The 1995 Voluntas Symposium addressed the need to revisit the very economic theories that in the past two decades have contributed so much to the development of a concentrated research agenda on non-profit organisations. These theories, introduced by Burton Weisbrod, Henry Hansmann and others, continue to shape theoretical and conceptual efforts, not only in economics but also in sociological and political science approaches to the study of the non-profit sector. While the theoretical map of non-profit research has expanded beyond these early attempts and now includes several other major theories – most notably Lester Salamon's third-party government or interdependence theory – we suggest that it is time to take stock and re-examine some of the very basics from which these economic theories operate.

This article examines the trust hypothesis: the claim that asymmetric information can explain the existence of non-profit enterprise in certain markets. We argue that this hypothesis, in order to be viable, has to meet three challenges: ‘reputational ubiquity’, ‘incentive compatibility’ and ‘adulteration’. Drawing on modern agency theory, we conclude that the trust hypothesis stands on shaky ground. It can be sustained only under particular conditions that have been neither carefully described in theory nor subject to empirical assessment. The available evidence, patchy and inadequate as it is, seems to suggests that there are some ownership-related differences in aspects of organisational performance connected with asymmetric information. However, there is little evidence that this relates to trust per se or provides a rationale for the existence of non-profit ownership in these industries. We conclude with a plea for substantial research on consumer expectations and provider motivations.

Ideology and altruism are central to understanding the non-profit charitable sector. This paper addresses three questions. Why do people make charitable gifts? Why do they usually give to non-profit organisations? When can non-profits run by committed ideologues compete with profitoriented entrepreneurs in the provision of services? The altruistic motives of individuals and the ideological commitments of entrepreneurs come together to support charitable organisations. The non-profit form provides a weak guarantee that gifts are not being syphoned off as profits. Furthermore, independent non-profits can often better reflect donors’ desires than public agencies constrained by majoritarian claims, and ideological entrepreneurs can use the non-profit form to reify their beliefs without being accountable to profit-seeking investors. A non-profit organisation can only survive, however, if it can attract money and customers. Sometimes its ideological character will facilitate both tasks. Non-ideological customers may, nevertheless, patronise an ideological non-profit if the entrepreneur's commitment helps to guarantee high quality.

Burton Weisbrod's 1975 article, Toward a theory of the voluntary non-profit sector in a three-sector economy’, models non-profit organisations as suppliers of public goods which are undersupplied by government to heterogeneous populations. This article examines the implications, extensions and empirical tests of the Weisbrod theory. It also examines the theories of pure and impure altruism, the heterogeneity hypothesis, and the various ‘publicness’ indexes of non-profit output. The commonalities between the public good model and the trustworthiness model of non-profit organisations are also explored.

This article examines and organises the economic literature dealing with non-profit institutions using the concept of ‘stakeholders’. In general, the literature identifies conflicts between various groups of stakeholders and then proceeds in two very different directions. The first is supportive of the non-profit sector, suggesting that non-profit organisations resolve those conflicts more effectively than other types of institutions. This provides a positive theory of the non-profit sector, explaining that non-profit institutions evolve when they are more effective in providing a particular good or service than other possible institutional arrangements. The second direction is more critical of the non-profit sector, suggesting that those conflicts will persist in non-profit institutions and will require some kind of resolution, including perhaps government intervention. Of course, a stakeholder approach to non-profit theory focuses on conflict and ignores some other views of the sector.

This article summarises the main results of entrepreneurship theories of the non-profit sector and discusses the impact they may have on theory development and on the real world non-profit sector. It is pointed out that the entrepreneurship approach advances our knowledge of the non-profit sector, especially by stressing the supply-side aspect and by focusing on the preferences individuals must have in order to engage in non-profit activities. There is empirical evidence consistent with entrepreneurship theories. Yet most observations do not exclusively support entrepreneurship theories but also provide evidence consistent with other economic theories of the non-profit sector. This illustrates that the various economic theories of the nonprofit sector are more complements than substitutes. Furthermore, entrepreneurship theories indirectly help to improve the image nonprofit organisations have in the real world; therefore they play a prominent role in teaching programmes which have been established to train non-profit managers.

This article evaluates economic theories of the non-profit sector by their ability to enlighten our understanding of the scope of inquiry, the determinants of the size and scope of the non-profit sector, and the behavioural responses of donors, volunteers, paid staff and non-profit organisations to changes in their external environment. Adherence to a non-distribution constraint has proven to be a useful way of delimiting economic analysis of non-profit organisations, but more attention should be paid to alternatives. Economists have been less successful at developing usable distinctions between voluntary action and exchange. The size and scope of the sector appear to be determined by entrepreneurial supply factors, donations (which in turn are influenced by tax policy, governmental spending, fund-raising, and the quality and mixture of organisational outputs, commercial or charitable), commercial activities, capital supply, the supply of labour (paid and volunteered), the marketability of outputs, and the distribution of consumer characteristics. Variations of James's (1983) model have proven useful to predict the reaction of non-profits to exogenous changes.