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THE FINE-TUNING ARGUMENT AND THE SIMULATION HYPOTHESIS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2017

Moti Mizrahi
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Abstract

In this article, I propose that, in addition to the multiverse hypothesis, which is commonly taken to be an alternative explanation for fine-tuning, other than the design hypothesis, the simulation hypothesis is another explanation for fine-tuning. I then argue that the simulation hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘designer’ and ‘supernatural designer of immense power and knowledge’ in much the same way that the multiverse hypothesis undercuts the alleged evidential connection between ‘fine-tuning’ and ‘fine-tuner’ (or ‘designer’). If this is correct, then the fine-tuning argument is a weak argument for the existence of God.

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Type
Research Article
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Think , Volume 16 , Issue 46 , Summer 2017 , pp. 93 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2017 

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References

Notes

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16 Thanks to Marcus Arvan for this point.

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21 Manson and Thrush, ‘Fine-Tuning, Multiple Universes, and the “this Universe” Objection’, 68.