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DO COMPASSION AND OTHER EMOTIONS MAKE US MORE INTELLIGENT?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2011

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Extract

Compassion (or ‘feeling with’) has attracted fervent admiration and vehement condemnation. Among the critics are some Stoics and early Christians, and early modern philosophers such as Kant and Spinoza. Characteristics that are regarded as ideal in humans tend to be regarded as divine perfections as well. Accordingly, traditional Christian and Jewish theology includes the belief that God is ‘impassible’, that is, both emotionless (in general) and incapable of suffering (in particular). Divine compassion is precluded on both grounds.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2011

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