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The inadequacies of the inter-state institutions and negotiating processes central to international climate policy create a pressing need for governance innovation. This article proposes one promising and feasible approach: strengthening the existing transnational regime complex for climate change. Leading organizations could strengthen the regime complex by forging stronger links among institutions, increasing coordination and collaboration, supporting weaker institutions and encouraging the entry of new ones where governance gaps exist. An enhanced regime complex would have a multilevel structure, enabling transnational institutions to bypass recalcitrant national governments by directly engaging sub-state and societal actors at multiple levels of authority and scale. It would also help to manage recalcitrant states by mobilizing advocacy, demonstration effects and other pressures on governments. Regime entrepreneurs, using the strategy of orchestration, could deploy a range of incentives and other tools of influence to enrol, support and steer transnational organizations.
This contribution is part of a collection of articles from the conference ‘Global Climate Change without the United States: Thinking the Unthinkable’, held at Yale University Law School, New Haven, CT (United States (US)), 9–10 November 2012.
1 Barrett S., Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods (Oxford University Press, 2007), at pp. 84–102.
2 The US refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (n. 13 below) and will not participate in its second commitment period. It has similarly refused to ratify other significant environmental conventions: see M.J. Angelo, R.M. Bratspies, D.B. Hunter, J.H. Knox, N. Sachs & S.B. Zellmer, ‘Reclaiming Global Environmental Leadership: Why the United States Should Ratify Ten Pending Environmental Treaties’, Center for Progressive Reform, CPR White Paper 1201, Jan. 2012, available at: http://www.progressivereform.org/whitePapers.cfm.
3 Snidal D., ‘The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory’ (1985) 39 International Organization, pp. 579–614; Young O.R., ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society’ (1991) 45(3) International Organization, pp. 281–308.
4 Copenhagen Accord, Decision 2/CP.15, FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 Mar. 2010, available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/session/6262/php/view/decisions.php.
5 ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention’, Decision 1/CP.16, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add. 1, 15 Mar. 2011, available at: http://unfccc.int/meetings/cancun_nov_2010/items/6005.php.
6 M.G.J. den Elzen et al., ‘Evaluation of the Copenhagen Accord: Chances and Risks for the 2°C Climate Goal’, May 2010, available at: http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/500114018.pdf; V. Duscha et al., ‘Post-2012 Climate Regime: How Industrial and Developing Nations Can Help to Reduce Emissions – Assessing Emission Trends, Reduction Potentials, Incentive Systems and Negotiation Options’, Feb. 2010, available at: http://www.umweltbundesamt.de/uba-info-medien-e/3954.html; UNEP, ‘Bridging the Emissions Gap’, 2011, available at: http://www.unep.org/publications/contents/pub_details_search.asp?ID=6227.
7 ‘Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action’, Decision 1/CP.17, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add. 1, 15 Mar. 2012, available at: http://unfccc.int/bodies/body/6645.php.
8 D. Bodansky, ‘The Durban Platform: Issues and Options for a 2015 Agreement’, Dec. 2012, available at: http://www.c2es.org/publications?topic=2531.
9 J. Boyle, ‘A Mirage in the Deserts of Doha? Assessing the Outcomes of COP 18’, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2012, available at: http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?id51728; J. Morgan, ‘Reflections on COP 18 in Doha: Negotiators Made Only Incremental Progress’, World Resources Institute, 14 Dec. 2012, available at: http://insights.wri.org; UN Climate Change Secretariat, UNFCCC, ‘June UN Climate Change Conference in Bonn Sees Concrete Progress Toward New Agreement and Speeding Up Climate Action’, 14 June 2013, available at: http://unfccc.int/press/press_releases_advisories/items/7365.php.
10 UNFCCC, Decision 3/CP.17, ‘Launching the Green Climate Fund’, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (2011).
11 UNFCCC, Decision 1/CP.16, ‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention’, Section IV.B (2010).
12 Hardin Russell, Collective Action (Johns Hopkins Press, 1982).
13 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto (Japan), 11 Dec. 1997, in force 16 Feb. 2005, available at: http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php.
14 Boyle, n. 9 above; Morgan, n. 9 above.
15 New York, NY (US), 9 May 1992, in force 21 Mar. 1994, available at: http://unfccc.int.
16 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, ‘Outcome of the Conference: The Future We Want’, A/CONF.216/L.1, June 2012, at p. 19. See also A. Powers, ‘The Rio+20 Process: Forward Movement for the Environment?’ (2012) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 403–12.
17 See ‘The Future We Want’, ibid., e.g., paras 190–2 on climate.
18 F. Dodds & A. Nayar, ‘Rio+20: A New Beginning’, UNEP Perspectives No. 8, Dec. 2012, available at: http://www.unep.org/civil-society/Portals/24105/documents/perspectives/ENVIRONMENT_PAPERS_DISCUSSION_8.pdf; UNEP, ‘United Nations Environment Programme Upgraded to Universal Membership Following Rio+20 Summit’, 21 Dec. 2012, available at: http://www.unep.org/newscentre/Default.aspx?DocumentID=2700&ArticleID=9363&l=en.
19 ‘Format and Organizational Aspects of the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development’, UNGA Res. A/67/L.72, 27 June 2013.
20 See UN Sustainable Development Knowledge Platform, ‘Post-2015 Process’, available at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1561.
21 Abbott K.W., ‘The Transnational Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2012) 30 Government and Policy: Environment and Planning C, pp. 571–90.
22 Ibid.; van Asselt H., Pattberg P., Biermann F. & Zelli F., ‘The Fragmentation of Global Governance Architectures: A Framework for Analysis’ (2009) 9(4) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 14–40.
23 I take the concepts of bypassing and managing from Abbott K.W., Genschel P., Snidal D. & Zangl B., ‘Orchestration: Global Governance through Intermediaries’, in Abbott K.W., Genschel P., Snidal D. & Zangl B. (eds), International Organizations as Orchestrators (Cambridge University Press, 2014 forthcoming).
24 Abbott K.W., ‘Engaging the Public and the Private in Global Sustainability Governance’ (2012) 88(3) International Affairs, pp. 543–64.
25 Keck M.E. & Sikkink K., Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (Cornell University Press, 1998).
26 Abbott K.W. & Snidal D., ‘Strengthening International Regulation through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit’ (2009) 42 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, pp. 501–78.
27 Falkner R., Global Governance – The Rise of Non-State Actors (European Environment Agency, 2011), available at: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/Falkner/_private/2011_EEAreport_GlobalGovernance.pdf.
28 Biermann F. & Pattberg P., ‘Global Environmental Governance: Taking Stock, Moving Forward’ (2008) 33 Annual Review of Environmental Resources, pp. 277–94; K. Raustiala & N.L. Bridgeman, ‘Nonstate Actors in the Global Climate Regime’, Nov. 2007, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1028603; E. Dannenmaier, ‘The Role of Non-state Actors in Climate Compliance’, in J. Brunée et al. (eds), Promoting Compliance in an Evolving Climate Regime (Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 149–76; T. Hale & C. Roger, ‘Orchestration and Transnational Climate Governance’ (2013 forthcoming) Review of International Organizations.
29 Betsill M.M. & Bulkeley H., ‘Cities and the Multilevel Governance of Global Climate Change’ (2006) 12(2) Global Governance, pp. 141–59; Osofsky H.M., ‘Multiscalar Governance and Climate Change: Reflections on the Role of States and Cities at Copenhagen’ (2010) 25 Maryland Journal of International Law, pp. 64–85.
30 Abbott & Snidal, n. 26 above.
31 Andonova L.B., ‘Public–Private Partnerships for the Earth: Politics and Patterns of Hybrid Authority in the Multilateral System’ (2010) 10(2) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 25–53; Bäckstrand K., ‘Accountability of Networked Climate Governance: The Rise of Transnational Climate Partnerships’ (2008) 8(3) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 74–102; Pattberg P., ‘Public–Private Partnerships in Global Climate Governance’ (2010) 1(2) WIREs Climate Change, pp. 279–87.
32 Andonova L.B., Betsill M.M. & Bulkeley H., ‘Transnational Climate Governance’ (2009) 9(2) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 52–73; Pattberg P. & Stripple J., ‘Beyond the Public and Private Divide: Remapping Transnational Climate Governance in the 21st Century’ (2008) 8 International Environmental Agreements, pp. 367–88.
33 Green J.F., ‘Order out of Chaos: Public and Private Rules for Managing Carbon’ (2013) 13(2) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 1–25.
34 Bernstein S., Betsill M.M., Hoffmann M.J. & Paterson M., ‘A Tale of Two Copenhagens: Carbon Markets and Climate Governance’ (2010) 39 Millennium – Journal of International Studies, pp. 161–73.
35 Abbott, n. 21 above; Cole D.H., ‘From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance’ (2011) 2 Climate Law, pp. 395–413; Ostrom E., ‘Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global Environmental Change’ (2010) 20(4) Global Environmental Change, pp. 550–7.
36 Bodansky D., ‘A Tale of Two Architectures: The Once and Future U.N. Climate Change Regime’ (2011) 43 Arizona State Law Journal, pp. 697–713; Falkner R., Stephan H. & Vogler J., ‘International Climate Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a “Building Blocks” Approach’ (2010) 1 Global Policy, pp. 252–62; Hulme M., ‘Moving beyond Climate Change’ (2010) 52(3) Environment, pp. 15–19; Victor D.G., Global Warming Gridlock (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
37 Keohane R.O. & Victor D., ‘The Regime Complex for Climate Change’ (2011) 9(1) Perspectives on Politics, pp. 7–23; Moncel R. & van Asselt H., ‘All Hands on Deck! Mobilizing Climate Change Action Beyond the UNFCCC’ (2012) 21(3) Review of European Community & International Environmental Law, pp. 163–76.
38 Boyd W., ‘Climate Change, Fragmentation and the Challenges of Global Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage’ (2010) 32 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, pp. 457–550.
39 Perez O., ‘Private Environmental Governance as Ensemble Regulation: A Critical Exploration of Sustainability Indices and the New Ensemble Politics’ (2011) 12 Theoretical Inquiries in Law, pp. 543–79.
40 Cole, n. 35 above; Orts E., ‘Climate Contracts’ (2011) 29 Virginia Environmental Law Journal, pp. 197–236; Peel J., Godden L. & Keenan R.J., ‘Climate Change Law in an Era of Multi-Level Governance’ (2012) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 245–80; Hale T. & Held D., ‘Gridlock and Innovation in Global Governance: The Partial Transnational Solution’ (2012) 3(2) Global Policy, pp. 169–81.
41 van Asselt H. & Zelli F., ‘Connect the Dots: Managing the Fragmentation of Global Climate Governance’ (2013 forthcoming) Environmental Economics and Policy Studies.
42 Stewart R.B., Oppenheimer M. & Rudyk B., ‘Reaching International Cooperation on Climate Change Mitigation: Building a More Effective Global Climate Regime Through a Bottom-Up Approach’ (2013) 14(1) Theoretical Inquiries in Law, pp. 273–306. See also Stewart R.B., Oppenheimer M. & Rudyk B., ‘A New Strategy for Global Climate Protection’ (2013) 120(1–2) Climatic Change, pp. 1–12.
43 Krasner S.D., ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables’, in Krasner S.D. (ed), International Regimes (Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 1–22.
44 Raustiala K. & Victor D., ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’ (2004) 58(2) International Organization, pp. 277–309; Alter K. & Meunier S., ‘The Politics of International Regime Complexity’ (2009) 7 Perspectives on Politics, pp. 13–24; Keohane & Victor, n. 37 above.
45 Abbott, n. 21 above.
46 Montreal (Canada), 16 Sept. 1987, in force 1 Jan. 1989, available at: http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/montreal_protocol.php.
47 Geneva (Switzerland), 12 Aug. 1949, in force 21 Oct. 1950, available at: http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Treaty.xsp?documentId=77CB9983BE01D004C12563CD002D6B3E&action=openDocument .
48 Helfer L.R., ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking’ (2004) 29 Yale Journal of International Law, pp. 1–83.
49 Traditional regime complex scholarship focuses heavily on such institutions.
50 Keohane & Victor, n. 37 above.
51 Abbott, n. 21 above; Ostrom, n. 35 above.
52 Cf. van Asselt, Pattberg, Biermann & Zelli, n. 22 above; Zelli F., ‘The Fragmentation of the Global Climate Governance Architecture’ (2011) 2(2) WIREs Climate Change, pp. 255–70; Zelli F. & van Asselt H., ‘The Institutional Fragmentation of Global Environmental Governance: Causes, Consequences and Responses’ (2013) 13(3) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 1–13.
53 See, e.g., Jessup P., Transnational Law (Yale University Press, 1956); Koh H.H., ‘Transnational Legal Process’ (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review, pp. 181–207; Shaffer G., ‘Transnational Legal Process and State Change’ (2012) 37 Law & Social Inquiry, pp. 229–64; Shaffer G. & Bodansky D., ‘Transnationalism, Unilateralism and International Law’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 31–41; Hale T. & Held D. (eds), Handbook of Transnational Governance: Institutions and Innovations (Polity Press, 2011); Dannenmaier E., ‘Constructing Transnational Climate Regimes’, in Handl G., Zekoll J. & Zumbansen P. (eds), Beyond Territoriality: Transnational Legal Authority in an Age of Globalization (Martinus Nijhoff, 2012), pp. 519–50; Zumbansen P., ‘Transnational Legal Pluralism’ (2010) 10(2) Transnational Legal Theory, pp. 141–89. See also Heyvaert V. & Etty T.F.M., ‘Introducing Transnational Environmental Law’ (2012) 1(1) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 1–11.
54 See, e.g., Risse-Kappen T. (ed), Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Nonstate Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 1995); Pattberg P., Private Institutions and Global Governance (Edward Elgar, 2007); Pattberg & Stripple, n. 32 above, at p. 367 n. 3; Andonova, Betsill & Bulkeley, n. 32 above; B. Eberlein et al., ‘Transnational Business Governance Interactions: Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis’ (2013 forthcoming) Regulation & Governance; Bulkeley H. et al. ., ‘Governing Climate Change Transnationally: Assessing the Evidence from a Database of Sixty Initiatives’ (2012) 30(4) Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy, pp. 591–612; Abbott, n. 21 above.
64 Another valuable ally would be a transgovernmental network on climate. A transgovernmental network is an association of government agencies, e.g., environment ministries; it is not formed by or made up of states as such: see Slaughter A.-M., A New World Order (Princeton University Press, 2005). Transgovernmental networks share information, coordinate rule-making and other domestic activities, and support weaker member agencies. They are important centres of governance in many areas. Unfortunately, national and supranational environment agencies have not created strong transgovernmental relationships on climate policy.
65 Abbott K.W. & Snidal D., ‘Why States Act Through Formal International Organizations’ (1998) 42(1) Journal of Conflict Resolution, pp. 3–32.
66 Biermann F. & Siebenhüner B. (eds), Managers of Global Change: The Influence of International Environmental Bureaucracies (The MIT Press, 2009).
73 C. van der Lugt & K. Dingwerth, ‘Governing Where Focality Is Low: UNEP and the Principles for Responsible Investment’, in Abbott, Genschel, Snidal & Zangl, n. 23 above.
74 UNFCCC, n. 15 above, Art. 8.
75 See http://unfccc.int/secretariat/partneships/items/6621.php. It has also joined the Global Compact as co-convenor of Caring for Climate, discussed below at Section 5.1.
76 Mattli W. & Woods N. (eds), The Politics of Global Regulation (Princeton University Press, 2009).
77 The Momentum for Change programme adopts similar goals: see http://unfccc.int/secretariat/momentum_for_change/items/6214.php.
78 Mattli & Woods, n. 76 above, at pp. 22–6.
79 Bulkeley H. (ed), ‘Between Public and Private? Governing Global Environmental Issues Transnationally’ (2012) 30(4) Government and Policy: Environment and Planning C, pp. 556–674.
80 Bulkeley et al., n. 54 above. See also Etty T.F.M., Heyvaert V., Carlarne C., Farber D., Lin J. & Scott J., ‘Transnational Dimensions of Climate Governance’ (2012) 1(2) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 235–43.
81 Abbott, n. 21 above.
82 Hoffmann M.J., Climate Governance at the Crossroads (Oxford University Press, 2011).
83 Hale & Roger, n. 28 above.
84 Green, n. 33 above.
87 K.W. Abbott & D. Snidal, ‘The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State’, in Mattli & Woods, n. 76 above, pp. 44–88. Some sub-state government associations, such as the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), promulgate binding rules, but most do not.
91 Bernstein, Betsill, Hoffman & Paterson, n. 34 above; Boyd W. & Salzman J., ‘The Curious Case of Greening in Carbon Markets’ (2011) 41 Environmental Law, pp. 73–94; M. Peters-Stanley & K.E. Hamilton , ‘Developing Dimension: State of the Voluntary Carbon Market 2012’, May 2012, available at: http://www.forest-trends.org/publication_details.php?publicationID=3164.
92 Green J.F., ‘Private Standards in the Climate Regime: The Greenhouse Gas Protocol’ (2010) 12(3) Business and Politics, Article 3.
106 Galaz V., Crona B., Österblom H., Olsson P. & Folke C., ‘Polycentric Systems and Interacting Planetary Boundaries – Emerging Governance of Climate Change – Ocean Acidification – Marine Biodiversity’ (2011) 81 Ecological Economics, pp. 21–32.
110 Galaz, Crona, Österblom, Olsson & Folke, n. 106 above, at p. 23.
111 Bartley T., ‘Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions’ (2007) 113(2) American Journal of Sociology, pp. 297–351; Dingwerth K. & Pattberg P., ‘World Politics and Organizational Fields: The Case of Transnational Sustainability Governance’ (2009) 15(4) European Journal of International Relations, pp. 707–44.
112 Abbott, n. 21 above.
113 K.W. Abbott, J.F. Green & R.O. Keohane, ‘Organizational Ecology and Organizational Strategies in World Politics’, 9 July 2013, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293678.
114 Green, n. 33 above.
115 GRI, ‘How do GRI and the Carbon Disclosure Project Align in 2011?’, 5 July 2011, available at: https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Pages/How-do-GRI-and-the-Carbon-Disclosure-Project-align-in-2011.aspx.
116 Abbott K.W. & Snidal D., ‘International Regulation without International Government: Improving International Organization Performance through Orchestration’ (2010) 5 Review of International Organizations, pp. 315–44.
117 Abbott & Snidal, n. 26 above; Keohane & Victor, n. 37 above.
118 Hooghe L. & Marks G., ‘Unraveling the Central State, But How? Types of Multi-Level Governance’ (2003) 97(2) American Political Science Review, pp. 233–43; Peel, Godden & Keenan, n. 40 above.
119 Hooghe & Marks, ibid., at pp. 236–9.
121 ‘REDD’ refers to projects for ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation’. ‘REDD+’ projects also address sustainable forest management. See: http://www.unep.org/climatechange/reddplus/Introduction/tabid/29525/Default.aspx. Transnational organizations such as the CCBA have developed specific standards for national programmes and projects: see, e.g., http://www.redd-standards.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=91&Itemid=136.
122 Börzel T. & Risse T., ‘Governance Without a State: Can It Work?’ (2010) 4(2) Regulation & Governance, pp. 113–34; Büthe T., ‘Private Regulation in the Global Economy: A (P)review’ (2010) 12(3) Business and Politics, Article 2.
123 Abbott, n. 24 above.
124 L.B. Andonova & M. Levy, ‘Franchising Global Governance: Making Sense of the Johannesburg Type II Partnerships’, in O.S. Stokke & O.B. Thommessen (eds), Yearbook of International Cooperation on Environment and Development (Earthscan, 2003), pp. 19–31. The UN maintains a registry of partnerships, available at: http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/index.php?menu=1500.
127 Green, n. 92 above, at p. 14.
128 VCS, ‘Groundbreaking Jurisdictional REDD+ Requirements Released’, 4 Oct. 2012, available at: http://v-c-s.org/news-events/news/groundbreaking-jurisdictional-redd-requirements-released.
129 J.F. Green & G. Auld, ‘Unbundling the Regime Complex: The Effects of Private Authority’, Working Paper, 24 July 2012, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2116296.
136 M. Peters-Stanley & D. Yin, ‘Maneuvering the Mosaic: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2013’, Forest Trends, June 2013, available at: http://www.forest-trends.org/publication_details.php?publicationID53898.
138 Peters-Stanley & Yin, n. 136 above, at p. 35.
143 World Bank, ‘State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012’, 30 May 2012, available at: http://tiny.cc/carbonmarket2012. New carbon trading programmes in, e.g., California and Australia, should increase demand for compliance credits.
144 Offsets covering 101 million CO2 equivalent tons were contracted in 2012, increasing 4% year-over-year; total market value declined by 11% to $523 million: Peters-Stanley & Yin, n. 136 above.
146 http://www.carbonfix.info/Project.html?PHPSESSID=4g0kp5isbpd4d9i0ufl4vij957. Carbon Fix was acquired by the Gold Standard in 2012.
148 Büthe T., ‘Global Private Politics: A Research Agenda’ (2010) 12(3) Business and Politics, Article 12; Green, n. 92 above.
149 NGOs and other norm entrepreneurs frequently perform these tasks.
150 Büthe, n. 148 above; Büthe, n. 122 above. Some observers see labelling programmes as inappropriately extending market structures: e.g., Fuchs D. & Kalfaggiani A., ‘The Causes and Consequences of Private Food Governance’ (2010) 12 Business and Politics, Article 5.
151 Abbott, n. 21 above.
152 Abbott & Snidal, n. 87 above.
153 See, e.g., Gulbrandsen L.H., Transnational Environmental Governance: The Emergence and Effects of the Certification of Forests and Fisheries (Edward Elgar, 2010), pp. 127–8 (Norwegian resistance to the Marine Stewardship Council).
154 For recent examples from China, see S. Chan, ‘Partnerships for Sustainable Development: Global Diffusion and Local Adaptation’, Institute for Environmental Studies, Newsletter No. 2, June 2013, available at: http://www.ivm.vu.nl/en/news-and-agenda/IVM-Newsletter/latest-issue-newsletter/Environmental-Policy-Analysis/index.asp.
155 Galaz, Crona, Österblom, Olsson & Folke, n. 106 above.
156 Abbott & Snidal, n. 87 above.
157 Most of the transnational organizations identified in Bulkeley et al. (n. 54 above) and in Hoffman (n. 82 above) were created since 2001–02. Most voluntary carbon market organizations were established even more recently: Green, n. 92 above.
158 Hoffman, n. 82 above.
159 Abbott & Snidal, n. 87 above.
160 Overdevest C., ‘Comparing Forest Certification Schemes: The Case of Ratcheting Standards in the Forest Sector’ (2010) 8(1) Socio-Economic Review, pp. 47–76.
161 Keck & Sikkink, n. 25 above, at p.16.
162 Ibid., at pp. 12–3, 14–6.
163 Abbott, n. 24 above; Abbott & Snidal, n. 116 above.
164 Most private climate standards recognize or hew closely to public rules, to enhance legitimacy and minimize switching costs for adherents.
165 Ostrom, n. 35 above; Ostrom E., ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems’ (2010) 100(3) American Economic Review, pp. 641–72.
166 Galaz, Crona, Österblom, Olsson & Folke, n. 106 above.
167 This helps to explain why international and transnational climate institutions are so numerous and diverse: Keohane & Victor, n. 37 above.
168 Sunstein C.R., ‘Social Norms and Social Roles’ (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review, pp. 903–68; Finnemore M. & Sikkink K., ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52(4) International Organization, pp. 887–917.
169 Roberts N.C. & King P.J., ‘Policy Entrepreneurs: Their Activity Structure and Function in the Policy Process’ (1991) 1(2) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, pp. 147–75.
170 Galaz, Crona, Österblom, Olsson & Folke, n. 106 above.
172 For example, the Gold Standard acquired the standards organization CarbonFix in 2012.
174 A. Loconto & E. Fouilleux, ‘Politics of Private Regulation: ISEAL and the Shaping of Transnational Sustainability Governance’ (2013 forthcoming) Regulation & Governance.
175 Abbott & Snidal, n. 116 above.
176 Ibid.; Abbott, n. 21 above; Abbott & Snidal, n. 26 above; cf. Abbott, Genschel, Snidal & Zangl, n. 23 above.
177 Orchestration theory hypothesizes that successful orchestrators are ‘focal’, with an accepted leadership position in an issue area (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal & Zangl, n. 23 above) and strong connections with other institutions (Hale & Roger, n. 28 above).
178 In orchestration theory, orchestrators engage intermediaries to influence the behaviour of target actors: Abbott, Genschel, Snidal & Zangl, n. 23 above. Here I de-emphasize targets and focus on the role of orchestrators in supporting and coordinating other organizations, many of which will operate as intermediaries.
179 On ‘enrolling’, see Latour B., ‘The Powers of Association’, in Law J. (ed), Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge? (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), pp. 264–80; Braithwaite J. & Drahos P., Global Business Regulation (Cambridge University Press, 2000); Black J., ‘Enrolling Actors in Regulatory Systems: Examples from UK Financial Services Regulation’ (2003 Spring) Public Law, pp. 63–91.
180 Stewart, Oppenheimer & Rudyk, ‘Reaching International Cooperation’, n. 42 above.
181 Barnett M. & Finnemore M., Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics (Cornell University Press, 2004).
182 Falkner R., ‘Private Environmental Governance and International Relations: Exploring the Links’ (2003) 3(2) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 72–87; Levy D. & Newell P., ‘Business Strategy and International Environmental Governance: Toward a Neo-Gramscian Synthesis’ (2002) 2(4) Global Environmental Politics, pp. 84–100.
183 Biermann & Siebenhüner, n. 66 above.
184 Haas P., ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’ (1992) 46(1) International Organization, pp. 1–35.
185 Keck & Sikkink, n. 25 above; Risse T., Ropp S.C. & Sikkink K., The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
186 Securities and Exchange Commission, ‘Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change’ (2010) 75(25) Federal Register, at p. 6290.
187 GEO-5 for Business: Impacts of a Changing Environment on the Corporate Sector (UNEP, 2013), available at: http://www.unep.org/geo/geo5.asp.
196 Advocates can create negative incentives through mechanisms such as consumer boycotts.
197 Mattli & Woods, n. 76 above, at pp. 35–6.
198 A few have become more active in this area. The UN Global Compact, which has long avoided any suggestion of ‘enforcement’, now publicly identifies firms that fail to submit timely communications and those expelled for failure to disclose. In addition, its ‘differentiation programme’ encourages NGOs to assess participants’ performance, so that it can single out superior performers: see: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/COP/differentiation_programme.html.
† This contribution is part of a collection of articles from the conference ‘Global Climate Change without the United States: Thinking the Unthinkable’, held at Yale University Law School, New Haven, CT (United States (US)), 9–10 November 2012.
Thanks for valuable comments to Philipp Pattberg, Liesbet Hooghe, participants in the graduate student seminar at the Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM), VU University Amsterdam (the Netherlands), and three anonymous reviewers for the journal.
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