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Solving stable matching problems using answer set programming

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 March 2016

SOFIE DE CLERCQ ,
STEVEN SCHOCKAERT ,
MARTINE DE COCK  and
ANN NOWE
SOFIE DE CLERCQ
Affiliation:
Department of Applied Mathematics, Computer Science & Statistics, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium (e-mail: SofieR.DeClercq@ugent.be)
STEVEN SCHOCKAERT
Affiliation:
School of Computer Science & Informatics, Cardiff University, Cardiff, UK (e-mail: SchockaertS1@cardiff.ac.uk)
MARTINE DE COCK
Affiliation:
Center for Data Science, UW Tacoma, Tacoma, US Deparment of Applied Mathematics, Computer Science & Statistics, Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium (e-mail: MDeCock@u.washington.edu)
ANN NOWE
Affiliation:
Computational Modeling Lab, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium (e-mail: ANowe@vub.ac.be)
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Abstract

Since the introduction of the stable marriage problem (SMP) by Gale and Shapley (1962), several variants and extensions have been investigated. While this variety is useful to widen the application potential, each variant requires a new algorithm for finding the stable matchings. To address this issue, we propose an encoding of the SMP using answer set programming (ASP), which can straightforwardly be adapted and extended to suit the needs of specific applications. The use of ASP also means that we can take advantage of highly efficient off-the-shelf solvers. To illustrate the flexibility of our approach, we show how our ASP encoding naturally allows us to select optimal stable matchings, i.e. matchings that are optimal according to some user-specified criterion. To the best of our knowledge, our encoding offers the first exact implementation to find sex-equal, minimum regret, egalitarian or maximum cardinality stable matchings for SMP instances in which individuals may designate unacceptable partners and ties between preferences are allowed.

Keywords

Answer set programmingLogic rulesStable marriage problemOptimal stable matchings

Information

Type
Regular Papers
Information
Theory and Practice of Logic Programming , Volume 16 , Special Issue 3: Special Issue on the International Web Rule Symposia 2012-2014 , May 2016 , pp. 247 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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