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Lisa Bortolotti introduces the arguments about whether dogs can have beliefs.

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Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff, Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology, (MIT Press, 1997): chapter five.
Davidson Donald, ‘Thought and Talk’, reprinted in Davidson D., Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1984), 155-170.
Davidson Donald, ‘What Thought Requires’, reprinted inDavidson D., Problems of Rationality, (Oxford Clarendon Press, 2004), 135-150.
Dennett Daniel, ‘Do Animals have Beliefs?’ In Roitblat Herbert L. and Meyer Jean-Arcady (eds.) Comparative Approaches to Cognitive Science, (Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1995), 111-118.
Dickinson Anthony and Balleine Bernard(2000) ‘Causal cognition and goal-directed action’. In Heyes C. & Huber L. (Eds.), Evolution of cognition, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 185-204.
MacIntyre Alasdair C., Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, (Open Court, 1999).
Mameli Matteo and Bortolotti Lisa‘Animal rights, animal minds, and human mind-reading’, Journal of Medical Ethics (2006) 32, 84-89.
Stich Stephen, ‘Do Animals Have Beliefs?’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1979) 57 (1).
Tolman Edward, Purposive behavior in animals and men (New York: Century, 1932).
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  • ISSN: 1477-1756
  • EISSN: 1755-1196
  • URL: /core/journals/think
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