actual leg work and preparation,” see Sidney W. Dean, Jr. to Robert R. Nathan, December 28, 1953 and Daniel P. Moynihan to Robert R. Nathan, February 21, 1954, in ADA Records, Series 7: Public Relations file box 78, folder 7-78-5, “Guide to Politics, Corr. 1953, June–1954, July.”
122. Howe and Schlesinger, Guide to Politics 1954, 196 (twelve Senate votes and six House votes were considered).
123. Americans for Democratic Action, Voting Guide 1956: How to Make Your Vote Count (Washington, DC, 1956)Google Scholar.
124. “ADA Congressional Voting Record, 2nd Session of 84th Congress: Democratic Vote Far More Liberal Than Republican on Key Issues,” August 9, 1956; “ADA Releases Political and Regional Studies of First Session of 85th Congress on Key Liberal vs. Conservative Issues,” October 2, 1957; “ADA Finds Record of Congress Is Constructive but Meager: Publishes Voting Record,” September 14, 1958; “ADA Calls First Session a Failure: Devoid of Real Accomplishment and Unresponsive to Challenges of Times,” October 18, 1959, and several others. All in ADA Records—Additions, Public Relations files, box 30, folder 30-21, “Press Releases—1948–59.”
125. “Democratic Vote Far More Liberal Than Republican on Key Issues.”
126. “Liberal quotient” appeared in the ADA's October 1957 press release, for example, and the New York Times adopted it in a related story. Robert R. Nathan also used it in a 1957 memo. See “ADA Releases Political and Regional Studies of First Session of 85th Congress”; “A.D.A. Hails Votes of 48 in Congress: In Listing 100% ‘Liberals’ It Finds Only Democrats,” New York Times, October 2, 1957; Robert R. Nathan, “Memo,” November 1957, p. 2, ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 14, “1956 Elections to 1958 Elections,” folder 6-14-6, “1958 Elections, Congress.” The term liberal quotient subsequently appeared in the Chicago Tribune in September 1960, for example, and again in the New York Times in 1961. See “Morton Cites Johnson Split with Kennedy,” Chicago Tribune, September 20, 1960, and “22 in State Make A.D.A. Honor Roll,” New York Times, October 8, 1961.
127. The 1957 ADA supplement did include a small graph charting “Party Liberalism in Congress” over the eleven years since the ADA's founding, where the Y-axis was labeled “Percent.” Yet there was no explanation of the chart, nor any reference to it in the supplement text. It does suggest, however, that the ADA had retroactively calculated percentages from its earliest scorecards. See “Congressional Supplement,” ADA World, September 1957, 1M.
128. “Legislative Supplement: Roll-Call Record of 1957–1958 General Court,” Bay State Citizen, October 1958, ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 14, “1956 Elections to 1958 Elections,” folder 6-14-3, “1958 Elections, ADA Political Questionnaires.”
129. Ibid.
130. Hearings before the Special Senate Committee to Investigate Political Activities, Lobbying and Campaign Contributions, 84th Congress, 2nd sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957), 651, 658–59 (hereafter cited as McClellan Committee Hearings).
131. Ibid., 653 (Testimony of Charles B. Shuman, October 8, 1956).
132. Ibid., 649–50.
133. Ibid., 655.
134. Ibid., 650.
135. Ibid., 651. (Testimony of Roger W. Fleming, October 8, 1956).
136. Ibid., 653.
137. COPE's “How Your Senators and Representatives Voted 1947–1956” (ca. 1956) included legislation on labor, “general welfare,” “domestic policy,” and “foreign aid.” Box scores summarizing the 1947–56 record (such as “5 right and 11 wrong”) appear in the 1958 update, “How Your Senators and Representatives Voted 1957–1958,” but they were not translated into summary scores. Both in “Congressional Voting Records, 1945–58,” CIO-PAC Papers.
138. Republican Congressional Committee, “A Look at C.O.P.E.’s Political Blackball,” (85th Congress, 1958), National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) Records, 1895–2001, accession no. 1411, Series V, box 62a, folder “UAW Political Activities and Misuses of Union Funds,” Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, DE (hereafter cited as NAM Records).
139. Prior to 1960, the last major party presidential nominee drawn directly from Congress had been Senator Warren G. Harding in 1920 (and Senator Robert LaFollette in 1924, if third party candidates are included).
140. Indeed, both presidential candidates in 1960 had legislative experience, since Republican Richard Nixon had served in the House and the Senate until his election as vice president in 1952, overlapping with Kennedy for part of that time. Both vice presidential candidates, too, were lawmakers—incumbent Senator Lyndon Johnson in the Democratic case, and former Senator Henry Cabot Lodge on the Republican side. Again, their service partly overlapped.
141. “ADA Rates Kennedy ‘Excellent in Congress’,” ADA Campaign Bulletin, issue no. 1, September 27, 1960, ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 15, “1958 Elections to 1960 Conventions—Dem. and Rep,” folder 6-15-7, “1960 Convention—Mimeographed and Other Miscellaneous Materials.”
142. Ibid.
143. See “Congressional Supplement,” ADA World, September 1960; “Congressional Supplement,” ADA World, September 1961; “Congressional Supplement,” ADA World, October 1962. All in Wisconsin Historical Society Library, microforms, reel P36307. The September 1960, October 1961, and October 1962 ADA press releases concerning the supplement do use the term liberal quotient, and have tables detailing scores for individual legislators. “Election of Kennedy Imperative, ADA Says, Citing Need for Strong Liberal Executive Leadership,” September 19, 1960; “Failures of Kennedy's Olive Branch Tactics with Southern Bloc Shown by ADA Record,” October 2, 1961; “Second Session of Congress Totally Inadequate to Times, ADA Says. Never Rose to Challenges of World in Turmoil and Change,” October 29, 1962. All in ADA Records—Additions, Public Relations files, box 30, folder 30-22, “Press Releases—1960–62.”
144. “ADA World Voting Record Supplement—88th Congress, First Session,” “Congressional Supplement,” ADA World 19, no. 1, January 1964, Wisconsin Historical Society Library, microforms, reel P45409.
145. Ibid., 1-S. The four Senators with 100% liberal voting records were Joseph S. Clark (D-PA), Pat McNamara (D-MI), Gaylord Nelson (D-WI), and Maurine Neuberger (D-OR).
146. “ADA World Voting Record Supplement—88th Congress, First Session,” 2-S.
147. “Dear Fellow-Citizen” mailer [1964], ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 16, “1960 Elections,” folder 6-16-4, “Correspondence, 1960, Feb–Oct.”
148. As in 1960, the contest involved a current and former senator with partly concurrent service. Incumbent President Lyndon Johnson had served in the Senate from 1949 until his elevation to the vice presidency in 1961. Goldwater had entered the Senate in 1953, thus overlapping with Johnson for four Congresses (83rd–86th).
149. “Goldwater's Record: Votes and Quotes,” ADA World, September 1964, 5. Wisconsin Historical Society Library, microforms, reel P45409.
150. Ibid.
151. On the rise of nonmember advocacy groups, see Skocpol, Theda, Diminished Democracy: From Membership to Management in American Civic Life (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2003)Google Scholar.
152. The ADA created a “Political Evaluation Committee” in the late 1950s, in part to examine endorsement practices by local chapters, finding that that “the Congressional voting record prepared by the national organization was pretty generally used by the chapters, at least as one factor in endorsement determination.” The picture was inconsistent, however, and they stressed the need for greater national guidance. Report to the National Board from the National Executive Committee, May 1, 1959, p. 2, ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 16, “1960 Elections,” folder 6-16-1, “ADA Political Evaluation Committee, 1959.”
153. The “Candidate Support Committee” raised this general fund. See, for example, John Kenneth Galbraith to Mrs. C. Girard Davidson, September 7, 1967, ADA Records—Additions, box 28, “Political files, 1948–1992,” folder 28-25, “Candidate Support Committee, Referendum ’70.”
154. William L. Taylor to Violet M. Gunther, “List of Senators and Congressmen Deserving of ADA Campaign Support,” August 16, 1960, ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 15, “1958 Elections to 1960 Conventions—Dem. and Rep,” folder 6-15-8, “A.D.A. Activities, General Strategy & Corr., 1960, Jan–Nov.”
155. “Report Card for 80th Congress,” 11.
156. Ibid. The record “makes the Democratic party look better than it really is,” the supplement noted, because several important and potentially divisive progressive issues did not come to a vote.
157. Quoted in Gillon, Steven M., Politics and Vision: The ADA and American Liberalism, 1947–1985 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 19Google Scholar.
158. Amlie, Let's Look at the Record, 23.
159. Ibid. On liberal Republicans bolstering their conservative colleagues, see 21–23.
160. Amlie, Let's Look at the Record, 21–23.
161. Tom Amlie to Arnold Zander, November 7, 1952, CIO-PAC Papers.
162. Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, “Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System.”
163. Susanna H. Davis to Philip Stern, August 19, 1954, ADA Records, Series 7: Public Relations file, box 78, folder 7-78-6, “Guide to Politics, Corr. 1954, Aug–1956, April.” Davis hoped to send promotional flyers about the Guide to the Democratic Digest mailing list. The mailing, however, would come directly from the publishers—with no reference either to the Democratic Party or ADA, thus appearing neutral. At the time of this letter, the once-Republican Senator Morse of Oregon was serving as an independent, but would switch his allegiance to the Democratic Party in 1955. See “Wayne Morse,” United States Senate website, accessed March 23, 2018, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Wayne_Morse.htm
164. Robert R. Nathan, “Memo,” November 1957, p. 1, ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 14, “1956 Elections to 1958 Elections,” folder 6-14-6, “1958 Elections, Congress.”
165. Ibid.
166. Ibid.
167. Staff of the Senate Republican Policy Committee, “Americans for Democratic Action.”
168. Ibid., 67.
169. M. Stanton Evans, “ADA: The Enemy Within. How the Left Achieves Its Political Victories,” Human Events, June 30, 1958, ADA Records, Series 2: Administrative file, 1946–1965, box 73, “Pe-Po,” folder 2-73-6, “Political Attacks on ADA Corr., 1958, Aug.–1962, March.”
170. Ibid.
171. Ad No. 1, “Who's Keeping America from Putting Castro in His Place? Mr. K. or the ADA?” ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 20, “1964 Election Undated Material, Smears on ADA and Replies,” folder 6-20-5, “1964 Elections—Republican Party and National Committee.” This ad script is filed under “Republican Party and National Committee,” though the source is not identified on the script itself.
Another ad explained: “The ADA keeps close tabs on the voting record of every Member of Congress. This is the way they push through their program to socialize America.” “You can fight the ADA by voting against your incumbent rubber stamp Congressman. He's on the ADA Honor Roll.” Ad No. 2, “Just How Close Is America to Socialism?” ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964, box 20, “1964 Election Undated Material, Smears on ADA and Replies,” folder 6-20-5, “1964 Elections—Republican Party and National Committee”
172. The Retail Barrister—A Monthly Labor Law Commentary, vol. 1, no. 9, September 19, 1958. This newsletter was sent to the ADA's Violet Gunther by Richard C. Sachs on October 22, 1958. ADA Records, Series 2: Administrative file, 1946–1965, box 73, “Pe-Po,” folder 2-73-6, “Political Attacks on ADA Corr., 1958, Aug.–1962, March.”
173. Ibid.
174. McClellan Committee Hearings, 655.
175. Ibid.
176. Ibid.
177. COPE had distributed more than ten million copies of its scorecard in 1958, conservative commentator Raymond Moley complained in early 1960, noting this had been a “most vital factor” in its midterm successes. ADA World’s 50,000 copies of its “Congressional Supplement” might look small by comparison, but they reinforced COPE's agenda, working toward the same legislative ends, he claimed. Raymond Moley, “Perspective—A Look at the Record,” Newsweek, February 1, 1960.
178. Testifying before a congressional committee in 1944, for example, Robert M. Gaylord, president of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), acknowledged his organization published votes where the issue was of vital concern to its members, and the tally had not been widely carried in the public press (p. 105). He was also eager to emphasize the lack of judgment associated with their presentation of roll call votes, or intent to shape the voting decisions of the members who would receive the information (pp. 125–26). “Campaign Expenditures,” Part 2 of Hearings before the Committee to Investigate Campaign Expenditures, U.S. House, 78th Cong., 2nd. Sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 105, 125–26.
179. In 1954, for example, the NAM compiled extensive records on congressional voting in the 83rd Congress, which they used to rank legislators and assess likely lobbying prospects. This was referenced in a later report on the 86th Congress—deemed “confidential” by the NAM's Director of Public Affairs, Carl L. Biemiller, and “not for publication or wide-spread dissemination.” Sending it to NAM managers and Public Affairs Directors, he encouraged them to “use your discretion as to the manner which you handle any set of Congressional rankings,” and bear in mind that with the results of 1958, it was “likely to be a long, cold legislative winter.” There was no sense in making enemies by careless handling of something they clearly viewed as sensitive. The information would not even be made available to NAM's own members. See Stricker-Henning Report on the Composition of the 86th Congress—October 3, 1958, NAM Records, Series I, box 5, folder, “Political.”
180. See, for example, Raymond Moley, “A Capital PAC?” Los Angeles Times, December 14, 1954 and Moley, “Perspective”; Brewbaker, James M., “Men to Match My Mountains: A Blueprint for Business Political Action,” Human Events 15, no. 14 (April 7, 1958): 1–4Google Scholar, in NAM Records, Series I, box 48, folder, “Public Affairs Dept. Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC) 1963 100-Q.”
181. ACA would be the most prominent, though not the first conservative organization to engage in score-keeping. Late in 1959, “The Free Citizens Voting Record” appeared, evaluating lawmakers votes in the first session of the 86th Congress, according to “six principles of economic and political freedom.” Produced by “Civic Affairs Associates, Incorporated,” it was the brainchild of Biehl P. Clarke, a former U.S. Chamber of Commerce staffer who had developed their “practical politics” program—encouraging businessmen to become more involved in politics. Moley's February 1960 “Perspective” column, in fact, was prompted by its publication. This scoring experiment was more limited than the ACA's would prove to be, however, both in scale and duration. While it gained coverage from Congressional Quarterly Weekly in 1960 and 1962, when a follow-up was produced, the Free Citizens Voting Record disappeared thereafter, and CQ noted in 1968 that Civic Affairs Associates was “no longer in existence.” See Civic Affairs Associates, Incorporated, “The Free Citizens Voting Record, First Session—86th Congress” (1959), Wisconsin Historical Society Library; “Interest Groups Rate Congress,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 18, no. 41 (1960): 1655–66Google Scholar; “Groups Rate Congress: ADA, ACA, COPE, CAA, NFU, AFBF Ratings on Every Member,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 20, no. 43 (1962): 2019–28Google Scholar; “Fact Sheet: Groups Rate Congress,” pt. 1, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 26, no. 17 (1968): 915Google Scholar.
182. Diamond, Sara, Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States (New York: Guilford Press, 1995), 61Google Scholar. Board members are listed in Synon, John J., “The ACA-Index: How to Trap a Demagog,” Human Events 12, no. 21 (May 26, 1960): 2Google Scholar. Americans for Constitutional Action Records, 1955–1971 [MSS 309], subject files, box 21, folder 21:2, “ACA Clippings, 1958–1967,” Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, WI (hereafter cited as ACA Records).
183. Robert S. Allen, “Inside Washington: New ACA Opposes ADA,” Christian Science Monitor, October 27, 1957, ADA Records, Series 7: Public Relations file, box 92, “Re-Ri,” folder 7-92-3, “Right Wing Materials—Americans for Constitutional Action, 1957, Dec–1962, Oct.”
184. The quotation comes from the ACA press release announcing its formation, as inserted into the Congressional Record by Senator Karl Mundt (R-SD), and noted in Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 61. The full quote was to “force back together the conservative coalition which for over 20 years successfully stopped the greatest excesses toward statism in this country.” See Congressional Record—Senate, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., August 4, 1958, p. 15901, and “Group to Defend Free Enterprise,” New York Times, August 5, 1958. ACA explicitly described its major aim as “to assist in the reelection of members of Congress who, by their voting records, have shown their dedication to the principles of Constitutional Conservatism.” ACA, “Action, Campaign, Aims” leaflet [1960?], ACA Records, Publications, box 20, folder 10, “ACA Brochures, 1959–1968.”
185. “ADA View Countered by Right Wing Group,” Milwaukee Journal, May 22, 1960, p. 30.
186. Americans for Constitutional Action, ACA-Index: A Statistical Evaluation of the Voting Record of United States Senators (1955-1959) and Members of the House of Representatives (1957-1959) (Washington, D.C. Human Events, 1960)Google Scholar. Synon mentions the production timeframe in “The ACA-Index: How to Trap a Demagog,” 2.
187. “Vital to the survival” appears in an explanatory broadsheet, “Reasons for the ACA Index” [1960], 1; “strengthen or weaken” in an “ACA Performance Fact Sheet” [1960]. Both in ACA Records, Publications, box 20. folder 20:4 “ACA Ratings of Congressmen, 1960.”
188. The need to reverse “the race toward statism” appears in the (Confidential) Report of the Executive Director [1959], 1. ACA Records, Executive Director's Records, box 3, folder 7, “Executive Director's Memoranda File, 1958-1962.” “Piecemeal socialism” appears in Evans, “ADA: The Enemy Within.”
189. ACA, “Reasons for the ACA Index” [1960], 2. The 1960 compilation included 77 Senate votes going back as far as 1955, and 40 House votes from 1957 onward.
190. Ibid. Other indices were constructed around private versus public ownership, efficiency versus government waste, private markets versus government regulation, and local self-government as opposed to centralized control. Only the “National Security Index” escaped such an oppositional title, since presumably everyone knew which side you should be on.
191. The ACA did, however, acknowledge using inverted ADA scores as a general check on their own estimate of a lawmaker's conservatism. See, for example, “Comments on the ACA Consistency Index Charts by Ben Moreell,” October 12, 1964, ACA Records, subject files, box 22, folder 22:8, “ACA Voting Index, Comments by Moreell, 1964.” Later in the 1960s, the ACA also began to use ADA and COPE scores in a more comparative way, including them alongside their own ratings in various publications.
192. Rev. I. E. Howard, “A Standard for the People,” Christian Economics, September 6, 1960, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:2, “ACA Clippings, 1958–1967.”
193. As Senator Allen J. Ellender (D-LA) wrote to the ACA's Executive Director Kenneth Ingwalson in January 1960: “I am glad to have your views and recommendations … and I will certainly bear them in mind when legislation affecting those issues is presented to the Senate for action.” Sen. Allen J. Ellender to Kenneth W. Ingwalson, January 21, 1960, ACA Records, Congressional Correspondence, 1959–1971, box 13, folder 13:5, “ACA Congressional Correspondence, 1960. Alphabetical.”
194. Rep. Ancher Nelsen to Kenneth Ingwalson, May 4, 1960, ACA Records, Congressional Correspondence, 1959–1971, box 13, folder 13:5, “ACA Congressional Correspondence, 1960. Alphabetical.”
195. “ADA View Countered by Right Wing Group,” Milwaukee Journal, May 22, 1960, p. 30.
196. Rep. Jack Westland to Kenneth W. Ingwalson, June 8, 1960, ACA Records, Congressional Correspondence, 1959–1971, box 13, folder 13:5, “ACA Congressional Correspondence, 1960. Alphabetical.”
197. Sen. Barry Goldwater to Admiral Ben Moreell, May 24, 1960, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:12, “ACA Enclosures, Printed, 1959–1960.” Goldwater's language is suggestive of a solicited and staff-guided endorsement, since ACA Assistant Director John J. Synon had earlier described the Index as “the most penetrating analysis of each member of Congress ever put between covers.” See John J. Synon to DeWitt Wallace, May 13, 1960, ACA Records, subject files, box 22, folder 22:10, “ACA Voting Fact Sheet Mailing to Press, 1960.” He repeated the language in his Human Events article, “The ACA-Index: How to Trap a Demagog,” 4.
198. Synon, “The ACA-Index: How to Trap a Demagog,” 2.
199. As conservative commentator Raymond Moley observed in 1960, scorecards were a “perfectly legitimate and proper means by which to carry on the work of a political organization.” Moley, “Perspective.”
200. Rep. Ronald Cameron (D-CA), for example, accused ACA of being “a reactionary, right-wing extremist group” while trying to clothe itself and the JBS in “an aura of respectability.” “ACA Awards to Congressmen Stir Dispute in House,” Congressional Quarterly, May 31, 1963, p. 847, ACA Records, Distinguished Service Awards (Series), box 14, folder 1, “Distinguished Service Award, 1963, 1965, 1967.”
201. Despite denials of an official connection, some ACA Trustees were connected to the JBS (General Bonner Fellers was “an endorser of the society” and Charles Edison had connections to a Robert Welch-backed publication) but ACA denied either were on the John Birch Society board, as an attack advertisement had claimed. See “This Is Not a Smear!” ad and A.D.A. response [1963], p. 2, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:13, “Extremism, Responses to Charges of, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1967.”
202. Wint Smith to Kenneth W. Ingwalson, June 2, 1960, and June 9, 1960. See also Kenneth W. Ingwalson to Wint Smith, June 6, 1960, ACA Records, Congressional Correspondence, 1959–1971, box 13, folder 13:5, “ACA Congressional Correspondence, 1960. Alphabetical.”
203. Smith to Ingwalson, June 2, 1960: “You seem to forget the fact … that 20 years ago the New Deal begged and promised the farmer to plant more crops to sustain the economy—not only our economy but the economy of the world.” Smith wrote. “Now that there is a surplus you expect us to break every small person, business and bank in our area.”
204. William M. Colmer to Charles A. McManus, December 11, 1961, ACA Records, Congressional Correspondence, 1959–1971, box 13, folder 7, “Congressional Replies to New Ratings, 1961” (McManus had replaced Ingwalson as the ACA's Executive Director in 1961).
205. Minutes of Meeting of Executive Committee of Americans for Constitutional Action, February 5, 1963, p. 21, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
206. “I am not sure where the 3% lapse occurred,” wrote Republican Congressman August Johansen of Michigan in 1960, after learning of his 97% ACA score, “but I will console myself with the knowledge that on the ADA report I scored zero.” Some requested more serious feedback, however. Senator Francis Case (R-SD), for example, asked for further details on how his 71% ACA score had been calculated. “It would be quite helpful for me, as one of those scored, to know the ground rules on which the rating was made,” Case explained. “No doubt we will have other similar measures coming before us in the future.” See Rep. August E. Johansen to Kenneth Ingwalson, May 31, 1960, and Sen. Francis Case to Kenneth W. Ingwalson, October 13, 1960. Both in ACA Records, Congressional Correspondence, 1959–1971, box 13, folder 13:5 “ACA Congressional Correspondence, 1960. Alphabetical.”
207. Americans for Constitutional Action, Right Action, 3, no. 1 (February 1964): 4, ACA Records, Publications, box 20, folder 1, “A.C.A. Right Action, 1962–1964.”
208. Noted in H. Allen Smith to Charles A. McManus, February 16, 1962, ACA Records, Congressional Correspondence, 1959–1971, box 13, folder 7, “Congressional Replies to New Ratings, 1961.”
209. “Gimmick” appears in “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 16, 1965, p. 10, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.” “Favorable publicity” appears in Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Annual Report, 1962,” November 26, 1962, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
210. 1961 figures are in Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Annual Report, 1962,” November 26, 1962; and 1965 figures are in Thomas A. Lane to the Board of Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action, “Annual Report, 1965,” January 29, 1966, p. 3. Both in ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).” 1963 figures are in “Memo from Ben Moreell to the Board of Trustees, Subject: Reception for Members of Congress,” May 28, 1963, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
211. Ben Moreell, Confidential Memo to the Board of Trustees, Subject: Distinguished Service Awards, May 25, 1961, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
212. Ibid.
213. Ibid.
214. The DSA eligibility cutoff, based on cumulative scores, was still 65% in 1964, 1965, and 1966, for example. See Ben Moreell to the Board of Trustees, December 16, 1964; “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 16, 1965, p. 4. Both in ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.” Also “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 29, 1966, pp. 6–7, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 4, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1966–67.” That cumulative scores were used to calculate is evident throughout these references and also emphasized in “ACA Awards to Congressmen Stir Dispute in House,” Congressional Quarterly, May 31, 1963, p. 847.
215. Ben Moreell to Rogers Follansbee, September 14, 1962, ACA Records, Executive Director's Records, box 5, folder 2, “A.C.A. Executive Correspondence, General, 1959–1962.”
216. “Memorandum from Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell and General Thomas A. Lane, Subject: Campaign Budget—1966 Elections,” August 3, 1965, ACA Records, Director's Records, box 4, folder 1, “Executive Director's Memoranda File, 1965–1969.”
217. “Earned Scores by Some “Known-in-News” Senators and Representatives as Measured by the ACA-Index, n.d. [1960], ACA Records, Publications, box 20, folder 20:4, “ACA Ratings of Congressmen, 1960.”
218. “One Man's Meat,” ADA Campaign Bulletin, issue no. 3, October 11, 1960, ADA Records, Series 6: Political file, 1944–1964.
219. “Non-Party Groups Seek to Influence Congressional Races,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 18, no. 41 (1960): 1655–66Google Scholar. The article introduced a series of rating groups, and then offered comparative tables including the ADA, COPE, National Farmers Union, Farm Bureau, the ACA, and Civic Affairs Associates (who produced the “Free Citizens Voting Record” discussed in note 181).
220. Ibid., 1660. In the comparative table, CQ indicates that the ADA, ACA, and Civic Affairs Associates compiled their own percentages, while CQ calculated the COPE, Farmers Union, and Farm Bureau percentages from scorecards these groups produced. CQ did this again to calculate the 1964 ratings, and as late as 1968, CQ was still compiling COPE's percentages from box scores. See “Non-Party Groups Rate Each Senator, Representative,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 23, no. 43 (1964): 2542–48Google Scholar; “Nonparty Groups Rate Each Senator, Representative,” pt. 1, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 26, no. 17 (1968): 915–28Google Scholar.
221. George Lardner Jr., “Groups Join Rating Game for House, Senate,” Washington Post, April 10, 1966, A7.
222. Lardner, for example, highlighted lawmakers receiving “perfect” 100% ACA or ADA scores, and those who “got ADA zeroes” (Ibid.).
223. The headline refers to Senators John Tower (R-TX) and Ralph Yarborough (D-TX), along with Congressman Robert Price (R-TX). “Tower, Price Rated 100, Yarborough 0 by ACA,” Dallas Morning News, September 6, 1967, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:2, “ACA Clippings, 1958–1967.”
224. John Sparks, “Winn Rates First Among Kansans in Conservative Voting in House,” Wichita Eagle, September 6, 1967, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:2, “ACA Clippings, 1958–1967.”
225. Sen. Harry F. Byrd to Admiral Ben Moreell, June 14, 1960, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:12, “ACA Enclosures, Printed, 1959–1960.”
226. Memo from Kenneth W. Ingwalson to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Subject: Report—Major Activities in 1960—ACA,” p. 3, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete)”; “Report on Mailings of the Fact Sheets,” n.d. [1960], ACA Records, Publications, box 20, folder 20:4, “ACA Ratings of Congressmen, 1960.”
227. The “sales” element, however, was somewhat complex. In 1960, at least, ACA did not directly sell the Index over fears that they might jeopardize their tax status as a nonprofit trust. Instead, they partnered with Human Events to publish and distribute it, with copies selling for $15. Individuals could also receive a “free” copy of the performance fact sheet in return for a $5 “gift” to ACA, again reflecting concerns about tax status. See Synon, “The ACA-Index: How to Trap a Demagog”; Kenneth W. Ingwalson to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Progress Report—September 15, 1960,” p. 2, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
228. Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Annual Report, 1962,” November 26, 1962, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
229. Rep. Charles R. Jonas (R-NC) complained that the Index “cost too much money to gain widespread circulation,” for example. Rep. Charles Raper Jonas to Ralph W. Gwinn, November 28, 1960, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:4, “ACA Congressional Candidates, 1960, Survey of by Ralph Gwinn.”
230. Memorandum from Charles A. McManus to Admiral Moreell, Subject: Gwinn Questionnaire, March 2, 1961, ACA Records, Executive Director's Records, box 3, folder 7, “Executive Director's Memoranda File, 1958–1962.”
231. CAM (Charles A. McManus) to Admiral Moreell, Subject: Human Events Rating and ACA Rating, September 19, 1961, pp. 1–2, ACA Records, Executive Director's Records, box 3, folder 7, “Executive Director's Memoranda File, 1958–1962.”
232. Ben Moreell to Charles A. McManus, September 2, 1961, ACA Records, Executive Director's Records, box 3, folder 7, “Executive Director's Memoranda File, 1958–1962.”
233. Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Annual Report, 1962,” November 26, 1962, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
234. 1964 data are in Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Annual Report, 1964,” December 9, 1964, p. 6. The 1965 data are in Thomas A. Lane to the Board of Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action, “Annual Report, 1965,” January 29, 1966, p. 3. The 1966 data are in Thomas A. Lane to the Board of Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action, “Subject: Annual Report, 1966,” March 1, 1967, p. 12. All are in the ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
235. Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Annual Report, 1962,” November 26, 1962, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
236. The ACA compiled interim or “unofficial” ratings every quarter or six months, depending when they had enough “crucial issues” to do so, McManus explained in 1965—typically drawing on votes featured in the ACA's Digest & Tally, a regular newsletter they had introduced in 1961. Then they produced an “official” Index for the congressional session, which may not include all the interim votes. The purpose of the interim scores, McManus added, was “to harass our opponents and compliment our boys.” “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” May 26, 1965, p. 8, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
237. This comment was made by new ACA board member Ralph Beermann, a former Republican congressman from Nebraska. “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” May 26, 1965, p. 11, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
238. “ACA Congressional Rating” leaflet [1967], ACA Records, Publications, box 20, folder 10, “ACA Brochures, 1959–1968.”
239. A 1969 memo mentions “a simplified six paneled statistical pamphlet” entitled “The ACA Congressional Ratings,” which was “our most popular pamphlet prepared to date and approximately 150,000 were distributed.” Memo from Charles A. McManus to General Thomas A. Lane, Re: Annual Report, January 24, 1969, ACA Records, Executive Director's Records, box 4, folder 1, “Executive Director's Memoranda File, 1965–1969.”
240. The ACA was originally formed as a purely national group, and had only a handful of regional affiliates by the mid-1960s. On its original intent not to create local or state chapters, see “Executive Director's Report on Progress of ACA,” July 1959, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
241. The ACA was a “nonprofit trust” which self-identified as a political action group and filed reports with the Clerk of the House of Representatives, as required under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925. Olson, for example, classified the ACA as an “electoral group,” which is a “special variation of the interest group” (p. 359). See Olson, David M., “The Structure of Electoral Politics,” The Journal of Politics 29, no. 2 (May 1967): 352–67Google Scholar. On the campaign finance reforms of the 1970s, see Mutch, Robert E., Buying the Vote: A History of Campaign Finance Reform (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014)Google Scholar, esp. chapters 7–8.
242. Kenneth W. Ingwalson to Wint Smith, June 6, 1960, ACA Records, Congressional Correspondence, 1959–1971, box 13, folder 13:5, “ACA Congressional Correspondence, 1960. Alphabetical.”
243. Kenneth W. Ingwalson to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Progress Report—September 15, 1960,” 1, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
244. The ACA prioritized campaign support for “incumbents with high ACA ratings” who faced “formidable opposition” in their election contests. See Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Annual Report, 1964,” December 9, 1964, p. 7, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete); Thomas A. Lane to the Board of Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action, “Subject: Annual Report, 1966,” March 1, 1967, p. 3, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
245. Thomas A. Lane to the Board of Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action, “Subject: Annual Report, 1966,” March 1, 1967, p. 4.
246. Ibid.
247. ACA was “not normally active in field programs in Primary elections,” McManus noted in early 1965, but they had endorsed 16 primary candidates (14 of whom won), and offered active campaign assistance to one: Rep. Walter Baring (D-NV), a conservative Democrat. In 1966, they hoped to offer “primary support for forty-three candidates,” plus “conditional support” for a further seventeen (presumably conditional upon them winning their primaries, if challenged), “and active opposition to sixty-five.” “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 16, 1965, 10; “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” May 26, 1965, 5; both in ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
248. Thomas A. Lane to the Board of Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action, “Annual Report, 1965,” January 29, 1966, p. 2, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).” This decision seems to have been more a strategic than legal matter, based on “the recommendations of several Members of Congress … that cash contributions to candidates whose campaign organizations are managed by political amateurs are frequently wasted.” Concerns over their nonprofit tax status, however, may have been a further consideration.
249. Ibid.
250. The ACA itself had only five permanent staff members. They spent $109,000 of their $188,000 in 1964 receipts on direct campaign assistance. “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 16, 1965, p. 10, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
251. Thomas A. Lane to the Board of Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action, “Subject: Annual Report, 1966,” March 1, 1967, p. 4, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
252. Charles A. McManus to Admiral Ben Moreell, “Annual Report, 1964,” December 9, 1964, pp. 7–8, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).” On “speech kits,” see “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” May 26, 1965, p. 4, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.” On direct mail lists, see Ben Moreell to Trustees of Americans for Constitutional Action, “Mid-year Report—January 1, 1966 through June 30, 1966,” July 20, 1966, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
253. The amount they typically spent assisting Senatorial candidates was $2,400–$2,600, and $1,500–$1,600 for House members. “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” May 26, 1965, p. 5, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
254. Thomas A. Lane to the Board of Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action, “Subject: Annual Report, 1966,” March 1, 1967, p. 8, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
255. Ibid.
256. The “Programmed Financial Support” initiative was undertaken “in confidence,” the 1971 Annual Report noted. “ACA Annual Report, 1971,” p. 3, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
257. Ben Moreell to Friends of ACA, March 10, 1969, p. 3, and “ACA Annual Report, 1968,” pp. 8–9, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
258. “Confidential Memorandum on 1966 United States Senate Races, Prepared by the Candidate Support Committee of Americans for Democratic Action,” September 1, 1966, ADA Records—Additions, box 28, Political files, 1948–1992, folder 28-25, “Candidate Support Committee, Referendum ’70.” There were additional notes in some cases specifying who the ADA considered to be “the liberal candidate” or deserving of support—primarily for nonincumbents lacking an LQ.
259. Quoted in Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 61.
260. On the way ACA ratings had been used to expose Southern Democrats “posing as conservatives” in Alabama, see “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 29, 1966, p. 20, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 4, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1966–67.”
261. Synon, “The ACA-Index: How to Trap a Demagog,” 2.
262. “An Index to Conservatives,” Richmond News Leader, May 31, 1960, p. 10, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:2, “ACA Clippings, 1958–1967.”
263. Ibid.
264. Ibid.
265. Synon, “The ACA-Index: How to Trap a Demagog,” 4. The highest ACA scorers were almost uniformly Republicans, the lowest scorers Democrats, Synon noted, adding that there was a low to mid-range percentage floor below which no Republicans fell, but through which Democrats plummeted all the way to zero (pp. 2–3).
266. “An Index to Conservatives,” 10.
267. Ibid.
268. “Comments on the ACA Consistency Index Charts—by Ben Moreell,” October 12, 1964, ACA Records, subject files, box 22, folder 22:8, “ACA Voting Index, Comments by Moreell, 1964.” ACA assisted 200 Republicans and just 17 Democrats in the 1964 congressional elections, as calculated from information in “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 16, 1965, p. 5, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
269. Ibid.
270. Ibid.
271. In fact, Moreell's comments on the ACA scores were circulated to Thurmond, who had just officially switched parties on September 16th, 1964. (See annotation on “Memorandum from Admiral Ben Moreell,” October 16, 1964, ACA Records, subject files, box 22, folder 22:8, “ACA Voting Index, Comments by Moreell, 1964”).
272. As Moreell later confirmed, this analysis “serves to encourage the hope that eventually there will be a realignment of the Parties on the basis of conservatism versus modern liberalism.” “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 16, 1965, p. 5, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
273. Viguerie, Richard A. and Franke, David, America's Right Turn: How Conservatives Used New and Alternative Media to Take Power (Chicago, IL: Bonus Books, 2004), 68Google Scholar. Diamond also suggests conservatives began their “efforts to reconstitute the Republican Party with the formation in 1958 of Americans for Constitutional Action (ACA)” (Diamond, Roads to Dominion, 61).
274. The RNC research division was originally established in 1935, while the DNC formed its “Research Division” during the Truman Administration. On the RNC, see A. James Reichley, The Life of the Parties: A History of American Political Parties (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 235; on the DNC, see Milkis, The President and the Parties, 156.
275. See, for example, Schattschneider, E. E., “Pressure Groups versus Political Parties,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 259 (1948): 17–23Google Scholar.
276. See, for example, Grossmann, Matt and Dominguez, Casey B. K., “Party Coalitions and Interest Group Networks,” American Politics Research 37, no. 5 (2009): 767–800CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Koger, Gregory, Masket, Seth, and Noel, Hans, “Partisan Webs: Information Exchange and Party Networks,” British Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (2009): 633–53Google Scholar.
277. Fiorina, Morris P., with Abrams, Samuel J. and Pope, Jeremy C., Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2006)Google Scholar. Fiorina et al., for example, stress the importance of issue activists selecting more ideologically extreme candidates—who are subsequently elected—in creating a polarized legislature. On the influx of northern liberal Democrats into the House in 1958 and 1964, see Rohde, David W., Parties and Leaders in the Post-Reform House (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 7CrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the changing composition of the Republican congressional delegation, see Black, Earl and Black, Merle, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2002)Google Scholar.
278. The archival record detailing ADA and ACA electoral successes is patchy, making it impossible to fully ascertain, on a quantitative basis, the extent to which they helped drive this process. The ACA, for example, calculated its success rate as 74% in 1960 and 73% in 1962, but just 56% in 1964 (though high-scoring incumbents had generally been reelected that year, they noted). See “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” January 16, 1965, pp. 4–5, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.” Similarly for the ADA in 1964, all but one Senate candidate with an LQ of 75% or above had been reelected—making ADA approval a “kiss of victory,” as far as national director Leon Shull was concerned. See “ADA is ‘Kiss of Victory,’” ADA World 19, no. 9, November 1964, p. 1Google Scholar. Wisconsin Historical Society Library, microforms, reel P45409. In 1962 and 1964, Congressional Quarterly provided comparisons of ACA and COPE electoral success rates, based on publicized endorsements, but this analysis excluded the ADA, did not evaluate candidates given campaign support without official endorsement, and was not replicated systematically thereafter. “How Liberal, Conservative Groups Faired in Election,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 20, no. 46 (November 16, 1962): 2157–60Google Scholar (evaluating ACA and COPE performance); “How Endorsed Candidates Fared in Election,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 22, no. 46 (November 13, 1964): 2681–86Google Scholar.
279. The ACA's 1967 “Code of Practice,” for example, reaffirmed the organization's fundamental commitment to electing “constitutional conservatives” and expressed the conviction that “the practice of publicizing the vote rating of each Senator and Representative” had been their most effective device in pursuing that goal. “Americans for Constitutional Action, Code of Practice,” June 19, 1967, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:27, “ACA Platform for Political Action, 1967.”
280. The American Conservative Union was founded in December, 1964, by William F. Buckley, Jr., Brent Bozell, and John Ashbrook, among others. “The American Conservative Union—A History,” accessed July 16, 2015, https://web.archive.org/web/20150716003551/http://conservative.org/acu-history/
281. The first ACU “Rating of Congress” was compiled in 1971, although from 1967 onward ACU had published “The DMV Report”—“a yearly analysis of how frequently liberal and moderate Republicans in Congress had provided the Democratic margin of victory on key legislation” (“The American Conservative Union—A History”). In 1971, Charles McManus (now ACA President) complained that the establishment of “rival” conservative voting analyses had “tended to confuse the public” and strained ACA finances (“ACA Annual Report, 1971,” p. 9, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 [incomplete]”).
282. “ACA Annual Report, 1971,” pp. 1, 12, ACA Records, Publications, box 19, folder 19:8, “Annual and Semiannual Reports, 1958–1971 (incomplete).”
283. The ACA produced an ACA-Index until 1980, at which point it reconstituted itself as the “Americans for Constitutional Action Research Institute”—a tax-exempt 501(c)(3) “educational” organization—and produced an “ACARI-INDEX” for four more years, before disappearing from view. In its round-up of 1985 congressional ratings, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report substituted American Conservative Union (ACU) scores for the now-defunct ACA, marking the first time it had published ACU ratings. See Americans for Constitutional Action Research Institute, “1981 ACARI INDEX: An Analysis of the Voting Record of Each Member in the Congress, 1st Session, 97th Congress” (Washington DC, 1981); “The 99th Congress: 1985 Group Ratings,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 44, no. 47 (November 22, 1986): 2959–66Google Scholar.
284. “RFK, Case, 25 Reps Get 100% in ADA Voting Record,” ADA World 23, no. 11 (November 1968): 1, Wisconsin Historical Society Library, microforms, reel P77-3945.
285. “Heroes” and “zeroes” are labels used in the Communications Workers of America (CWA) scorecard, featured in Melia, Thomas O. and Pfifferling, Sueanne, eds., 98th Congress—How They Rate (Washington, DC: Quadriga Research, 1986)Google Scholar.
286. As an ACA press release explained just before the 1960 election, the ACA-Index could provide voters with information to aid in their choice, but they must “decide for yourself who can be counted on to stand for the principles in which you believe.” “Americans for Constitutional Action News Release,” November 1, 1960, p. 3 (emphasis mine), in ACA Records, News Releases, box 18, folder 6, “A.C.A. News Releases, 1958–1960.”
287. They were people “who measure politics on the ACA's meter.” Charles McDowell, “How to Rate Senators and Bamboozle Yourself,” Richmond Times-Dispatch, September 20, 1967, ACA Records, subject files, box 21, folder 21:13, “Extremism, Responses to Charges of, 1960, 1963, 1964, 1967.”
288. “ADA Voting Record, First Session, 86th Congress,” ADA World, October 1959, 2. Wisconsin Historical Society Library, microforms, reel P36307.
289. “Minutes of the Meeting of the Trustees, Americans for Constitutional Action,” May 26, 1965, pp. 10–11, ACA Records, Board of Trustees Records, box 1, folder 2, “ACA Trustee Minutes, 1960–1965.”
