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³ Mearsheimer, John, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19 (Winter 1994–95)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁶ Evans, Gareth, “Cooperative Security and Instrastate Conflict,” Foreign Policy 96 (Fall 1994)Google Scholar. See also the related volume, Kevin Clements and Ward, Robin, Building International Community: Cooper-atingfor Peace Case Studies (St. Leonards and Canberra: Allen and Unwin and Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, 1994)Google Scholar; and the interesting collection of responses to Cooperatingfor Peace in Lawson, Stephanie, ed., The New Agendafor Global Security: Cooperating for Peace and Beyond (Canberra: Allen and Unwin, 1996)Google Scholar.

⁷ Stephanie Lawson, “Introduction: Activating the Agenda,” in Lawson (fn. 6), 7—8.

⁸ World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987)Google ScholarPubMed; Commission, South, The Challenge to the South (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)Google Scholar.

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¹¹ It is impossible to determine whether these proposals led directly to these and other reforms; after all, the proposals built on both already existing “lessons learned” in recent peacekeeping operations and the recommendations of other documents and commissions. At the least these commissions lent greater credibility to these and other proposals.

¹² Those scholars whose work is informed by a Gramscian approach also situate the UN system within a global, though largely economic, context and focus on its role as an agent of liberal change. See Murphy, Craig, International Organizations and Industrial Change (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995)Google Scholar; and Cox, Robert, “The Crisis of World Order and the Problem of International Organizations,” International Journal 35, no. 2 (1980)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹³ Zacher, Mark and Matthews, Richard, “Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands,” in Kegley, C., ed., Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neo-Liberal Challenge (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), 110Google Scholar.

¹⁴ I derive these tenets from Keohane, Robert, “International Liberalism Reconsidered,” in Dunn, John, ed., The Economic Limits to Modern Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990)Google Scholar; Andrew Moravcsik, “Liberalism and International Relations Theory,” Center for International Affairs, Working Paper Series, no. 92–6 (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1993); Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Structural Liberalism: The Nature and Sources of Western Political Order” (Manuscript, 1995); Zacher and Matthews (fn. 13); and Michael Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” in Kegley (fn. 13).

¹⁵ Zacher and Matthews (fn. 13), 110.

¹⁶ See also Rosenau, James, The UnitedNations in a Turbulent World (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992)Google Scholar.

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¹⁸ This raises a potentially interesting, though generally unexplored, question: what role did the UN play in helping to manage the end of the cold war? As international relations theorists isolate various explanations, they tend to focus on the Soviet Union's “new thinking” and the emerging belief that the U.S. would not take advantage of its international retreat and domestic reforms. Was the easy fall of the Soviet Union facilitated by the existence of the UN? The U.S. and the Soviet Union worked jointly and multilaterally to end various regional conflicts, and they did so under the auspices of the UN. It is conceivable that by working through the UN, the Soviets (1) could rest assured that there was a forum that guaranteed them superpower status and decision-making power despite their declining stature (and perhaps caused the U.S. to give it more due than otherwise might have been the case, for example, in the negotiations preceding the Persian Gulf War in January 1991); and (2) learned through doing that the U.S. would not try to settle these and other conflicts in a manner immediately disadvantageous to the Soviets. As Roberts and Kingsbury note, Soviet premier Gorbachev increasingly and simultaneously stressed the necessity of a framework of international cooperation and the importance of the UN. See Roberts, and Kingsbury, , “The UN's Roles in International Society,” in Roberts, A. and Kingsbury, B., eds., United Nations, Divided World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 46–47Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, “Global Leadership after the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs 75 (March-April 1996)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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²¹ Hume, Cameron, Ending Mozambique's War (Washington, D.C.: USIP Press, 1994)Google Scholar; The United Nations and Nuclear Non-Proliferation, United Nations Book Series, vol. 3 (New York: Department of Public Information, 1995).

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²³ See also Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, “An Agenda for Peace: One Year Later,” Orbis 37 (Summer 1993), 329CrossRefGoogle Scholar; idem, “Democracy: A Newly Recognized Imperative,” Global Governance 1 (Winter 1995), 3–12Google Scholar; and the recently published Agendafor Democratization (New York: UN Publications, 1996).

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²⁸ Jacobsen (fn. 17), 47; and Henkin, Louis, “The United Nations and Human Rights,” International Organization 19 (Summer 1965), 512CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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³⁰ This is not the first time that an international organization has argued that domestic politics matters for international order and is a legitimate concern of the international community. The League of Nations, too, through its mandate policies and various commissions on minority rights and plebiscites in Europe, made the case that there was an important relationship between domestic and international order. See Jones, Dorothy, Code ofPeace (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991)Google Scholar. As reflected by the League of Nations mandate system, at issue was whether or not the recognized state could maintain some semblance of order—that domestic order and the capacity to govern should be used as criteria for independence and recognition.

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³⁴ Claude (fn. 32).

³⁵ Javier Perez de Cuellar, “The United Nations and the United States” (Address at the fiftieth anniversary celebration, Dartmouth College, May 10,1988). Cited from Franck (fn. 5), 9.

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⁴³ These principles of state action are “sovereign equality of states; territorial integrity and political independence of states; equal rights and self-determination of peoples; nonintervention in internal affairs of states; peaceful settlement of disputes between states; no threat or use of force; fulfillment in good faith of international obligations; cooperation with other states; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.” See Jones, “The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law,” in Nardin, T. and Marpel, D., eds., Traditions ofInternationalEthics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 44–45Google Scholar.

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⁴⁸ See also Abraham Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization (Spring 1993).

⁴⁹ Roberts and Kingsbury (fn. 18), 57.

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⁵⁵ Boutros-Ghali (fn. 19).

⁵⁶ Robert Cox, John Ruggie, and Tom Biersteker have examined various features of how a liberal political order was established and to whose advantage it operates. Cox, See, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)Google Scholar; Ruggie (fn. 46); and Biersteker, “The Triumph of Neoclassical Economics in the Developing World,” in J. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Cziempel, eds., Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). See also Beetham (fn. 50), chap. 4.

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