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ON INTROSPECTION AND INTROSPECTIONISM1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 April 2015

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Abstract

For some time now, the topics of introspection, inner experience and so-called first-person approaches to the mental, have been the subject of attention in philosophy, psychology and consciousness studies. Indeed, some philosophers (such as David Chalmers) think that a central task of the latter field is to systematically relate and integrate data about subjective experience (first-person data) and data about behavior and brain processes (third-person data).

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2015 

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References

Notes

2 Heavey, C. L., Hurlburt, R. T. & Lefforge, N. L., ‘Descriptive Experience Sampling: A Method for Exploring Momentary Inner Experience’, Qualitative Research in Psychology vol. 7, 2010, 345368CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 Prolegomena to a Study of Introspection’, The American Journal of Psychology vol. 23, 1912, 427–48CrossRefGoogle Scholar.