In Scale and Scope, A.D. Chandler explores the role of management in shaping growth and competitiveness in industrialising nations. Chandler views managers as reacting to technological and economic change rather than initiating it, giving little attention to the extent to which growth of modern management and corporate capacities were tied to the emergence of parallel structures in government and society, and the important national differences in the role of public and private sectors in the process. His failure to offer a broad and encompassing paradigm of organisational growth and change produces a celebration of ‘American exceptionalism’ and corporate bigness rather than a genuinely comparative analysis.

This article argues that Alfred Chandler's analysis of the British firm cannot be transposed to the very different context of non-profit organisations in Britain. Both in relation to charitable non-profit organisations and mutual benefit organisations, Chandler's theory of the development of firms does not help explain organisational development. The main thrust of the argument is that the explanation for the smaller size of charitable non-profits in Britain than in America is largely institutional and partly socio-cultural; the explanation does not lie in any failure in Britain to adopt new techniques of management and organisation. With mutual benefit non-profits, a rather different account is presented. ‘Mutuals’ which had a strong fraternal element were relatively more successful in Britain than in America, although there is less difference between the two countries with regard to ‘non-fraternal’ mutuals. Once again, it is argued that institutional and socio-cultural factors — rather than the factors identified by Chandler — account for this.

The purpose of writing Scale and Scope was to examine, within the historical context of national and international economies, the similarities and differences in the evolution of large-scale for-profit industrial enterprises in the three leading industrial nations, namely the United States, Great Britain and Germany. The study covers three-quarters of a century, from the time of the Second Industrial Revolution of the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which was driven by new capital-using and scale-dependent technologies, until the coming of World War II, when the direct and drastic impact of those technologies became relatively stabilised and the micro- and macro-economic environment critically altered. During these years, and still today, the capital-intensive industries have played a central role in driving technological advance for the growth of global as well as national economies, and these industries have been dominated by managerial enterprises.

This article explores how the Rockefeller Foundation's hookworm campaigns, sponsorship of local sanitary units and involvement in public health education in Mexico shaped the conceptualisation and practice of public health during the decades following the Mexican Revolution. A 1923 hookworm agreement set the terms of the relationship, minimising the Foundation's financial commitment while maximising its administrative control. In establishing rural health units, the Foundation adapted to local conditions without compromising scientific public health by ingeniously incorporating midwives while shunning other traditional healers. When President Lázaro Cárdenas's socialist politics threatened the Rockefeller model of public health in the 1930s, delicate tactics enabled the Foundation to overcome these challenges. For the Mexican government, the overriding goals of modernisation and progress required an acceptance of Rockefeller pressure and scientific expertise. The special status granted the Rockefeller Foundation, its political, administrative, educational and financial strategies, and its institutional flexibility enabled it to influence profoundly the development of the Mexican public health system.

There are two opposing views on the role of private foundations, especially the corporate foundations. Korean people seem to think that corporate foundations have been used as a device to transfer the wealth of rich families with favourable tax treatment. Considering the current status and past performance of corporate foundations, the evidence seems to lend support to this negative view at the moment. The corporate foundations have performed within a very limited range of activities and have not made many efforts to develop non-profit activities to meet the expectations of Korean society. The negative view does not imply that corporate foundations have not contributed to Korean society. But the negative view can be regarded as a criticism of the past performance of corporate foundations and the way they have been managed.

This paper reports on research into mergers in the voluntary sector in the UK from 1988 to 1993. It compares empirically derived critical success factors with success factors derived from previous work on mergers in both the voluntary and private sectors. The study concludes that merger can be an extremely effective strategy for voluntary organisations. For it to be so, it has to be undertaken willingly, with a shared vision between the partners of what the merger will achieve. Cultural differences need to be recognised and handled within a trusting context in which mutual respect is backed by an equitable process. Finally, sensitive handling of individuals caught up in the merger process is essential — but something which the voluntary sector ought to be well capable of doing.